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Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2018

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Volume 111, issue C, 2018

On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition pp. 1-15 Downloads
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenaël Piaser
The conditions in the existence results for discontinuous games by Reny and by Simon and Zame are incomparable pp. 16-19 Downloads
Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck
A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions pp. 20-40 Downloads
Martin Bichler and Per Paulsen
A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data pp. 41-63 Downloads
Victor H. Aguiar, Roland Pongou and Jean-Baptiste Tondji
No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems pp. 64-74 Downloads
Stefano Leucci, Akaki Mamageishvili and Paolo Penna
Free intermediation in resource transmission pp. 75-84 Downloads
Lining Han and Ruben Juarez
Agreements with reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs pp. 85-99 Downloads
Dooseok Jang, Amrish Patel and Martin Dufwenberg
Goal bracketing and self-control pp. 100-121 Downloads
Alice Hsiaw
Confidence in knowledge or confidence in the ability to learn: An experiment on the causal effects of beliefs on motivation pp. 122-142 Downloads
Mira Fischer and Dirk Sliwka
A window of cognition: Eyetracking the reasoning process in spatial beauty contest games pp. 143-158 Downloads
Chun-Ting Chen, Chen-Ying Huang and Joseph Wang
(Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem pp. 159-186 Downloads
Theodoros M. Diasakos and Kostas Koufopoulos
Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation pp. 187-202 Downloads
Yuji Fujinaka and Takuma Wakayama
Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals pp. 203-216 Downloads
Michele Lombardi and N. Yoshihara
A simple characterization of responsive choice pp. 217-221 Downloads
Christopher Chambers and M. Bumin Yenmez
Hotelling competition and the gamma distribution pp. 222-240 Downloads
Bassel Tarbush
On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games pp. 241-249 Downloads
Andrew Ellis
Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games pp. 250-273 Downloads
Eray Cumbul and Gábor Virág
Lying opportunities and incentives to lie: Reference dependence versus reputation pp. 274-288 Downloads
Eberhard Feess and Florian Kerzenmacher
On pure-strategy equilibria in games with correlated information pp. 289-304 Downloads
M. Ali Khan and Yongchao Zhang
How long is a minute? pp. 305-322 Downloads
Isabelle Brocas, Juan D. Carrillo and Jorge Tarrasó

Volume 110, issue C, 2018

On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness pp. 1-18 Downloads
Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt and Markus Brill
An axiomatization of plays in repeated games pp. 19-31 Downloads
Laurent Mathevet
Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching pp. 32-49 Downloads
Jose Alcalde
Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information pp. 50-57 Downloads
Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli
Games for cautious players: The Equilibrium in Secure Strategies pp. 58-70 Downloads
M. Iskakov, A. Iskakov and Claude d'Aspremont
The object allocation problem with random priorities pp. 71-89 Downloads
Mustafa Afacan
Preemptive investment under uncertainty pp. 90-119 Downloads
Jan-Henrik Steg
Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: A new proof for Battigalli's theorem pp. 120-138 Downloads
Andrés Perea
The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer pp. 139-164 Downloads
Xi Chen, Ilias Diakonikolas, Dimitris Paparas, Xiaorui Sun and Mihalis Yannakakis
Information acquisition and the value of bad news pp. 165-173 Downloads
Alessandro Ispano
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness pp. 174-193 Downloads
Mu'alem, Ahuva and Michael Schapira
Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment pp. 194-215 Downloads
Lukas M. Wenner
Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games pp. 216-225 Downloads
John Rehbeck
Price competition in product variety networks pp. 226-247 Downloads
Philip Ushchev and Yves Zenou
Rationalizability and logical inference pp. 248-257 Downloads
Dieter Balkenborg
Keep on fighting: The dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions pp. 258-272 Downloads
Derek J. Clark and Tore Nilssen
Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry pp. 273-294 Downloads
Sung-Ha Hwang, Wooyoung Lim, Philip Neary and Jonathan Newton
Matching in the large: An experimental study pp. 295-317 Downloads
Yan Chen, Ming Jiang, Onur Kesten, Stéphane Robin and Min Zhu
To reveal or not to reveal: Privacy preferences and economic frictions pp. 318-329 Downloads
Ned Augenblick and Aaron Bodoh-Creed
Dynamic communication with biased senders pp. 330-339 Downloads
Chiara Margaria and Alex Smolin

