When higher prizes lead to lower efforts—The impact of favoritism in tournaments

Claus Herbertz and Dirk Sliwka

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 2, 188-191

Abstract: We investigate the relationship between tournament prices and effort choices in the presence of favoritism. High tournament prizes can decrease agents’ effort supply when the choice of the winner is not perfectly objective but affected to some extent by personal preferences of an evaluator.

Keywords: Incentives; Favoritism; Nepotism; Tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 J71 M51 M52 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:188-191

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.015

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