Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2026

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Volume 159, issue C, 2026

Bureaucratic norms and dynamic Bayesian persuasion pp. 1-19

Yihang Zhou

The resolution of uncertainty in the value and probability domains pp. 20-55

Eungik Lee, Kathleen Ngangoue and Andrew Schotter

Motives for delegating financial decisions pp. 56-70

Mikhail Freer, Daniel Friedman and Simon Weidenholzer

Network attrition: Theory and policy implications pp. 71-88

Christophe Bravard, Promit K. Chaudhuri, Sudipta Sarangi and Hector Tzavellas

Dynamic coordination with switching costs pp. 89-112

Joe S. Ballard and Luke Boosey

Algorithmic cooperation: A comparison with human play in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma pp. 113-130

Bernhard Kasberger, Simon Martin, Hans-Theo Normann and Tobias Werner

New methods to compensate artists in music streaming platforms pp. 131-143

Gustavo Bergantiños and Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

Ranking teams pp. 144-155

Adam Hamdan

Long-run efficiency with local interactions and heterogeneous types pp. 156-178

Erik Lillethun

Optimal mechanisms for selling market segmentation pp. 179-197

Stefan Terstiege

Endowments-swapping-proof object reallocation with transfers pp. 198-224

Hiroki Shinozaki

Fair allocation in hierarchies pp. 225-240

Biung-Ghi Ju, Soojeong Jung, Hokyu Song and Kyubang Jo

Rewarding success and failure: Moral hazard and adverse selection in strategic experimentation pp. 241-267

Fahad Khalil, Jacques Lawarree and Alexander Rodivilov

Memory overload and asymmetric underreaction pp. 268-285

Lorenz Goette, Hua-Jing Han and Benson Tsz Kin Leung

Strong Nash implementation and economic applications pp. 286-309

Mohamed Bouchta, Ahmed Doghmi and Abderrahmane Ziad

Fair and efficient allocation of indivisible items under category constraints pp. 310-319

Ayumi Igarashi and Frédéric Meunier

Weak* dominance pp. 320-328

Xiao Luo and Yongchuan Qiao

The persistence of disadvantages: Theory and experiment pp. 329-392

Nishtha Sharma

Repression and autocratic consolidation pp. 393-424

Livio Di Lonardo, Jessica S. Sun and Scott A. Tyson

Optimal verification of (mis)information in networks pp. 425-441

Luca P. Merlino and Nicole Tabasso

Which probability measures are strict correlated equilibria? pp. 442-443

Can Kizilkale, Anthony Rodriguez and Rakesh V. Vohra

Information paths and learning in games: Experimental evidence pp. 444-482

Peiran Jiao, Heinrich H. Nax and Jichuan Zong

How to replace public communication with private one pp. 483-491

Helmuts Āzacis and Péter Vida

Contagion-based safety premium in bank networks pp. 492-545

Zhongjie Fan, Ping He and Zehao Liu

Disclosure-proof correlated equilibria pp. 546-563

Scott Saas

Kuhn’s theorem for games of the extensive form with unawareness pp. 564-583

Ki Vin Foo and Burkhard C. Schipper

On the strategyproof allocation of items under a budget constraint pp. 584-603

Javier Cembrano, Max Klimm and Martin Knaack

On the political economy of nonlinear income taxation pp. 604-624

Marcus Berliant and Miguel Gouveia

Volume 158, issue C, 2026

Evaluating non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanisms: Theory and experiment pp. 1-34

Shan Gui and Daniel Houser

Compellingness in Nash implementation pp. 35-62

Shurojit Chatterji, Takashi Kunimoto and Paulo Ramos

Istanbul flower auction: The need for speed pp. 63-79

Isa Hafalir, Onur Kesten, Donglai Luo, Katerina Sherstyuk and Cong Tao

Welfare properties of the Taiwan mechanism pp. 80-113

Ilan Wolff

When is it (im)possible to respect all individuals’ preferences under uncertainty? pp. 114-121

Kensei Nakamura

Failing to correctly aggregate signals pp. 122-131

Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein

Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities: A limit theorem pp. 132-141

