Games and Economic Behavior
1989 - 2022
Current editor(s): E. Kalai From Elsevier Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (). Access Statistics for this journal.
Track citations for all items by RSS feed
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.
Volume 134, issue C, 2022
- Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest pp. 1-19

- Francesc Dilmé
- When are groups less moral than individuals? pp. 20-36

- Pol Campos-Mercade
- Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation pp. 37-51

- Zhiwei Cui and Fei Shi
- Control, cost, and confidence: Perseverance and procrastination in the face of failure pp. 52-74

- Inga Deimen and Julia Wirtz
- Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks pp. 75-103

- Edoardo Gallo, Yohanes E. Riyanto, Nilanjan Roy and Tat-How Teh
- Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing pp. 104-116

- Shuchi Chawla, Yifeng Teng and Christos Tzamos
- Dynamic semi-consistency pp. 117-126

- Sophie Bade
- A variant of Harsanyi's tracing procedures to select a perfect equilibrium in normal form games pp. 127-150

- Yiyin Cao and Chuangyin Dang
- Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation pp. 151-168

- Marc P. Saur, Markus G. Schlatterer and Stefanie Y. Schmitt
- Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes pp. 169-198

- Ai Takeuchi, Róbert Veszteg, Yoshio Kamijo and Yukihiko Funaki
- The secretary recommendation problem pp. 199-228

- Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer and Rann Smorodinsky
- Two-sided strategic information transmission pp. 229-241

- Saori Chiba and Kazumi Hori
- Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case pp. 242-263

- Stéphan Sémirat and Françoise Forges
- Simple equilibria in general contests pp. 264-280

- Spencer Bastani, Thomas Giebe and Oliver Gürtler
- The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation pp. 281-307

- Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski and Noam Nisan
- Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy pp. 308-343

- Constantinos Daskalakis and Vasilis Syrgkanis
- Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values pp. 344-360

- Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil R. Devanur, Anna R. Karlin and Balasubramanian Sivan
- Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets pp. 361-375

- Krishnamurthy Dvijotham, Yuval Rabani and Leonard J. Schulman
- Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria pp. 376-398

- Yakov Babichenko and Aviad Rubinstein
- On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design pp. 399-427

- Christos Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Alexandros Psomas and Aviad Rubinstein
- Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding pp. 428-448

- Paul Dütting and Thomas Kesselheim
Volume 133, issue C, 2022
- Expectations-based loss aversion in contests pp. 1-27

- Qiang Fu, Youji Lyu, Zenan Wu and Yuanjie Zhang
- Fair cake-cutting in practice pp. 28-49

- Maria Kyropoulou, Josué Ortega and Erel Segal-Halevi
- The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition pp. 50-57

- Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli
- Varieties of risk preference elicitation pp. 58-76

- Daniel Friedman, Sameh Habib, Duncan James and Brett Williams
- Strategic transfers between cooperative games pp. 77-84

- Caroline Berden, Hans Peters, Laura Robles and Dries Vermeulen
- Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors pp. 85-108

- Marieke Pahlke
- Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value pp. 109-114

- Manfred Besner
- Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship pp. 115-125

- Shunya Noda
- Communication and cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games pp. 126-137

- Eric Bahel, Sheryl Ball and Sudipta Sarangi
- Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice pp. 138-149

- Achille Basile, Surekha Rao and K.P.S. Bhaskara Rao
- Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections pp. 150-161

- Joseph McMurray
- The influence of self and social image concerns on lying pp. 162-169

- Zvonimir Bašić and Simone Quercia
- Optimal attention management: A tractable framework pp. 170-180

- Elliot Lipnowski, Laurent Mathevet and Dong Wei
- Parallel markets in school choice pp. 181-201

- Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, Piotr Evdokimov, Rustamdjan Hakimov and Bertan Turhan
- Prize-linked savings games: Theory and experiment pp. 202-229

- Paan Jindapon, Pacharasut Sujarittanonta and Ajalavat Viriyavipart
- Listen before you link: Optimal monitoring rules for communication networks pp. 230-247

