Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2023

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 141, issue C, 2023

On self- and other-regarding cooperation: Kant versus Berge pp. 1-20

Burak Ünveren, Murat Donduran and Guy Barokas

Learning through period and physical time pp. 21-29

Teresa Backhaus, Steffen Huck, Johannes Leutgeb and Ryan Oprea

Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence pp. 30-51

Arne Lauber, Christoph March and Marco Sahm

Reciprocity and gift exchange in markets for credence goods pp. 52-69

Serhiy Kandul, Bruno Lanz and Evert Reins

Trustworthy by design pp. 70-87

Sen Geng and Menglong Guan

An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value pp. 88-104

Michela Chessa, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Aymeric Lardon and Takashi Yamada

Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma pp. 105-132

Anujit Chakraborty

Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment pp. 133-155

Alessandra Casella, Jeffrey Da-Ren Guo and Michelle Jiang

Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles pp. 156-181

Açelya Altuntaş, William Phan and Yuki Tamura

Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It's a matter of timing pp. 182-195

Diego Aycinena, Alexander Elbittar, Andrei Gomberg and Lucas Rentschler

Beyond uncertainty aversion pp. 196-222

Brian Hill

Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms pp. 223-260

Devansh Jalota, Marco Pavone, Qi Qi and Yinyu Ye

Increasing the external validity of social preference games by reducing measurement error pp. 261-285

Xinghua Wang and Daniel Navarro-Martinez

On the manipulability of equitable voting rules pp. 286-302

Steven Kivinen

Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games pp. 303-320

Aditya Aradhye, János Flesch, Mathias Staudigl and Dries Vermeulen

Fairness for multi-self agents pp. 321-336

Sophie Bade and Erel Segal-Halevi

Stable sharing pp. 337-363

Antonio Nicolò, Pietro Salmaso, Arunava Sen and Sonal Yadav

A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain pp. 364-379

Shunya Noda

Targeting in social networks with anonymized information pp. 380-402

Francis Bloch and Shaden Shabayek

Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints pp. 403-427

Mengling Li, Yohanes E. Riyanto and Menghan Xu

Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments pp. 428-443

Federico Echenique, Antonio Miralles and Jun Zhang

Polytope-form games and index/degree theories for extensive-form games pp. 444-471

Lucas Pahl

Attacking a nuclear facility: The impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality pp. 472-483

Siyu Ma and Dov Biran

Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: Experimental evidence pp. 484-502

David L. Dickinson and David Masclet

Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox pp. 503-514

Geir Asheim and Thomas Brunnschweiler

The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice pp. 515-528

Josué Ortega and Thilo Klein

Unique stable matchings pp. 529-547

Gregory Z. Gutin, Philip R. Neary and Anders Yeo

Expropriation power in private dealings: Quota rule in collective sales pp. 548-580

Metin Uyanik and Duygu Yengin

Volume 140, issue C, 2023

Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: Is sharing caring? pp. 1-32

Viola Ackfeld and Werner Güth

An analytically solvable principal-agent model pp. 33-49

Lars-Göran Mattsson and Jörgen W. Weibull

Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information pp. 50-72

Aidas Masiliūnas

The team allocator game: Allocation power in public goods games pp. 73-87

Alexandros Karakostas, Martin G. Kocher, Dominik Matzat, Holger A. Rau and Gerhard Riewe

Weighted average-convexity and Shapley values pp. 88-98

Alexandre Skoda and Xavier Venel

Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information pp. 99-114

Yizhaq Minchuk and Aner Sela

A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time pp. 115-131

Ailin Leng

Competitive information disclosure in random search markets pp. 132-153

Wei He and Jiangtao Li

Targeting in networks under costly agreements pp. 154-172

Mohamed Belhaj, Frédéric Deroïan and Shahir Safi

Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design pp. 173-180

Andrew McClellan

Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences pp. 181-196

Yuki Tamura

Mechanism design with informational punishment pp. 197-209

Benjamin Balzer and Johannes Schneider

Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples pp. 210-228

Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa

Scheduling games with rank-based utilities pp. 229-252

Shaul Rosner and Tami Tamir

Price competition with capacity uncertainty - feasting on leftovers pp. 253-271

Robert Somogyi, Wouter Vergote and Gabor Virag

Temptation and guilt pp. 272-295

Jawwad Noor and Linxia Ren

Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation pp. 296-315

Anqi Li and Lin Hu

Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding pp. 316-340

Michal Feldman and Galia Shabtai

Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information pp. 341-347

Ezra Einy and Ori Haimanko

On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest pp. 348-362

Pavlo Prokopovych and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict: A volunteer's dilemma experiment pp. 363-379

Tse-Min Wang, Florian Heine and Arjen van Witteloostuijn

Morally questionable decisions by groups: Guilt sharing and its underlying motives pp. 380-400

Eberhard Feess, Florian Kerzenmacher and Gerd Muehlheusser

Stability of alliance networks pp. 401-409

Xinyue Cai and Mert Kimya

Linking friction, social coordination and the speed of evolution pp. 410-430

Zhiwei Cui

Choice structures in games pp. 431-455

Paolo Galeazzi and Johannes Marti

Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing pp. 456-480

Ahmet Altınok

Continuous level-k mechanism design pp. 481-501

Geoffroy de Clippel, Rene Saran and Roberto Serrano

Competition with list prices pp. 502-528

Marco A. Haan, Pim Heijnen and Martin Obradovits

Strategic rationing in Stackelberg games pp. 529-555

Niloofar Yousefimanesh, Iwan Bos and Dries Vermeulen

Designing weighted and directed networks under complementarities pp. 556-574

Xueheng Li

The non-dismal science of intergenerational affective interactions pp. 575-584

Aviad Heifetz