Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 143, issue C, 2024

Buying winners pp. 1-11

Charles Louis-Sidois

Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules pp. 12-24

R. Pablo Arribillaga and Agustín Bonifacio

Rejection-proof mechanisms for multi-agent kidney exchange pp. 25-50

Danny Blom, Bart Smeulders and Frits Spieksma

Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values pp. 51-76

Yuval Heller and Christoph Kuzmics

Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities pp. 77-102

Ville Korpela, Michele Lombardi and Riccardo D. Saulle

School choice with transferable student characteristics pp. 103-124

Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez and Antonio Romero-Medina

Social roles and competitiveness: My willingness to compete depends on who I am (supposed to be) pp. 125-151

Peilu Zhang, Yinjunjie Zhang and Marco Palma

Order independence for rationalizability pp. 152-160

Julien Manili

Auction timing and market thickness pp. 161-178

Isaías N. Chaves and Shota Ichihashi

Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments pp. 179-190

Tobias Cagala, Ulrich Glogowsky, Johannes Rincke and Simeon Schudy

The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism pp. 191-203

Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene) and Joosung Lee

Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations pp. 204-222

Bo Chen and Bo Chen

Believe it or not: Experimental evidence on sunspot equilibria with social networks pp. 223-247

Pietro Battiston and Sharon Harrison

School choice with costly information acquisition pp. 248-268

Tyler Maxey

Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems pp. 269-286

Yoichi Kasajima and Manabu Toda

Reallocation with priorities pp. 287-299

Julien Combe and Jan Christoph Schlegel

The n-player Hirshleifer contest pp. 300-320

Christian Ewerhart and Guang-Zhen Sun

Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences pp. 321-339

Adriana Piazza and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Independent versus collective expertise pp. 340-356

Emiliano Catonini, Andrey Kurbatov and Sergey Stepanov

Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market pp. 357-369

Helmut Bester and József Sákovics

Volume 142, issue C, 2023

The in-group egalitarian Owen values pp. 1-16

Takaaki Abe and Satoshi Nakada

Location games with references pp. 17-32

Gaëtan Fournier and Amaury Francou

Coordinated democracy pp. 33-45

Dimitrios Xefteris

Lying for votes pp. 46-72

Subhasish Dugar and Quazi Shahriar

Screening for experiments pp. 73-100

Daehong Min

Submission costs in risk-taking contests pp. 101-112

Mark Whitmeyer

Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment pp. 113-149

Valeria Burdea, Maria Montero and Martin Sefton

Bad reputation with simple rating systems pp. 150-178

Caio Lorecchio and Daniel Monte

Leadership ability and agenda choice pp. 179-192

Ilwoo Hwang and Stefan Krasa

Voting with interdependent values: The Condorcet winner pp. 193-208

Alex Gershkov, Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu and Xianwen Shi

Accomplice plea bargains in the presence of costly juror effort pp. 209-225

Brishti Guha

Losing money to make money: The benefits of redistribution in collective bargaining in sports pp. 226-242

Akhil Vohra

Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms pp. 243-265

Mihai Manea and Eric Maskin

Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences pp. 266-291

Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer and Warut Suksompong

Markovian persuasion with two states pp. 292-314

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Penélope Hernández, Zvika Neeman and Eilon Solan

A multi-agent model of misspecified learning with overconfidence pp. 315-338

Cuimin Ba and Alice Gindin

Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior pp. 339-356

Rainer Berkemer, Jens Starke and Atsushi Kawamoto

Revealed deliberate preference change pp. 357-367

Niels Boissonnet, Alexis Ghersengorin and Simon Gleyze

An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation pp. 368-380

Ritesh Jain, Michele Lombardi and Christoph Müller

Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections pp. 381-410

Jacob Meyer and Lucas Rentschler

Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: District-based versus school-based admissions pp. 411-422

Lars Ehlers

Robust equilibria in tournaments pp. 423-439

Lining Han, Ruben Juarez and Miguel Vargas

Ex-post implementation with interdependent values pp. 440-453

Saurav Goyal and Aroon Narayanan

Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game pp. 454-479

Simin He and Xun Zhu

Paying for what kind of performance? Performance pay, multitasking, and sorting in mission-oriented jobs pp. 480-507

Daniel B. Jones, Mirco Tonin, Michael Vlassopoulos and Kanatip Winichakul

Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: Approvals can be harder than strict preferences pp. 508-526

Matthias Bentert, Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger and Tomohiro Koana

Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games pp. 527-551

Pierpaolo Battigalli, E. Catonini and J. Manili

Preventive wars pp. 552-569

Klaus Abbink, Lu Dong and Lingbo Huang

Evolution and the ultimatum game pp. 570-612

Aslıhan Akdeniz and Matthijs van Veelen

Communication between unbiased agents pp. 613-622

Francesc Dilme

Policy experimentation with repeated elections pp. 623-644

Ilwoo Hwang

Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints pp. 645-665

Feifei Lu and Fei Shi

Sharing cost of network among users with differentiated willingness to pay pp. 666-689

Elena Panova

Guilt aversion in (new) games: Does partners' payoff vulnerability matter? pp. 690-717

Giuseppe Attanasi, Claire Rimbaud and Marie Claire Villeval

Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown pp. 718-729

Kfir Eliaz and Alexander Frug

Bargaining: Nash, Consensus, or Compromise? pp. 730-742

Xiangliang Li

Fairly taking turns pp. 743-764

Andrew Mackenzie and Vilmos Komornik

On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust pp. 765-793

Sebastiano Della Lena, Elena Manzoni and Fabrizio Panebianco

Stable constitutions pp. 794-811

Daeyoung Jeong and Semin Kim

The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study pp. 812-832

Andrew Kloosterman and Shakun Mago

Influencing a polarized and connected legislature pp. 833-850

Ratul Das Chaudhury, C. Matthew Leister and Birendra Rai

Stochastic replicator dynamics: A theoretical analysis and an experimental assessment pp. 851-865

Kangkan Dev Choudhury and Tigran Aydinyan

The development gap in economic rationality of future elites pp. 866-878

Alexander Cappelen, Shachar Kariv, Erik Sørensen and Bertil Tungodden

Influence relation in two-output multichoice voting games pp. 879-895

Joseph Siani, Narcisse Tedjeugang and Bertrand Tchantcho

Signal-jamming in the frequency domain pp. 896-930

B. Taub

Predictably competitive? What faces can tell us about competitive behavior pp. 931-940

Loukas Balafoutas, Helena Fornwagner and Brit Grosskopf

Strategic default in financial networks pp. 941-954

Nizar Allouch, Maya Jalloul and Alfred Duncan

Asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: Theory and experiment pp. 955-977

Toshiji Kawagoe, Hirokazu Takizawa and Tetsuo Yamamori

Effort discrimination and curvature of contest technology in conflict networks pp. 978-991

Xiang Sun, Jin Xu and Junjie Zhou

Constrained contests with a continuum of battles pp. 992-1011

Sung-Ha Hwang, Youngwoo Koh and Jingfeng Lu

Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result pp. 1012-1017

Wonki Jo Cho and William Thomson

Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies pp. 1018-1042

Stefanie Y. Schmitt and Dominik Bruckner