Volume 109, issue C, 2018

Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining pp. 1-20 Downloads
Volker Britz
Belief updating and the demand for information pp. 21-39 Downloads
Sandro Ambuehl and Shengwu Li
An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner pp. 40-64 Downloads
Brit Grosskopf, Lucas Rentschler and Rajiv Sarin
Volunteering under population uncertainty pp. 65-81 Downloads
Adrian Hillenbrand and Fabian Winter
A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: Axiomatic and strategic perspectives pp. 82-98 Downloads
Cheng-Cheng Hu, Min-Hung Tsay and Chun-Hsien Yeh
A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly pp. 99-103 Downloads
Rabah Amir and Igor V. Evstigneev
Equilibrium informativeness in veto games pp. 104-125 Downloads
Dmitry Lubensky and Eric Schmidbauer
Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams pp. 126-131 Downloads
Henrique de Oliveira
Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games pp. 132-155 Downloads
Andreas Blume
Cognitive ability and games of school choice pp. 156-183 Downloads
Christian Basteck and Marco Mantovani
Noncooperative oligopoly in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders pp. 184-200 Downloads
Sayantan Ghosal and Simone Tonin
The lattice of envy-free matchings pp. 201-211 Downloads
Qingyun Wu and Alvin E. Roth
The Skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: Theory and experiment pp. 212-239 Downloads
Toshiji Kawagoe, Taisuke Matsubae and Hirokazu Takizawa
Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers pp. 240-261 Downloads
Debasis Mishra, Swaprava Nath and Souvik Roy
Information diffusion in networks with the Bayesian Peer Influence heuristic pp. 262-270 Downloads
Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin
Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics pp. 271-293 Downloads
Dean P. Foster and Sergiu Hart
Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination pp. 294-310 Downloads
Subhasish Dugar and Quazi Shahriar
Goal setting in the principal–agent model: Weak incentives for strong performance pp. 311-326 Downloads
Brice Corgnet, Joaquin Gomez-Minambres and Hernán-González, Roberto
Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule pp. 327-363 Downloads
Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs pp. 364-381 Downloads
Drew Fudenberg and Yuichiro Kamada
Bounded memory and incomplete information pp. 382-400 Downloads
Benjamin Sperisen
Sampled fictitious play is Hannan consistent pp. 401-412 Downloads
Zifan Li and Ambuj Tewari
On random social choice functions with the tops-only property pp. 413-435 Downloads
Shurojit Chatterji and Huaxia Zeng
Perceived motives and reciprocity pp. 436-451 Downloads
A. Yeşim Orhun
Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted pp. 452-464 Downloads
Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson
Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information pp. 465-483 Downloads
Jon Eguia, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Rebecca Morton and Antonio Nicolò
A theory of bargaining deadlock pp. 501-522 Downloads
Ilwoo Hwang
Indexing gamble desirability by extending proportional stochastic dominance pp. 523-543 Downloads
Ziv Hellman and Amnon Schreiber
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory pp. 544-564 Downloads
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick Schmitz
Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks pp. 565-581 Downloads
Shachar Kariv, Maciej H. Kotowski and Christian Leister
Contracting under uncertainty: A principal–agent model with ambiguity averse parties pp. 582-597 Downloads
Simon Grant, J. Jude Kline and John Quiggin
Speculation under unawareness pp. 598-615 Downloads
Spyros Galanis
Learning the fundamentals in a stationary environment pp. 616-624 Downloads
Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Eran Shmaya
Financially-constrained lawyers: An economic theory of legal disputes pp. 625-647 Downloads
Claudia Landeo and Maxim Nikitin
Page updated 2018-12-16