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal, Ludovic Julien and Damiano Turchet

Approximating competitive equilibrium by Nash welfare pp. 142-166

Jugal Garg, Yixin Tao and László A. Végh

Neural correlates of interactions between adaptive learning and hierarchical reasoning in repeated strategic games pp. 167-190

Jun Feng, Jia Jin, Sasa Zhao, Edmund Derrington, Xiangdong Qin, Shiguang Fu, Qiang Shen and Jean-Claude Dreher

Guilt and fairness pp. 191-218

Alessandro Stringhi

Morality meets risk: What makes a good excuse for selfishness pp. 219-236

Wanxin Dong and Jiakun Zheng

Representation in collective policymaking pp. 237-259

Daniel Gibbs and Gleason Judd

The quasi-prekernel for cooperative games pp. 260-271

Qianqian Kong, Hans Peters and Hao Sun

The case for lobbying transparency pp. 272-282

Antoine Zerbini

River-sharing problem with floods pp. 283-298

Takayuki Oishi and Tomoya Tajika

The effect of exit rights on cost-based procurement contracts pp. 299-316

Rodrigo Andrade, Henrique Castro-Pires and Humberto Moreira

Reduced strategies and cognitive hierarchies in the extensive and normal form pp. 317-329

Pierpaolo Battigalli

The effects of induced emotions on punishment and reward pp. 330-347

Michalis Drouvelis and Brit Grosskopf

Efficient equilibrium in submodular global games of entry pp. 348-366

Rabah Amir, Rodrigo Harrison and Pedro Jara-Moroni

Competitive limit of competing auctions pp. 367-382

Zizhen Ma and Nicolás Riquelme

A simultaneous analysis of turnout and voting under proportional representation: Theory and experiments pp. 383-401

Aaron Kamm and Arthur Schram

Competing for influence in networks through strategic targeting pp. 402-418

Margherita Comola, Agnieszka Rusinowska and Marie Claire Villeval

Potentials in social environments pp. 419-440

Thomas Demuynck, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Christian Seel

Designing Heaven’s will: The job assignment in the Chinese imperial civil service pp. 441-461

Inácio Bó and Li Chen

Lucky but confident –The effect of confidence on meritocratic beliefs and preferences for redistribution pp. 462-487

Kajsa Hansson and Oda Kristine Storstad Sund

When information and communication are both costly pp. 488-504

Shahir Safi

On the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium under the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism pp. 505-526

Yao Cheng, Dazhong Wang and Jingsheng Yu

Substitutes for nonunitary many-to-many matching with contracts pp. 527-546

Keisuke Bando and Toshiyuki Hirai

Two-player binary global games without dominance solvable states pp. 547-562

In-Uck Park and Efthymios Smyrniotis

Persuasion of interacting receivers pp. 563-583

Yishu Zeng

The evolution of strategies in repeated 2 × 2 anti-coordination games pp. 584-604

Jiabin Wu

Authority measure for opinion dynamics pp. 605-621

Igal Milchtaich, Ron Peretz and Yevgeny Tsodikovich

The effort-maximizing move order in tullock contests pp. 622-629

Lei Gao, Jingfeng Lu and Zhewei Wang

Strategic formation of production networks pp. 630-656

Antoine Mandel, Van-Quy Nguyen and Bach Dong-Xuan

A model of participatory persuasion pp. 657-683

Liuchun Deng and Yufeng Sun

Delay in social learning pp. 684-690

Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn

Caps on bids in all-pay contests with identity-dependent externalities pp. 691-716

Dan Kovenock, Jian Song and Francesco Trevisan

Transparency and information acquisition in college admissions pp. 717-736

Youngwoo Koh and Wooyoung Lim

Eliciting and distinguishing between weak and incomplete preferences: Theory, experiment and computation pp. 737-762

Georgios Gerasimou

Information manipulation of wishful thinkers pp. 763-786

Emel Filiz-Ozbay and Zhenxun Liu

Cheap talk and lie detection pp. 787-814

Hitoshi Sadakane and Yin Chi Tam

Competition in persuasion in the attention economy pp. 815-826

Federico Innocenti