Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 152, issue C, 2025

Stability as right to counsel of choice: A lawyers' matching problem pp. 1-22

Kemal Kıvanç Aköz, Emre Doğan, Onur Kesten and Danisz Okulicz

Rituals of reason: Experimental evidence on the social acceptability of lotteries in allocation problems pp. 23-36

Elias Bouacida and Renaud Foucart

Social image, observer identity, and crowding up pp. 37-54

Yamit Asulin, Yuval Heller, Nira Munichor and Ro'i Zultan

Lone wolves just got lonelier pp. 55-61

Esteban Peralta

Network stability under limited foresight pp. 62-92

P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Abhimanyu Khan

Lying in persuasion pp. 93-112

Zhaotian Luo and Arturas Rozenas

Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace pp. 113-132

Jaideep Roy and Bibhas Saha

Optimal grading contests pp. 133-149

Sumit Goel

Grouping agents with persistent types pp. 150-174

James M. Malcomson

Borda rule and arrow's independence condition in finite societies pp. 175-180

Guy Barokas and Shmuel Nitzan

Polarizing persuasion pp. 181-198

Axel Anderson and Nikoloz Pkhakadze

Core thresholds of symmetric majority voting games pp. 199-215

Takaaki Abe

Strategy-proof preference aggregation and the anonymity-neutrality tradeoff pp. 216-240

Stergios Athanasoglou, Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Lars Ehlers

Conditional cooperation under uncertainty: The social description-experience gap pp. 241-256

Orestis Kopsacheilis, Dennie van Dolder and Ozan Isler

The motivated memory of noise pp. 257-275

Jeanne Hagenbach, Nicolas Jacquemet and Philipp Sternal

Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods pp. 276-292

Kevin Bauer, Michael Kosfeld and Ferdinand A. von Siemens

Iterated exclusion of implausible types in signaling games pp. 293-312

Francesc Dilmé

Matching with transfers under distributional constraints pp. 313-332

Devansh Jalota, Michael Ostrovsky and Marco Pavone

The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game pp. 333-344

A. Galichon and A. Jacquet

Endogenous limits on veto power in dynamic bargaining pp. 345-370

Ravideep Sethi and Ewout Verriest

Upstream reciprocity in the battle of good vs evil pp. 371-395

Luis Avalos-Trujillo

A taste for variety pp. 396-422

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Dominik Karos and Ehud Lehrer

Bargaining with binary private information pp. 423-442

Francesc Dilmé

Volume 151, issue C, 2025

Optimal tree contest design and winner-take-all pp. 1-23

Qian Jiao, Zhonghong Kuang, Yiran Liu and Yang Yu

The value of and demand for diverse news sources pp. 24-41

Evan Calford and Anujit Chakraborty

The prevalence of take-it-or-leave-it offers pp. 42-58

Shinsuke Kambe

Inefficiency in a frictionless market pp. 59-69

Keith Jin Deng Chan

Obvious manipulations in matching with and without contracts pp. 70-81

R. Pablo Arribillaga and Eliana Pepa Risma

An implementation of the general optimal mechanism in Esö and Szentes (2007) pp. 82-94

Dongri Liu and Jingfeng Lu

Auctions with signaling bidders: Optimal design and information disclosure pp. 95-107

Olivier Bos and Martin Pollrich

Learning in unprofitable games pp. 108-126

Andrea Gaunersdorfer and Josef Hofbauer

Fair division with subjective divisibility pp. 127-147

Xiaohui Bei, Shengxin Liu and Xinhang Lu

Stable mixing in Hawk–Dove Games under best experienced payoff dynamics pp. 148-161

Srinivas Arigapudi and Yuval Heller

Comparative statics of minimum-cost-spanning-tree games pp. 162-182

Zhibin Tan, Cao Zhigang and Zhengxing Zou

Accountability in Markovian elections pp. 183-217

John Duggan and Jean Guillaume Forand

Going through the roof: On prices for drugs sold through insurance pp. 218-242

Jurjen Kamphorst and Vladimir Karamychev

Volume 150, issue C, 2025

A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices pp. 1-26

Yuya Wakabayashi, Ryosuke Sakai and Shigehiro Serizawa

Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments pp. 27-33

Homa Hosseinzadeh Ranjbar and Mehdi Feizi

When is trust robust? pp. 34-47

Luca Anderlini, Larry Samuelson and Daniele Terlizzese

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem pp. 48-70

Shurojit Chatterji, Jordi Massó and Shigehiro Serizawa

Taming selten's horse with impulse response pp. 71-92

Tibor Neugebauer, Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Reinhard Selten

Supermodularity and incentive reversal in teams pp. 93-105

Svetlana Boyarchenko, Dominika Machowska and Iryna Topolyan

On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets pp. 106-130

Laura Doval and Balázs Szentes

Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis pp. 131-159

Mikhail Freer and Khushboo Surana

Ideological consistency and valence pp. 160-182

Enriqueta Aragonès and Dimitrios Xefteris

Efficient public good provision between and within groups pp. 183-190

Chowdhury Mohammad S Anwar, Jorge Bruno, Renaud Foucart and Sonali SenGupta

Asymptotic full revelation in cheap talk with many senders pp. 191-196

Oleg Rubanov

Corrigendum to: “Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests” pp. 197-197

Zhonghong Kuang, Hangcheng Zhao and Jie Zheng

Endogenous network formation in local public goods: An experimental analysis pp. 198-214

Ying Chen, Tom Lane and Stuart McDonald

The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation pp. 215-234

Xiaoxiao Hu and Haoran Lei

Homophily and infections: Static and dynamic effects pp. 235-259

Matteo Bizzarri, Fabrizio Panebianco and Paolo Pin

The impact of perceived strength in the war of attrition pp. 260-277

David P. Myatt

Contracting with heterogeneous researchers pp. 278-294

Han Wang

Why do children pass in the centipede game? Cognitive limitations v. risk calculations pp. 295-311

Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo

Computing agents' reputation within a network pp. 312-333

Federico Grigis, Sergio Ortobelli Lozza and Sebastiano Vitali

Foundation and identification of multi-attribute Shannon entropy pp. 334-355

David Walker-Jones

Optimal contracts under interpersonal projection pp. 356-364

Kimiyuki Morita, Akitoshi Muramoto and Takeharu Sogo

Occupational segregation in a Roy model with composition preferences pp. 365-386

Haoning Chen, Miaomiao Dong, Marc Henry and Ivan Sidorov

Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information pp. 387-400

Eric van Damme and Xu Lang

Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab pp. 401-414

Emanuel Kandel, Yevgeny Mugerman and Eyal Winter

Complementarity in matching markets and exchange economies pp. 415-435

Marzena Rostek and Nathan Yoder

Move orders in contests: Equilibria and winning chances pp. 436-468

Lei Gao, Jingfeng Lu and Zhewei Wang

Priority, solidarity, and egalitarianism in the capability approach pp. 469-479

Inkee Jang and Biung-Ghi Ju

Nonparametric identification and estimation of the generalized second-price auction pp. 480-500

Ksenia Shakhgildyan

Deterrence in networks pp. 501-517

Leo Bao, Lata Gangadharan and C. Matthew Leister

On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games pp. 518-536

Rodney Falvey, Tom Lane and Shravan Luckraz

The limits of identification in discrete choice pp. 537-551

Christopher Chambers and Christopher Turansick