Asymmetric Information may Protect the Commons: The Welfare Benefits of Uniformed Regulators
Ana Espinola-Arredondo () and
Felix Munoz-Garcia ()
No 2013-8, Working Papers from School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University
We examine an entry-deterrence model in the commons. We investigate in which contexts the presence of asymmetric information among the fi?rms exploiting the commons becomes welfare improving, relative to complete information, and in which settings an uninformed regulator might have incentives to assess and disseminate the available stock among potential entrants.
Keywords: Cost asymmetries; Entry Deterrence; Signaling; Commons; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D82 L12 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
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http://faculty.ses.wsu.edu/WorkingPapers/Munoz/WP2013-8.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Asymmetric information may protect the commons: The welfare benefits of uninformed regulators (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-14
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