On the Role of Information in Contests

Pradeep Dubey

No 12-11, Department of Economics Working Papers from Stony Brook University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his own ability, but may or may not know those of his rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more e¤ort and output are engendered under incomplete information; whereas, if the value is low, that distinction goes to complete information. We also examine strategic behavior of a "contest manager" who is privy to information about the abilities of all the players. It turns out that, in order to inspire performance, it is often better for him neither to reveal all nor to conceal all, but to follow a middle path of partial revelation.

JEL-codes: C70 C72 C79 D44 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/economics/research/papers/2012/contests.pdf First version, 2012 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The role of information in contests (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nys:sunysb:12-11

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