A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller

Natalia Lazzati and Matthew Van Essen

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 122, issue 3, 396-399

Abstract: This paper describes a nearly optimal auction mechanism that does not require previous knowledge of the distribution of values of potential buyers. The mechanism we propose builds on the new literature on the elicitation of information from experts. We extend the latter to the case where the secret information shared by the experts–potential buyers in our model–can be used against them if it becomes public knowledge.

Keywords: Optimal auction; Probability elicitation; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:122:y:2014:i:3:p:396-399

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.028

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