Details about Matthew James Van Essen

Access statistics for papers by Matthew James Van Essen.

Last updated 2025-01-07. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pva554

Working Papers

2024

1. Equity Equilibrium for Cooperative Games
   Working Papers, University of Tennessee, Department of Economics

2018

2. Allocating Positions Fairly: An Auction and its Relationship to the Shapley Value
   Working Papers, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science
3. Dual Auctions for Assigning Winners and Compensating Losers
   Working Papers, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science View citations (2)
   See also Journal Article Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers, Economic Theory, Springer (2023) (2023)

2016

4. Dissolving a Partnership Dynamically
   Working Paper Series, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney View citations (4)
   See also Journal Article Dissolving a partnership dynamically, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2016) View citations (3) (2016)
5. King of the Hill: Giving Backward Induction its Best Shot
   CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article King of the Hill: Giving backward induction its best shot, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2018) View citations (9) (2018)

2014

6. A Simple Bargaining Model where Parties Make Errors
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (2)

2013

7. Blind Stealing: Experience and Expertise in a Mixed-Strategy Poker Experiment
   Working Paper Series, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney View citations (4)
   See also Journal Article Blind stealing: Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2015) View citations (10) (2015)

2008

8. A Simple Supermodular Mechanism that Implements Lindahl Allocations
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (5)

Journal Articles

2023

1. Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers
   Economic Theory, 2023, 76, (4), 1069-1114
   See also Working Paper Dual Auctions for Assigning Winners and Compensating Losers, Working Papers (2018) View citations (2) (2018)

2022

2. Breaking-up should not be hard to do! Designing contracts to avoid wars of attrition
   European Economic Review, 2022, 143, (C) View citations (1)

2021

3. Allocating positions fairly: Auctions and Shapley value
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, 196, (C) View citations (2)

2020

4. Dissolving a partnership securely
   Economic Theory, 2020, 69, (2), 415-434 View citations (1)

2019

5. Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model
   Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019, 102, (C), 15-23

2018

6. King of the Hill: Giving backward induction its best shot
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, 112, (C), 125-138 View citations (9)
   See also Working Paper King of the Hill: Giving Backward Induction its Best Shot, CESifo Working Paper Series (2016) View citations (1) (2016)

2017

7. A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 101, (C), 6-19 View citations (9)

2016

8. Dissolving a partnership dynamically
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, 166, (C), 212-241 View citations (3)
   See also Working Paper Dissolving a Partnership Dynamically, Working Paper Series (2016) View citations (4) (2016)

2015

9. Bartering Games in the Kolm Triangle
   Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2015, 17, (3), 297-310 View citations (2)
10. Blind stealing: Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, 91, (C), 186-206 View citations (10)
    See also Working Paper Blind Stealing: Experience and Expertise in a Mixed-Strategy Poker Experiment, Working Paper Series (2013) View citations (4) (2013)

2014

11. A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, 43, (2), 309-327
12. A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller
    Economics Letters, 2014, 122, (3), 396-399

2013

13. An Equilibrium Analysis of Knaster’s Fair Division Procedure
    Games, 2013, 4, (1), 1-17 View citations (1)
14. HOLD-UP: WITH A VENGEANCE
    Economic Inquiry, 2013, 51, (1), 896-908 View citations (36)
15. Making efficient public good decisions using an augmented Ausubel auction
    Economic Theory Bulletin, 2013, 1, (1), 57-68
16. Regulating the Anticommons: Insights from Public‐Expenditure Theory
    Southern Economic Journal, 2013, 80, (2), 523-539
17. Tacit Collusion in Price‐Setting Oligopoly: A Puzzle Redux
    Southern Economic Journal, 2013, 79, (3), 703-726

2012

18. A note on the stability of Chen’s Lindahl mechanism
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, 38, (2), 365-370 View citations (3)
19. Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms
    Review of Economic Design, 2012, 16, (1), 15-40 View citations (5)
20. Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: Experimental evidence
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 74, (1), 366-381 View citations (12)