Asymmetric information may protect the commons: The welfare benefits of uninformed regulators

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 121, issue 3, 463-467

Abstract: We examine an entry-deterrence model in the commons. We investigate in which contexts asymmetric information among firms becomes welfare improving, and in which settings an uninformed regulator may prefer to assess and disseminate information about the available stock among firms.

Keywords: Entry deterrence; Signaling; Commons; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D82 L12 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Asymmetric Information may Protect the Commons: The Welfare Benefits of Uniformed Regulators
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:3:p:463-467

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.09.032

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