Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2022

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 134, issue C, 2022

Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest pp. 1-19

Francesc Dilmé

When are groups less moral than individuals? pp. 20-36

Pol Campos-Mercade

Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation pp. 37-51

Zhiwei Cui and Fei Shi

Control, cost, and confidence: Perseverance and procrastination in the face of failure pp. 52-74

Inga Deimen and Julia Wirtz

Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks pp. 75-103

Edoardo Gallo, Yohanes E. Riyanto, Nilanjan Roy and Tat-How Teh

Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing pp. 104-116

Shuchi Chawla, Yifeng Teng and Christos Tzamos

Dynamic semi-consistency pp. 117-126

Sophie Bade

A variant of Harsanyi's tracing procedures to select a perfect equilibrium in normal form games pp. 127-150

Yiyin Cao and Chuangyin Dang

Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation pp. 151-168

Marc P. Saur, Markus G. Schlatterer and Stefanie Y. Schmitt

Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes pp. 169-198

Ai Takeuchi, Róbert Veszteg, Yoshio Kamijo and Yukihiko Funaki

The secretary recommendation problem pp. 199-228

Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer and Rann Smorodinsky

Two-sided strategic information transmission pp. 229-241

Saori Chiba and Kazumi Hori

Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case pp. 242-263

Stéphan Sémirat and Françoise Forges

Simple equilibria in general contests pp. 264-280

Spencer Bastani, Thomas Giebe and Oliver Gürtler

The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation pp. 281-307

Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski and Noam Nisan

Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy pp. 308-343

Constantinos Daskalakis and Vasilis Syrgkanis

Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values pp. 344-360

Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil R. Devanur, Anna R. Karlin and Balasubramanian Sivan

Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets pp. 361-375

Krishnamurthy Dvijotham, Yuval Rabani and Leonard J. Schulman

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria pp. 376-398

Yakov Babichenko and Aviad Rubinstein

On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design pp. 399-427

Christos Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Alexandros Psomas and Aviad Rubinstein

Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding pp. 428-448

Paul Dütting and Thomas Kesselheim

Volume 133, issue C, 2022

Expectations-based loss aversion in contests pp. 1-27

Qiang Fu, Youji Lyu, Zenan Wu and Yuanjie Zhang

Fair cake-cutting in practice pp. 28-49

Maria Kyropoulou, Josué Ortega and Erel Segal-Halevi

The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition pp. 50-57

Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli

Varieties of risk preference elicitation pp. 58-76

Daniel Friedman, Sameh Habib, Duncan James and Brett Williams

Strategic transfers between cooperative games pp. 77-84

Caroline Berden, Hans Peters, Laura Robles and Dries Vermeulen

Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors pp. 85-108

Marieke Pahlke

Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value pp. 109-114

Manfred Besner

Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship pp. 115-125

Shunya Noda

Communication and cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games pp. 126-137

Eric Bahel, Sheryl Ball and Sudipta Sarangi

Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice pp. 138-149

Achille Basile, Surekha Rao and K.P.S. Bhaskara Rao

Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections pp. 150-161

Joseph McMurray

The influence of self and social image concerns on lying pp. 162-169

Zvonimir Bašić and Simone Quercia

Optimal attention management: A tractable framework pp. 170-180

Elliot Lipnowski, Laurent Mathevet and Dong Wei

Parallel markets in school choice pp. 181-201

Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, Piotr Evdokimov, Rustamdjan Hakimov and Bertan Turhan

Prize-linked savings games: Theory and experiment pp. 202-229

Paan Jindapon, Pacharasut Sujarittanonta and Ajalavat Viriyavipart

Listen before you link: Optimal monitoring rules for communication networks pp. 230-247

Shahir Safi

A characterization of proportionally representative committees pp. 248-255

Haris Aziz and Barton Lee

Auctions with flexible information acquisition pp. 256-281

Kyungmin Kim and Youngwoo Koh

Optimal stopping with behaviorally biased agents: The role of loss aversion and changing reference points pp. 282-299

Jon Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg and Sigal Oren

Search equilibrium with unobservable investment pp. 300-330

Neel Rao

Adverse selection and contingent reasoning in preadolescents and teenagers pp. 331-351

Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo

Volume 132, issue C, 2022

Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games pp. 1-21

Marco Pangallo, James B.T. Sanders, Tobias Galla and J. Doyne Farmer

Do people maximize quantiles? pp. 22-40

Luciano de Castro, Antonio F. Galvao, Charles Noussair and Liang Qiao

Statistical discrimination and affirmative action in the lab pp. 41-58

Ahrash Dianat, Federico Echenique and Leeat Yariv

Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance pp. 59-72

Cristina Bicchieri, Eugen Dimant, Simon Gächter and Daniele Nosenzo

Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects pp. 73-89

Patrick Harless and William Phan

Fairness and risk in ultimatum bargaining pp. 90-105

Kyle Hyndman and Matthew J. Walker

Market screening with limited records pp. 106-132

Ayça Kaya and Santanu Roy

A dynamic theory of spatial externalities pp. 133-165

Raouf Boucekkine, Giorgio Fabbri, Salvatore Federico and Fausto Gozzi

Limited Foresight Equilibrium pp. 166-188

Jeevant Rampal

Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions pp. 189-203

Benjamin Rosa

On incentive-compatible estimators pp. 204-220

Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler

Social learning in nonatomic routing games pp. 221-233

Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini and Tristan Tomala

Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices pp. 234-239

Rene Kirkegaard

Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring pp. 240-254

Yaron Azrieli

Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets pp. 255-273

Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo

Equilibrium player choices in team contests with multiple pairwise battles pp. 274-287

Hideo Konishi, Chen-Yu Pan and Dimitar Simeonov

Cheap talk with private signal structures pp. 288-304

Maxim Ivanov and Alex Sam

On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games pp. 305-315

Bin Wu

Local public goods with weighted link formation pp. 316-327

Markus Kinateder and Luca Merlino

The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs pp. 328-336

Elena D'Agostino and Daniel Seidmann

Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests pp. 337-352

Jingfeng Lu, Yuanzhu Lu, Zhewei Wang and Lixue Zhou

Stable cores in information graph games pp. 353-367

Marina Núñez and Juan Vidal-Puga

Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities pp. 368-379

Yusuke Iwase, Shoya Tsuruta and Akina Yoshimura

Voting on tricky questions pp. 380-389

Tomoya Tajika

The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: An extension of the sure-thing principle pp. 390-399

Dov Samet

College admissions with tuition transfers pp. 400-420

Mustafa Oğuz Afacan

Dominant firm and competitive bundling in oligopoly markets pp. 421-447

Jie Shuai, Huanxing Yang and Lan Zhang

Invariant equilibria and classes of equivalent games pp. 448-462

Blake A. Allison, Adib Bagh and Jason J. Lepore

Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation pp. 463-477

Armando Gomes

The general graph matching game: Approximate core pp. 478-486

Vijay V. Vazirani

Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium pp. 487-509

Simon Grant and Ronald Stauber

Affirmative action in the presence of income heterogeneity pp. 510-533

Brishti Guha and Prabal Roy Chowdhury

Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity pp. 534-552

Swagata Bhattacharjee

Robust coalitional implementation pp. 553-575

Huiyi Guo and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Inductive inference with incompleteness pp. 576-591

Shiri Alon, Gilad Bavly and Gabrielle Gayer

Informational robustness of common belief in rationality pp. 592-597

Gabriel Ziegler