Decision time and steps of reasoning in a competitive market entry game

Florian Lindner ()

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: Entry decisions in market entry games usually depend on the belief about how many others are entering the market, the belief about the own rank in a real effort task, and subjects’ risk preferences. In this paper I am able to replicate these basic results and examine two further dimensions: (i) the level of strategic sophistication, which has a positive impact on entry decisions, and (ii) the impact of time pressure, which has a (partly) negative influence on entry rates. Furthermore, when ranks are determined using a real effort task, differences in entry rates are explainable by higher competitiveness of males. Additionally, I show that individual characteristics are more important for the entry decision in more competitive environments.

Date: 2013
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Published in Economics Letters 1 122(2013): pp. 7-11

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Related works:
Journal Article: Decision time and steps of reasoning in a competitive market entry game (2014)
Working Paper: Decision time and steps of reasoning in a competitive market entry game (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:19236

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