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Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2022

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Volume 134, issue C, 2022

Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest pp. 1-19 Downloads
Francesc Dilmé
When are groups less moral than individuals? pp. 20-36 Downloads
Pol Campos-Mercade
Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation pp. 37-51 Downloads
Zhiwei Cui and Fei Shi
Control, cost, and confidence: Perseverance and procrastination in the face of failure pp. 52-74 Downloads
Inga Deimen and Julia Wirtz
Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks pp. 75-103 Downloads
Edoardo Gallo, Yohanes E. Riyanto, Nilanjan Roy and Tat-How Teh
Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing pp. 104-116 Downloads
Shuchi Chawla, Yifeng Teng and Christos Tzamos
Dynamic semi-consistency pp. 117-126 Downloads
Sophie Bade
A variant of Harsanyi's tracing procedures to select a perfect equilibrium in normal form games pp. 127-150 Downloads
Yiyin Cao and Chuangyin Dang
Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation pp. 151-168 Downloads
Marc P. Saur, Markus G. Schlatterer and Stefanie Y. Schmitt
Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes pp. 169-198 Downloads
Ai Takeuchi, Róbert Veszteg, Yoshio Kamijo and Yukihiko Funaki
The secretary recommendation problem pp. 199-228 Downloads
Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer and Rann Smorodinsky
Two-sided strategic information transmission pp. 229-241 Downloads
Saori Chiba and Kazumi Hori
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case pp. 242-263 Downloads
Stéphan Sémirat and Françoise Forges
Simple equilibria in general contests pp. 264-280 Downloads
Spencer Bastani, Thomas Giebe and Oliver Gürtler
The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation pp. 281-307 Downloads
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski and Noam Nisan
Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy pp. 308-343 Downloads
Constantinos Daskalakis and Vasilis Syrgkanis
Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values pp. 344-360 Downloads
Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil R. Devanur, Anna R. Karlin and Balasubramanian Sivan
Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets pp. 361-375 Downloads
Krishnamurthy Dvijotham, Yuval Rabani and Leonard J. Schulman
Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria pp. 376-398 Downloads
Yakov Babichenko and Aviad Rubinstein
On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design pp. 399-427 Downloads
Christos Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Alexandros Psomas and Aviad Rubinstein
Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding pp. 428-448 Downloads
Paul Dütting and Thomas Kesselheim

Volume 133, issue C, 2022

Expectations-based loss aversion in contests pp. 1-27 Downloads
Qiang Fu, Youji Lyu, Zenan Wu and Yuanjie Zhang
Fair cake-cutting in practice pp. 28-49 Downloads
Maria Kyropoulou, Josué Ortega and Erel Segal-Halevi
The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition pp. 50-57 Downloads
Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli
Varieties of risk preference elicitation pp. 58-76 Downloads
Daniel Friedman, Sameh Habib, Duncan James and Brett Williams
Strategic transfers between cooperative games pp. 77-84 Downloads
Caroline Berden, Hans Peters, Laura Robles and Dries Vermeulen
Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors pp. 85-108 Downloads
Marieke Pahlke
Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value pp. 109-114 Downloads
Manfred Besner
Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship pp. 115-125 Downloads
Shunya Noda
Communication and cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games pp. 126-137 Downloads
Eric Bahel, Sheryl Ball and Sudipta Sarangi
Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice pp. 138-149 Downloads
Achille Basile, Surekha Rao and K.P.S. Bhaskara Rao
Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections pp. 150-161 Downloads
Joseph McMurray
The influence of self and social image concerns on lying pp. 162-169 Downloads
Zvonimir Bašić and Simone Quercia
Optimal attention management: A tractable framework pp. 170-180 Downloads
Elliot Lipnowski, Laurent Mathevet and Dong Wei
Parallel markets in school choice pp. 181-201 Downloads
Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, Piotr Evdokimov, Rustamdjan Hakimov and Bertan Turhan
Prize-linked savings games: Theory and experiment pp. 202-229 Downloads
Paan Jindapon, Pacharasut Sujarittanonta and Ajalavat Viriyavipart
Listen before you link: Optimal monitoring rules for communication networks pp. 230-247 Downloads
Shahir Safi
A characterization of proportionally representative committees pp. 248-255 Downloads
Haris Aziz and Barton Lee
Auctions with flexible information acquisition pp. 256-281 Downloads
Kyungmin Kim and Youngwoo Koh
Optimal stopping with behaviorally biased agents: The role of loss aversion and changing reference points pp. 282-299 Downloads
Jon Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg and Sigal Oren
Search equilibrium with unobservable investment pp. 300-330 Downloads
Neel Rao
Adverse selection and contingent reasoning in preadolescents and teenagers pp. 331-351 Downloads
Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo

