The role of information in contests

Pradeep Dubey

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 2, 160-163

Abstract: Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his/her own ability, but may or may not know those of his/her rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more effort and output are engendered under incomplete information, whereas, if the value is low, that distinction goes to complete information.

Keywords: Contests; Prizes; Information; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C79 D44 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517651300181X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: On the Role of Information in Contests (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:160-163

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.010

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().