Intention-Based Fairness Preferences in Two-Player Contests

Magnus Hoffmann and Martin Kolmar

No 4104, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We analyze equilibria of two-player contests where players have intention-based preferences. We find that players invest more effort compared to the case with selfish preferences and are even willing to exert effort when the monetary value of the prize converges to zero. As a consequence, overdissipation occurs if the value of the prize is sufficiently small.

Keywords: contests; intention-based fairness preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests (2013)
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