Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2018

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Volume 111, issue C, 2018

On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition pp. 1-15

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenaël Piaser

The conditions in the existence results for discontinuous games by Reny and by Simon and Zame are incomparable pp. 16-19

Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck

A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions pp. 20-40

Martin Bichler and Per Paulsen

A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data pp. 41-63

Victor H. Aguiar, Roland Pongou and Jean-Baptiste Tondji

No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems pp. 64-74

Stefano Leucci, Akaki Mamageishvili and Paolo Penna

Free intermediation in resource transmission pp. 75-84

Lining Han and Ruben Juarez

Agreements with reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs pp. 85-99

Dooseok Jang, Amrish Patel and Martin Dufwenberg

Goal bracketing and self-control pp. 100-121

Alice Hsiaw

Confidence in knowledge or confidence in the ability to learn: An experiment on the causal effects of beliefs on motivation pp. 122-142

Mira Fischer and Dirk Sliwka

A window of cognition: Eyetracking the reasoning process in spatial beauty contest games pp. 143-158

Chun-Ting Chen, Chen-Ying Huang and Joseph Wang

(Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem pp. 159-186

Theodoros M. Diasakos and Kostas Koufopoulos

Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation pp. 187-202

Yuji Fujinaka and Takuma Wakayama

Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals pp. 203-216

Michele Lombardi and N. Yoshihara

A simple characterization of responsive choice pp. 217-221

Christopher Chambers and M. Bumin Yenmez

Hotelling competition and the gamma distribution pp. 222-240

Bassel Tarbush

On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games pp. 241-249

Andrew Ellis

Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games pp. 250-273

Eray Cumbul and Gábor Virág

Lying opportunities and incentives to lie: Reference dependence versus reputation pp. 274-288

Eberhard Feess and Florian Kerzenmacher

On pure-strategy equilibria in games with correlated information pp. 289-304

M. Ali Khan and Yongchao Zhang

How long is a minute? pp. 305-322

Isabelle Brocas, Juan D. Carrillo and Jorge Tarrasó

Volume 110, issue C, 2018

On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness pp. 1-18

Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt and Markus Brill

An axiomatization of plays in repeated games pp. 19-31

Laurent Mathevet

Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching pp. 32-49

Jose Alcalde

Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information pp. 50-57

Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli

Games for cautious players: The Equilibrium in Secure Strategies pp. 58-70

M. Iskakov, A. Iskakov and Claude d'Aspremont

The object allocation problem with random priorities pp. 71-89

Mustafa Afacan

Preemptive investment under uncertainty pp. 90-119

Jan-Henrik Steg

Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: A new proof for Battigalli's theorem pp. 120-138

Andrés Perea

The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer pp. 139-164

Xi Chen, Ilias Diakonikolas, Dimitris Paparas, Xiaorui Sun and Mihalis Yannakakis

Information acquisition and the value of bad news pp. 165-173

Alessandro Ispano

Setting lower bounds on truthfulness pp. 174-193

Mu'alem, Ahuva and Michael Schapira

Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment pp. 194-215

Lukas M. Wenner

Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games pp. 216-225

John Rehbeck

Price competition in product variety networks pp. 226-247

Philip Ushchev and Yves Zenou

Rationalizability and logical inference pp. 248-257

Dieter Balkenborg

Keep on fighting: The dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions pp. 258-272

Derek J. Clark and Tore Nilssen

Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry pp. 273-294

Sung-Ha Hwang, Wooyoung Lim, Philip Neary and Jonathan Newton

Matching in the large: An experimental study pp. 295-317

Yan Chen, Ming Jiang, Onur Kesten, Stéphane Robin and Min Zhu

To reveal or not to reveal: Privacy preferences and economic frictions pp. 318-329

Ned Augenblick and Aaron Bodoh-Creed

Dynamic communication with biased senders pp. 330-339

Chiara Margaria and Alex Smolin

Volume 109, issue C, 2018

Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining pp. 1-20

Volker Britz

Belief updating and the demand for information pp. 21-39

Sandro Ambuehl and Shengwu Li

An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner pp. 40-64

Brit Grosskopf, Lucas Rentschler and Rajiv Sarin

Volunteering under population uncertainty pp. 65-81

Adrian Hillenbrand and Fabian Winter

A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: Axiomatic and strategic perspectives pp. 82-98

Cheng-Cheng Hu, Min-Hung Tsay and Chun-Hsien Yeh

A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly pp. 99-103

Rabah Amir and Igor V. Evstigneev

Equilibrium informativeness in veto games pp. 104-125

Dmitry Lubensky and Eric Schmidbauer

Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams pp. 126-131

Henrique de Oliveira

Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games pp. 132-155

Andreas Blume

Cognitive ability and games of school choice pp. 156-183

Christian Basteck and Marco Mantovani

Noncooperative oligopoly in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders pp. 184-200

Sayantan Ghosal and Simone Tonin

The lattice of envy-free matchings pp. 201-211

Qingyun Wu and Alvin E. Roth

The Skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: Theory and experiment pp. 212-239

Toshiji Kawagoe, Taisuke Matsubae and Hirokazu Takizawa

Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers pp. 240-261

Debasis Mishra, Swaprava Nath and Souvik Roy

Information diffusion in networks with the Bayesian Peer Influence heuristic pp. 262-270

Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin

Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics pp. 271-293

Dean P. Foster and Sergiu Hart

Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination pp. 294-310

Subhasish Dugar and Quazi Shahriar

Goal setting in the principal–agent model: Weak incentives for strong performance pp. 311-326

Brice Corgnet, Joaquin Gomez-Minambres and Hernán-González, Roberto

Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule pp. 327-363

Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs pp. 364-381

Drew Fudenberg and Yuichiro Kamada

Bounded memory and incomplete information pp. 382-400

Benjamin Sperisen

Sampled fictitious play is Hannan consistent pp. 401-412

Zifan Li and Ambuj Tewari

On random social choice functions with the tops-only property pp. 413-435

Shurojit Chatterji and Huaxia Zeng

Perceived motives and reciprocity pp. 436-451

A. Yeşim Orhun

Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted pp. 452-464

Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson

Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information pp. 465-483

Jon Eguia, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Rebecca Morton and Antonio Nicolò

A theory of bargaining deadlock pp. 501-522

Ilwoo Hwang

Indexing gamble desirability by extending proportional stochastic dominance pp. 523-543

Ziv Hellman and Amnon Schreiber

Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory pp. 544-564

Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick Schmitz

Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks pp. 565-581

Shachar Kariv, Maciej H. Kotowski and Christian Leister

Contracting under uncertainty: A principal–agent model with ambiguity averse parties pp. 582-597

Simon Grant, J. Jude Kline and John Quiggin

Speculation under unawareness pp. 598-615

Spyros Galanis

Learning the fundamentals in a stationary environment pp. 616-624

Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Eran Shmaya

Financially-constrained lawyers: An economic theory of legal disputes pp. 625-647

Claudia Landeo and Maxim Nikitin