Third party assessments in trust problems with conflict of interest: An experiment on the effects of promises

Mitesh Kataria () and Fabian Winter

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 1, 53-56

Abstract: Is it possible to elicit reliable assessment from an assessor having a conflict of interest (e.g. a professor that writes a recommendation letter for a formal PhD student)? We propose an experimental test and show that compared to a not-incentivized assessment, a promise to give a truthful assessment reduces misreporting to the same extent as an incentivized assessment (i.e. when the assessor gains higher payoff if the assessment is correct).

Keywords: Trust game; Communication; Cheap-talk; Promises; Oath (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C91 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: Third Party Assessments in Trust Problems with Conflict of Interest: An Experiment on the Effects of Promises (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:1:p:53-56

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.028

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