Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests

Magnus Hoffmann and Martin Kolmar

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 2, 276-279

Abstract: We analyze equilibria of two-player contests where players have intention-based preferences. We find that players invest more effort compared to the case with selfish preferences and are even willing to exert effort when the monetary value of the prize converges to zero. As a consequence, overdissipation occurs if the value of the prize is sufficiently small.

Keywords: Contests; Intention-based fairness preferences; Overdissipation; Overspending; Joy of winning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Intention-Based Fairness Preferences in Two-Player Contests (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:276-279

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.038

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