Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (repec@elsevier.com).

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Volume 93, issue C, 2015

Mandate and paternalism: A theory of large elections pp. 1-23

Marco Faravelli, Priscilla Man and Randall Walsh

Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution pp. 24-41

Victor Naroditskiy and Richard Steinberg

Markets, correlation, and regret-matching pp. 42-58

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority pp. 59-88

Brett Graham and Dan Bernhardt

Focal points and bargaining in housing markets pp. 89-107

Devin Pope, Jaren Pope and Justin R. Sydnor

Agreeing to agree and Dutch books pp. 108-116

Yi-Chun Chen, Ehud Lehrer, Jiangtao Li, Dov Samet and Eran Shmaya

Legislative bargaining with teams pp. 117-127

Anthony J. Bradfield and John Kagel

Volume 92, issue C, 2015

Decentralized matching: The role of commitment pp. 1-17

Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Eiichi Miyagawa and Licun Xue

Making just school assignments pp. 18-27

Thayer Morrill

Persuasion with communication costs pp. 28-40

Jonas Hedlund

Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma pp. 41-52

Christian Hilbe, Arne Traulsen and Karl Sigmund

Personalized pricing and advertising: An asymmetric equilibrium analysis pp. 53-73

Simon Anderson, Alicia Baik and Nathan Larson

Social cohesion and the evolution of altruism pp. 74-105

José A. García-Martínez and Fernando Vega-Redondo

Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent pp. 106-121

Jonathan Tan, Yves Breitmoser and Friedel Bolle

Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks pp. 122-137

James Malcomson

Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions pp. 138-149

Nora Szech

Indirect control and power in mutual control structures pp. 150-165

Dominik Karos and Hans Peters

Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads pp. 166-190

Jung S. You

Bribing in second-price auctions pp. 191-205

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Auction fever: Rising revenue in second-price auction formats pp. 206-227

Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Marion Ott and Susanne Abele

A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time pp. 232-247

Umang Bhaskar, Lisa Fleischer and Elliot Anshelevich

How bad is forming your own opinion? pp. 248-265

David Bindel, Jon Kleinberg and Sigal Oren

Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing pp. 266-305

Yang Cai and Constantinos Daskalakis

Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games pp. 306-326

Richard Cole, José R. Correa, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Vahab Mirrokni and Neil Olver

Near-optimal no-regret algorithms for zero-sum games pp. 327-348

Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum and Anthony Kim

Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders pp. 349-369

Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu and Robert Kleinberg

Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions pp. 370-400

Shaddin Dughmi and Jan Vondrák

Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings pp. 401-429

Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg and Azarakhsh Malekian

Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors pp. 430-454

Christos Papadimitriou and George Pierrakos

Volume 91, issue C, 2015

Competitive economy as a ranking device over networks pp. 1-13

Ye Du, Ehud Lehrer and Ady Pauzner

Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games pp. 14-25

Adrian de Groot Ruiz, Theo Offerman and Sander Onderstal

Discontinuous games with asymmetric information: An extension of Reny's existence theorem pp. 26-35

Wei He and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Interim partially correlated rationalizability pp. 36-44

Qianfeng Tang

Plausible cooperation pp. 45-59

Olivier Compte and Andrew Postlewaite

Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders pp. 60-74

Pauli Murto and Juuso Välimäki

Pessimistic information gathering pp. 75-96

Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort

Firing threats: Incentive effects and impression management pp. 97-113

Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González and Stephen Rassenti

An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk pp. 114-144

Ernest K. Lai, Wooyoung Lim and Joseph Wang

Strategic disclosure of feasible options pp. 145-165

Geoffroy de Clippel and Kfir Eliaz

Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring pp. 166-185

Itai Arieli and Yehuda Levy

Blind stealing: Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment pp. 186-206

Matthew Van Essen and John Wooders

Outside opportunities and termination pp. 207-228

Cheng Wang and Youzhi Yang

Time and Nash implementation pp. 229-236

Georgy Artemov

Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations pp. 237-257

Salvador Barberà, Carmen Bevia and Clara Ponsati

Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners pp. 258-267

Makoto Shimoji and Paul Schweinzer

The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets pp. 268-282

Ratul Lahkar and Frank Riedel

Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange pp. 284-296

Itai Ashlagi, Felix Fischer, Ian A. Kash and Ariel D. Procaccia

The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design pp. 297-317

Shuchi Chawla, David Malec and Balasubramanian Sivan

Revenue maximization with a single sample pp. 318-333

Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden and Qiqi Yan

Selling privacy at auction pp. 334-346

Arpita Ghosh and Aaron Roth

Polynomial-time computation of exact correlated equilibrium in compact games pp. 347-359

Albert Xin Jiang and Kevin Leyton-Brown

Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs pp. 360-382

Panos Toulis and David C. Parkes