A Simple Supermodular Mechanism that Implements Lindahl Allocations

Matthew Van Essen

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper introduces a new incentive compatible mechanism which for general preference environments implements Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibria. The mechanism does not increase in structural complexity as consumers are added to the economy, the minimum dimension of data needed to compute payoffs is smaller than other mechanisms with comparable properties; and for quasi-linear environments, the mechanism induces a supermodular game for appropriate choices of the mechanism parameters. Thus, this new Lindahl mechanism provides a connection between the desirable welfare properties of Lindahl allocations and the desirable theoretical/ convergence properties of supermodular games.

Keywords: Lindahl Equilibrium; Nash Implementation; Supermodular Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D02 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15277/1/MPRA_paper_15277.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15278/1/MPRA_paper_15278.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:12781

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