Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2019

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Volume 114, issue C, 2019

The problem of multiple commons: A market design approach pp. 1-27

Ryan Tierney

Coalition preclusion contracts and moderate policies pp. 28-46

Hans Gersbach, Maik T. Schneider and Oriol Tejada

A variational inequality framework for network games: Existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis pp. 47-82

Francesca Parise and Asuman Ozdaglar

Bargaining with private information and the option of a compulsory license pp. 83-100

Eric W. Bond and Larry Samuelson

Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings pp. 101-117

Emiliano Catonini

The evolution of collaboration in symmetric 2×2-games with imperfect recognition of types pp. 118-127

Hannes Rusch

Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: A strategy method approach pp. 128-145

Timothy Cason and Vai-Lam Mui

Political rents and voter information in search equilibrium pp. 146-168

Jørgen Andersen and Tom-Reiel Heggedal

Endogenous institutional selection, building trust, and economic growth pp. 169-176

Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.

Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game pp. 177-192

Pérez-Castrillo, David and Marilda Sotomayor

Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining pp. 193-214

Andrea Isoni, Anders Poulsen, Robert Sugden and Kei Tsutsui

Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies pp. 232-252

Daniel E. Fragiadakis and Peter Troyan

An experiment on the efficiency of bilateral exchange under incomplete markets pp. 253-267

Olga A. Rud, Jean Paul Rabanal and Manizha Sharifova

The market for talent: Competition for resources and self-governance in teams pp. 268-284

Abhijit Ramalingam, Brock V. Stoddard and James M. Walker

Recursive non-expected utility: Connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity pp. 285-307

Özgür Evren

Welfare maximization entices participation pp. 308-314

Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt and Johannes Hofbauer

A note on “Renegotiation in repeated games” [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327–360] pp. 318-323

Michael Günther, Christoph Kuzmics and Antoine Salomon

Volume 113, issue C, 2019

A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions pp. 4-16

Berthold Vöcking

Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design pp. 17-37

Konstantinos Georgiou and Chaitanya Swamy

Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition) pp. 38-57

Amos Fiat, Elias Koutsoupias, Katrina Ligett, Yishay Mansour and Svetlana Olonetsky

Competitive contagion in networks pp. 58-79

Sanjeev Goyal, Hoda Heidari and Michael Kearns

Optimal crowdsourcing contests pp. 80-96

Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline and Balasubramanian Sivan

Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design pp. 97-115

Robert Kleinberg and S. Matthew Weinberg

Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions pp. 116-136

Francesc Dilmé

Promises, expectations & causation pp. 137-146

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa and Francesco Passarelli

Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment pp. 147-163

Flip Klijn, Joana Pais and Marc Vorsatz

On equilibria in games with imperfect recall pp. 164-185

Nicolas S. Lambert, Adrian Marple and Yoav Shoham

Hodge decomposition and the Shapley value of a cooperative game pp. 186-198

Ari Stern and Alexander Tettenhorst

Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets pp. 199-208

Bertan Turhan

Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders pp. 209-222

Indranil Chakraborty

Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli pp. 223-247

Yuval Heller and Erik Mohlin

Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions pp. 248-261

Martínez- de-Albéniz, F. Javier, Carlos Rafels and Neus Ybern

Regime change in large information networks pp. 262-284

Joan de Martí and Pau Milán

Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations pp. 285-305

Matías Núñez and Marcus Pivato

Manipulated news model: Electoral competition and mass media pp. 306-338

Shintaro Miura

Polyequilibrium pp. 339-355

Igal Milchtaich

Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response pp. 356-380

Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim

Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: When are evolutionary models reliable? pp. 381-395

Daniel Stephenson

The instability of matching with overconfident agents pp. 396-415

Siqi Pan

Credit auctions and bid caps pp. 416-422

David Lagziel

Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions pp. 423-447

Yves Breitmoser

Gossip and the efficiency of interactions pp. 448-460

Dietmar Fehr and Matthias Sutter

The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting pp. 461-481

Rebecca B. Morton, Marco Piovesan and Jean-Robert Tyran

How to choose your victim pp. 482-496

Klaus Abbink and Gönül Doğan

Citizens or lobbies: Who controls policy? pp. 497-514

Paolo Roberti

Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: A strategic perspective pp. 515-532

Min-Hung Tsay and Chun-Hsien Yeh

Exclusive intermediation in unobservable networks pp. 533-548

Itay P. Fainmesser

Testing models of belief bias: An experiment pp. 549-565

Alexander Coutts

Testing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs in games using eye-tracking pp. 566-586

Luca Polonio and Giorgio Coricelli

The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games pp. 587-610

Nobuyuki Hanaki, Yukio Koriyama, Angela Sutan and Marc Willinger

Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets pp. 611-632

Gagan Ghosh and Heng Liu

Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems pp. 633-650

Ryoji Sawa

Communication is more than information sharing: The role of status-relevant knowledge pp. 651-672

Michael Kurschilgen and Isabel Marcin

Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains pp. 673-693

Swaprava Nath and Tuomas Sandholm

Voting with public information pp. 694-719

Shuo Liu

A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining pp. 720-733

Juan Ortner

The degree and cost adjusted folk solution for minimum cost spanning tree games pp. 734-742

Henk Norde

The informativeness principle without the first-order approach pp. 743-755

Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb

Contests between groups of unknown size pp. 756-769

Luke Boosey, Philip Brookins and Dmitry Ryvkin

Belief-updating rule and sequential reciprocity pp. 770-780

Lianjie Jiang and Jiabin Wu