Volume 132, issue C, 2022

Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games pp. 1-21 Downloads
Marco Pangallo, James B.T. Sanders, Tobias Galla and J. Doyne Farmer
Do people maximize quantiles? pp. 22-40 Downloads
Luciano de Castro, Antonio F. Galvao, Charles Noussair and Liang Qiao
Statistical discrimination and affirmative action in the lab pp. 41-58 Downloads
Ahrash Dianat, Federico Echenique and Leeat Yariv
Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance pp. 59-72 Downloads
Cristina Bicchieri, Eugen Dimant, Simon Gächter and Daniele Nosenzo
Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects pp. 73-89 Downloads
Patrick Harless and William Phan
Fairness and risk in ultimatum bargaining pp. 90-105 Downloads
Kyle Hyndman and Matthew J. Walker
Market screening with limited records pp. 106-132 Downloads
Ayça Kaya and Santanu Roy
A dynamic theory of spatial externalities pp. 133-165 Downloads
Raouf Boucekkine, Giorgio Fabbri, Salvatore Federico and Fausto Gozzi
Limited Foresight Equilibrium pp. 166-188 Downloads
Jeevant Rampal
Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions pp. 189-203 Downloads
Benjamin Rosa
On incentive-compatible estimators pp. 204-220 Downloads
Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler
Social learning in nonatomic routing games pp. 221-233 Downloads
Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini and Tristan Tomala
Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices pp. 234-239 Downloads
Rene Kirkegaard
Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring pp. 240-254 Downloads
Yaron Azrieli
Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets pp. 255-273 Downloads
Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo
Equilibrium player choices in team contests with multiple pairwise battles pp. 274-287 Downloads
Hideo Konishi, Chen-Yu Pan and Dimitar Simeonov
Cheap talk with private signal structures pp. 288-304 Downloads
Maxim Ivanov and Alex Sam
On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games pp. 305-315 Downloads
Bin Wu
Local public goods with weighted link formation pp. 316-327 Downloads
Markus Kinateder and Luca Merlino
The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs pp. 328-336 Downloads
Elena D'Agostino and Daniel Seidmann
Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests pp. 337-352 Downloads
Jingfeng Lu, Yuanzhu Lu, Zhewei Wang and Lixue Zhou
Stable cores in information graph games pp. 353-367 Downloads
Marina Núñez and Juan Vidal-Puga
Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities pp. 368-379 Downloads
Yusuke Iwase, Shoya Tsuruta and Akina Yoshimura
Voting on tricky questions pp. 380-389 Downloads
Tomoya Tajika
The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: An extension of the sure-thing principle pp. 390-399 Downloads
Dov Samet
College admissions with tuition transfers pp. 400-420 Downloads
Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Dominant firm and competitive bundling in oligopoly markets pp. 421-447 Downloads
Jie Shuai, Huanxing Yang and Lan Zhang
Invariant equilibria and classes of equivalent games pp. 448-462 Downloads
Blake A. Allison, Adib Bagh and Jason J. Lepore
Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation pp. 463-477 Downloads
Armando Gomes
The general graph matching game: Approximate core pp. 478-486 Downloads
Vijay V. Vazirani
Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium pp. 487-509 Downloads
Simon Grant and Ronald Stauber
Affirmative action in the presence of income heterogeneity pp. 510-533 Downloads
Brishti Guha and Prabal Roy Chowdhury
Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity pp. 534-552 Downloads
Swagata Bhattacharjee
Robust coalitional implementation pp. 553-575 Downloads
Huiyi Guo and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Inductive inference with incompleteness pp. 576-591 Downloads
Shiri Alon, Gilad Bavly and Gabrielle Gayer
Informational robustness of common belief in rationality pp. 592-597 Downloads
Gabriel Ziegler
Page updated 2022-06-30