Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences

Gianandrea Staffiero, Filippos Exadaktylos () and Antonio Espín

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 121, issue 2, 236-238

Abstract: We show that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer to zero in an ultimatum game are the most generous players in a dictator game. This finding challenges the interpretation of the acceptance of low offers as payoff-maximizing behavior.

Keywords: Ultimatum game; Dictator game; Altruism; Selfishness; Other-regarding preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 C93 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Accepting Zero in the Ultimatum Game Does Not Reflect Selfish Preferences (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:2:p:236-238

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.021

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