- Shahir Safi
- A characterization of proportionally representative committees pp. 248-255

- Haris Aziz and Barton Lee
- Auctions with flexible information acquisition pp. 256-281

- Kyungmin Kim and Youngwoo Koh
- Optimal stopping with behaviorally biased agents: The role of loss aversion and changing reference points pp. 282-299

- Jon Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg and Sigal Oren
- Search equilibrium with unobservable investment pp. 300-330

- Neel Rao
- Adverse selection and contingent reasoning in preadolescents and teenagers pp. 331-351

- Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo
Volume 132, issue C, 2022
- Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games pp. 1-21

- Marco Pangallo, James B.T. Sanders, Tobias Galla and J. Doyne Farmer
- Do people maximize quantiles? pp. 22-40

- Luciano de Castro, Antonio F. Galvao, Charles Noussair and Liang Qiao
- Statistical discrimination and affirmative action in the lab pp. 41-58

- Ahrash Dianat, Federico Echenique and Leeat Yariv
- Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance pp. 59-72

- Cristina Bicchieri, Eugen Dimant, Simon Gächter and Daniele Nosenzo
- Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects pp. 73-89

- Patrick Harless and William Phan
- Fairness and risk in ultimatum bargaining pp. 90-105

- Kyle Hyndman and Matthew J. Walker
- Market screening with limited records pp. 106-132

- Ayça Kaya and Santanu Roy
- A dynamic theory of spatial externalities pp. 133-165

- Raouf Boucekkine, Giorgio Fabbri, Salvatore Federico and Fausto Gozzi
- Limited Foresight Equilibrium pp. 166-188

- Jeevant Rampal
- Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions pp. 189-203

- Benjamin Rosa
- On incentive-compatible estimators pp. 204-220

- Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler
- Social learning in nonatomic routing games pp. 221-233

- Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini and Tristan Tomala
- Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices pp. 234-239

- Rene Kirkegaard
- Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring pp. 240-254

- Yaron Azrieli
- Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets pp. 255-273

- Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo
- Equilibrium player choices in team contests with multiple pairwise battles pp. 274-287

- Hideo Konishi, Chen-Yu Pan and Dimitar Simeonov
- Cheap talk with private signal structures pp. 288-304

- Maxim Ivanov and Alex Sam
- On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games pp. 305-315

- Bin Wu
- Local public goods with weighted link formation pp. 316-327

- Markus Kinateder and Luca Merlino
- The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs pp. 328-336

- Elena D'Agostino and Daniel Seidmann
- Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests pp. 337-352

- Jingfeng Lu, Yuanzhu Lu, Zhewei Wang and Lixue Zhou
- Stable cores in information graph games pp. 353-367

- Marina Núñez and Juan Vidal-Puga
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities pp. 368-379

- Yusuke Iwase, Shoya Tsuruta and Akina Yoshimura
- Voting on tricky questions pp. 380-389

- Tomoya Tajika
- The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: An extension of the sure-thing principle pp. 390-399

- Dov Samet
- College admissions with tuition transfers pp. 400-420

- Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
- Dominant firm and competitive bundling in oligopoly markets pp. 421-447

- Jie Shuai, Huanxing Yang and Lan Zhang
- Invariant equilibria and classes of equivalent games pp. 448-462

- Blake A. Allison, Adib Bagh and Jason J. Lepore
- Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation pp. 463-477

- Armando Gomes
- The general graph matching game: Approximate core pp. 478-486

- Vijay V. Vazirani
- Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium pp. 487-509

- Simon Grant and Ronald Stauber
- Affirmative action in the presence of income heterogeneity pp. 510-533

- Brishti Guha and Prabal Roy Chowdhury
- Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity pp. 534-552

- Swagata Bhattacharjee
- Robust coalitional implementation pp. 553-575

- Huiyi Guo and Nicholas C. Yannelis
- Inductive inference with incompleteness pp. 576-591

- Shiri Alon, Gilad Bavly and Gabrielle Gayer
- Informational robustness of common belief in rationality pp. 592-597

- Gabriel Ziegler
| |