Third Party Assessments in Trust Problems with Conflict of Interest: An Experiment on the Effects of Promises

Mitesh Kataria () and Fabian Winter

No 2012-067, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Is it possible to elicit reliable assessment from an assessor with conflict of interest (e.g. a professor that writes a recommendation letter for a formal PhD student)? We propose an experimental test and show that compared to a not-incentivized assessment, a promise to give a truthful assessment reduces misreporting to the same extent as incentivized assessment (i.e. when assessor gain higher payoff if assessment is correct).

Keywords: trust game; communication; cheap-talk; promises; oath (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C91 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-12-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Third party assessments in trust problems with conflict of interest: An experiment on the effects of promises (2013)
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