Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2026

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 157, issue C, 2026

Algorithmic collusion and a folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality pp. 1-21

Álvaro Cartea, Patrick Chang, José Penalva and Harrison Waldon

Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences pp. 22-33

Hande Erkut and Dorothea Kübler

Outcome destabilization pp. 34-49

Francesc Dilmé

Conventions in large games with randomly drawn payoffs pp. 50-70

Jonathan Newton and Ryoji Sawa

Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching pp. 71-87

Hyukjun Kwon and Ran I. Shorrer

Duality in financial networks pp. 88-108

Martijn W. Ketelaars, Peter Borm and P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Timing and skewness of information revelation: Evidence on information structures and compound lotteries pp. 109-124

Enrico Diecidue, Thomas Langer, Sven Nolte, Sebastian Riedmiller and Judith C. Schneider

Strategyproof mechanism for two heterogeneous facilities with constant approximation ratio pp. 125-137

Minming Li, Pinyan Lu, Xingchen Sha, Yuhao Yao and Jialin Zhang

Algorithms and complexity for computing Nash equilibria in adversarial team games pp. 138-152

Ioannis Anagnostides, Fivos Kalogiannis, Ioannis Panageas, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis and Stephen Mcaleer

Strategy vs. direct-response method: evidence from a large online experiment on simple social dilemmas pp. 153-185

Marcus Roel and Zhuoqiong Chen

Present-bias and the value of sophistication: Splurging vs. smoothing pp. 186-225

Subas Acharya, David Jimenez-Gomez, Dmitrii Rachinskii and Alejandro Rivera

A generalization of von Neumann’s reduction from the assignment problem to zero-sum games pp. 226-236

Ilan Adler, Martin Bullinger and Vijay V. Vazirani

Privately designed correlated equilibrium pp. 237-252

Guilherme Carmona and Krittanai Laohakunakorn

Success functions in large contests pp. 253-262

Yaron Azrieli and Christopher P. Chambers

Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice pp. 263-285

Stergios Athanasoglou and Somouaoga Bonkoungou

Equilibrium cycle: A “Dynamic” equilibrium pp. 286-297

Tushar Shankar Walunj, Shiksha Singhal, Veeraruna Kavitha and Jayakrishnan Nair

Auction design with ambiguity: Optimality of the first-price auction pp. 298-321

Sung-Ha Hwang, Youngwoo Koh and Sosung Baik

Adapting stable matchings to evolving preferences pp. 322-350

Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Dušan Knop, Junjie Luo and Rolf Niedermeier

Transaction fee mechanisms robust to welfare-increasing collusion pp. 351-375

Yotam Gafni and Aviv Yaish

Introduction to 25+ years of quantal response equilibrium pp. 376-378

Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey

Rent dissipation and streamlined costs: Laboratory experiments pp. 379-394

Charles A. Holt and Angela M. Smith

An experimental study of prisoners' dilemma and stag hunt games played by teams of players pp. 395-417

Jeongbin Kim and Thomas R. Palfrey

High-stakes failures of backward induction pp. 418-439

Bouke Klein Teeselink, Dennie van Dolder, Martijn J. van den Assem and Jason D. Dana

Endogenous barriers to learning pp. 440-463

Olivier Compte

Pork barrel politics, voter turnout, and inequality: An experimental study pp. 464-479

Jens Großer and Thorsten Giertz

Electoral accountability in the lab pp. 480-495

César Martinelli and Naila C. Sebastián Esandi

Quantal response equilibrium and rationalizability: Inside the black box pp. 496-515

Shuige Liu and Fabio Maccheroni

The refinement of Nash equilibrium based on equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior pp. 516-534

Rodrigo A. Velez and Alexander L. Brown

On the smooth unfolding of bifurcations in quantal-response equilibria pp. 535-570

Adam Harris, Scott McCallum and Michael S. Harré

Quantal response equilibrium with a continuum of types: Characterization and nonparametric identification pp. 571-591

Evan Friedman and Duarte Gonçalves

Quantal response equilibrium as a structural model for estimation: The missing manual pp. 592-618

James R. Bland and Theodore L. Turocy

Bayesian inference for Quantal Response Equilibrium in normal-form games pp. 619-636

James R. Bland

Non-parametric identification and testing of quantal response equilibrium pp. 637-659

Johannes Hoelzemann, Ryan Webb and Erhao Xie

Volume 156, issue C, 2026

Choice and welfare under social constraints pp. 1-13

Mauricio Ribeiro

Provoking the opposition pp. 14-34

Korhan Kocak

Risk-taking in financial networks pp. 35-57

Mohamed Belhaj, Renaud Bourlès and Frédéric Deroïan

A note on the non-coincidence of the core and the bargaining set in many-to-one assignment markets pp. 58-63

Ata Atay, Marina Núñez and Tamás Solymosi

Improving the deferred acceptance with minimal compromise pp. 64-81

Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, Umut Dur, A. Arda Gitmez and Özgür Yılmaz

Marginal contribution and singleton cores in one-sided matching and assignment pp. 82-97

Hyunjun Cho, Jin Yeub Kim and Jaeok Park

Payoff continuity in games of incomplete information across models of knowledge pp. 98-108

Ashwin Kambhampati

Extensive form games with incentive stage-bidding: An emergence of non-cooperative cooperation pp. 109-134

Stéphane Le Roux and Valentin Goranko

When do prediction markets return average beliefs? Experimental evidence pp. 135-148

Marco Mantovani and Antonio Filippin

Naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play in games pp. 149-163

Bernardo García-Pola and Nagore Iriberri

Volume 155, issue C, 2026

The topology of poker pp. 1-9

Laurent Bartholdi and Roman Mikhailov

A maximal domain for weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness of the extended probabilistic serial correspondence pp. 10-26

Kiyong Yun and Youngsub Chun

A dynamic optimization approach to delegation with an application to volunteer contracts pp. 27-54

Rene Saran

Information design in the principal-agent problem pp. 55-69

Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu and Konstantin Zabarnyi

Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice pp. 70-88

Gregorio Curello and Ludvig Sinander

The art of concession in General Lotto games pp. 89-106

Rahul Chandan, Keith Paarporn, Dan Kovenock, Mahnoosh Alizadeh and Jason R. Marden

Pricing skewed assets in multi-asset experimental markets pp. 107-148

Shuchen Zhao

Sequential creation of surplus and the Shapley value pp. 149-166

Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, Ines Macho-Stadler and David Perez-Castrillo

Rankings-dependent preferences: A real goods matching experiment pp. 167-191

Andrew Kloosterman and Peter Troyan

Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence pp. 192-211

Leonie Baumann

Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result pp. 212-227

Pedro Calleja and Francesc Llerena

Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms pp. 228-249

Xueheng Li

Preconvex games pp. 250-266

Eric Bahel, Christian Trudeau and Haoyu Wang

Corrigendum to “Values for environments with externalities – the average approach” [Games Econ. Behav. 108 (2018) 49–64.] pp. 267-269

Ines Macho-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein

Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices pp. 270-286

Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Tommy Andersson and Lars Ehlers

Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned pp. 287-309

Wataru Ishida and Changwoo Park

Exact Nash-like solutions of blockchain gap games pp. 310-320

Mitsunori Noguchi