Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 97, issue C, 128-146

Abstract: We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogeneous objects to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties (unavailable-type-invariance, individual-rationality, weak non-wastefulness, or truncation-invariance).

Keywords: Indivisible objects allocation; Deferred-acceptance-algorithm; Strategy-proofness; Resource-monotonicity; Population-monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics (2014)
Working Paper: Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics (2014)
Working Paper: Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:97:y:2016:i:c:p:128-146

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.001

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