 Decision time and steps of reasoning in a competitive market entry gameEconomics Letters, 2014, vol. 122, issue 1, 7-11 Abstract: Entry decisions in market entry games usually depend on the belief about how many others are entering the market, the belief about the own rank in a real effort task, and subjects’ risk preferences. In this paper I am able to replicate these basic results and examine two further dimensions: (i) the level of strategic sophistication, which has a positive impact on entry decisions, and (ii) the impact of time pressure, which has a (partly) negative influence on entry rates. Furthermore, when ranks are determined using a real effort task, differences in entry rates are explainable by higher competitiveness of males. Additionally, I show that individual characteristics are more important for the entry decision in more competitive environments. Keywords: Market entry game; Time pressure; Level-k reasoning; Risk; Competitiveness; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:122:y:2014:i:1:p:7-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.019 Access Statistics for this article Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier |
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