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Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2019

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Volume 114, issue C, 2019

The problem of multiple commons: A market design approach pp. 1-27 Downloads
Ryan Tierney
Coalition preclusion contracts and moderate policies pp. 28-46 Downloads
Hans Gersbach, Maik T. Schneider and Oriol Tejada
A variational inequality framework for network games: Existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis pp. 47-82 Downloads
Francesca Parise and Asuman Ozdaglar
Bargaining with private information and the option of a compulsory license pp. 83-100 Downloads
Eric W. Bond and Larry Samuelson
Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings pp. 101-117 Downloads
Emiliano Catonini
The evolution of collaboration in symmetric 2×2-games with imperfect recognition of types pp. 118-127 Downloads
Hannes Rusch
Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: A strategy method approach pp. 128-145 Downloads
Timothy Cason and Vai-Lam Mui
Political rents and voter information in search equilibrium pp. 146-168 Downloads
Jørgen Andersen and Tom-Reiel Heggedal
Endogenous institutional selection, building trust, and economic growth pp. 169-176 Downloads
Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.
Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game pp. 177-192 Downloads
Pérez-Castrillo, David and Marilda Sotomayor
Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining pp. 193-214 Downloads
Andrea Isoni, Anders Poulsen, Robert Sugden and Kei Tsutsui
Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies pp. 232-252 Downloads
Daniel E. Fragiadakis and Peter Troyan
An experiment on the efficiency of bilateral exchange under incomplete markets pp. 253-267 Downloads
Olga A. Rud, Jean Paul Rabanal and Manizha Sharifova
The market for talent: Competition for resources and self-governance in teams pp. 268-284 Downloads
Abhijit Ramalingam, Brock V. Stoddard and James M. Walker
Recursive non-expected utility: Connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity pp. 285-307 Downloads
Özgür Evren
Welfare maximization entices participation pp. 308-314 Downloads
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt and Johannes Hofbauer
A note on “Renegotiation in repeated games” [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327–360] pp. 318-323 Downloads
Michael Günther, Christoph Kuzmics and Antoine Salomon

Volume 113, issue C, 2019

A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions pp. 4-16 Downloads
Berthold Vöcking
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design pp. 17-37 Downloads
Konstantinos Georgiou and Chaitanya Swamy
Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition) pp. 38-57 Downloads
Amos Fiat, Elias Koutsoupias, Katrina Ligett, Yishay Mansour and Svetlana Olonetsky
Competitive contagion in networks pp. 58-79 Downloads
Sanjeev Goyal, Hoda Heidari and Michael Kearns
Optimal crowdsourcing contests pp. 80-96 Downloads
Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline and Balasubramanian Sivan
Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design pp. 97-115 Downloads
Robert Kleinberg and S. Matthew Weinberg
Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions pp. 116-136 Downloads
Francesc Dilmé
Promises, expectations & causation pp. 137-146 Downloads
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa and Francesco Passarelli
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment pp. 147-163 Downloads
Flip Klijn, Joana Pais and Marc Vorsatz
On equilibria in games with imperfect recall pp. 164-185 Downloads
Nicolas S. Lambert, Adrian Marple and Yoav Shoham
Hodge decomposition and the Shapley value of a cooperative game pp. 186-198 Downloads
Ari Stern and Alexander Tettenhorst
Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets pp. 199-208 Downloads
Bertan Turhan
Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders pp. 209-222 Downloads
Indranil Chakraborty
Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli pp. 223-247 Downloads
Yuval Heller and Erik Mohlin
Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions pp. 248-261 Downloads
Martínez- de-Albéniz, F. Javier, Carlos Rafels and Neus Ybern
Regime change in large information networks pp. 262-284 Downloads
Joan de Martí and Pau Milán
Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations pp. 285-305 Downloads
Matías Núñez and Marcus Pivato
Manipulated news model: Electoral competition and mass media pp. 306-338 Downloads
Shintaro Miura
Polyequilibrium pp. 339-355 Downloads
Igal Milchtaich
Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response pp. 356-380 Downloads
Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim
Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: When are evolutionary models reliable? pp. 381-395 Downloads
Daniel Stephenson
The instability of matching with overconfident agents pp. 396-415 Downloads
Siqi Pan
Credit auctions and bid caps pp. 416-422 Downloads
David Lagziel
Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions pp. 423-447 Downloads
Yves Breitmoser
Gossip and the efficiency of interactions pp. 448-460 Downloads
Dietmar Fehr and Matthias Sutter
The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting pp. 461-481 Downloads
Rebecca B. Morton, Marco Piovesan and Jean-Robert Tyran
How to choose your victim pp. 482-496 Downloads
Klaus Abbink and Gönül Doğan
Citizens or lobbies: Who controls policy? pp. 497-514 Downloads
Paolo Roberti
Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: A strategic perspective pp. 515-532 Downloads
Min-Hung Tsay and Chun-Hsien Yeh
Exclusive intermediation in unobservable networks pp. 533-548 Downloads
Itay P. Fainmesser
Testing models of belief bias: An experiment pp. 549-565 Downloads
Alexander Coutts
Testing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs in games using eye-tracking pp. 566-586 Downloads
Luca Polonio and Giorgio Coricelli
The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games pp. 587-610 Downloads
Nobuyuki Hanaki, Yukio Koriyama, Angela Sutan and Marc Willinger
Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets pp. 611-632 Downloads
Gagan Ghosh and Heng Liu
Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems pp. 633-650 Downloads
Ryoji Sawa
Communication is more than information sharing: The role of status-relevant knowledge pp. 651-672 Downloads
Michael Kurschilgen and Isabel Marcin
Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains pp. 673-693 Downloads
Swaprava Nath and Tuomas Sandholm
Voting with public information pp. 694-719 Downloads
Shuo Liu
A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining pp. 720-733 Downloads
Juan Ortner
The degree and cost adjusted folk solution for minimum cost spanning tree games pp. 734-742 Downloads
Henk Norde
The informativeness principle without the first-order approach pp. 743-755 Downloads
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Contests between groups of unknown size pp. 756-769 Downloads
Luke Boosey, Philip Brookins and Dmitry Ryvkin
Belief-updating rule and sequential reciprocity pp. 770-780 Downloads
Lianjie Jiang and Jiabin Wu
Page updated 2019-04-22