Blind stealing: Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment

Matthew Van Essen and John Wooders

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 91, issue C, 186-206

Abstract: We explore the role of experience in mixed-strategy games by comparing, for a stylized version of Texas Hold-em, the behavior of experts, who have extensive experience playing poker online, to the behavior of novices. We find significant differences. The initial frequencies with which players bet and call are closer to equilibrium for experts than novices. And, while the betting and calling frequencies of both types of subjects exhibit too much heterogeneity to be consistent with equilibrium play, the frequencies of experts exhibit less heterogeneity. We find evidence that the style of online play transfers from the field to the lab.

Keywords: Expertise; Mixed strategy; Minimax; Laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Blind Stealing: Experience and Expertise in a Mixed-Strategy Poker Experiment (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:186-206

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.014

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