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Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2020

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Volume 122, issue C, 2020

Distributions of centrality on networks pp. 1-27 Downloads
Krishna Dasaratha
Stability in matching markets with peer effects pp. 28-54 Downloads
Anna Bykhovskaya
Competition with an information clearinghouse and asymmetric firms: Why more than two firms compete (or not) for shoppers pp. 55-82 Downloads
Michael Arnold and Lan Zhang
Solving two-state Markov games with incomplete information on one side pp. 83-104 Downloads
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Catherine Rainer and Eilon Solan
Fishing for fools pp. 105-129 Downloads
Ulrike Malmendier and Adam Szeidl
Preordered service in contract enforcement pp. 130-149 Downloads
Jan U. Auerbach and Miguel A. Fonseca
Frustration and anger in the Ultimatum Game: An experiment pp. 150-167 Downloads
Chiara Aina, Pierpaolo Battigalli and Astrid Gamba
Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice pp. 168-202 Downloads
Srinivas Arigapudi
Dynamic price discovery: Transparency vs. information design pp. 203-232 Downloads
Ali Kakhbod and Fei Song
The evolution of monetary equilibrium pp. 233-239 Downloads
Thomas W.L. Norman
A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria pp. 240-255 Downloads
Nicola Gatti, Mario Gilli and Alberto Marchesi
Correlated beliefs: Predicting outcomes in 2 × 2 games pp. 256-276 Downloads
Timothy N. Cason, Tridib Sharma and Radovan Vadovič
Free and perfectly safe but only partially effective vaccines can harm everyone pp. 277-289 Downloads
Eduard Talamàs and Rakesh Vohra
Consulting collusive experts pp. 290-317 Downloads
Dilip Mookherjee, Alberto Motta and Masatoshi Tsumagari
Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian pp. 318-327 Downloads
Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato and Ludovic Julien
In-group bias in prisons pp. 328-340 Downloads
Shiqi Guo, Pinghan Liang and Erte Xiao
On self-serving strategic beliefs pp. 341-353 Downloads
Nadja R. Ging-Jehli, Florian H. Schneider and Roberto A. Weber
Information frictions and market power: A laboratory study pp. 354-369 Downloads
Anna Bayona, Jordi Brandts and Xavier Vives
Strategic decompositions of normal form games: Zero-sum games and potential games pp. 370-390 Downloads
Sung-Ha Hwang and Luc Rey-Bellet
Habits as adaptations: An experimental study pp. 391-406 Downloads
Ludmila Matysková, Brian Rogers, Jakub Steiner and Keh-Kuan Sun
A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem pp. 407-412 Downloads
Deniz Dizdar and Eugen Kováč
Determinants of trust: The role of personal experiences pp. 413-425 Downloads
Frederik Schwerter and Florian Zimmermann
Lexicographic probabilities and robustness pp. 426-439 Downloads
Henrik Petri
Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: A set-valued games approach pp. 440-452 Downloads
Ehud Lehrer and Roee Teper
Information acquisition and welfare in network games pp. 453-475 Downloads
C. Matthew Leister

Volume 121, issue C, 2020

Endogenous group formation and responsibility diffusion: An experimental study pp. 1-31 Downloads
Katharina Brütt, Arthur Schram and Joep Sonnemans
Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations pp. 32-54 Downloads
Francis Bloch and Anne van den Nouweland
Equal sacrifice taxation pp. 55-75 Downloads
John E. Stovall
Pre-matching gambles pp. 76-89 Downloads
Hanzhe Zhang
Grouping, in-group bias and the cost of cheating pp. 90-107 Downloads
Moti Michaeli
Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation pp. 108-116 Downloads
Ville Korpela and Michele Lombardi
On the empirical validity of axioms in unstructured bargaining pp. 117-145 Downloads
Noemí Navarro and Róbert F. Veszteg
A theory of decisive leadership pp. 146-168 Downloads
B. Douglas Bernheim and Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed
Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs pp. 169-189 Downloads
Satoshi Fukuda
Communication via intermediaries pp. 190-203 Downloads
Maksymilian Kwiek
Matching through institutions pp. 204-231 Downloads
Francis Bloch, David Cantala and Damián Gibaja
Gain-loss framing in interdependent choice pp. 232-251 Downloads
Susann Fiedler and Adrian Hillenbrand
Unraveling over time pp. 252-264 Downloads
Sandro Ambuehl and Vivienne Groves
Starting small to communicate pp. 265-296 Downloads
Alp Atakan, Levent Koçkesen and Elif Kubilay
Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions pp. 297-306 Downloads
Justin Burkett and Kyle Woodward
Vagueness in multidimensional proposals pp. 307-328 Downloads
Qiaoxi Zhang
Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment pp. 329-367 Downloads
Ying Xue Li and Burkhard Schipper
Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation pp. 368-381 Downloads
Antonio Cabrales, Francesco Feri, Piero Gottardi and Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez
Money burning in the theory of delegation pp. 382-412 Downloads
Manuel Amador and Kyle Bagwell
Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets pp. 413-434 Downloads
Mathew Knudson
The agency costs of on-the-job search pp. 435-452 Downloads
Daniel Herbold and Heiner Schumacher
Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse pp. 453-481 Downloads
B. Hoyer and N. Stroh-Maraun
Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands pp. 482-505 Downloads
Nikhil R. Devanur, Nima Haghpanah and Alexandros Psomas
Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions pp. 506-530 Downloads
Milena Wittwer
Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures pp. 533-547 Downloads
Pierpaolo Battigalli, Paolo Leonetti and Fabio Maccheroni
Affective empathy in non-cooperative games pp. 548-564 Downloads
Jorge Vásquez and Marek Weretka
Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains pp. 565-584 Downloads
Peng Liu
Page updated 2020-08-07