Efficient matching under general constraints

Kenzo Imamura and Yasushi Kawase

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 145, issue C, 197-207

Abstract: We study indivisible goods allocation problems under constraints and provide algorithms to check whether a given matching is Pareto efficient. We first show that the serial dictatorship algorithm can be used to check Pareto efficiency if the constraints are matroid. To prove this, we develop a generalized top trading cycles algorithm. Moreover, we show that the matroid structure is necessary for obtaining all Pareto efficient matchings by the serial dictatorship algorithm. Second, we provide an extension of the serial dictatorship algorithm to check Pareto efficiency under general constraints. As an application of our results to prioritized allocations, we discuss Pareto improving the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Keywords: Matching with constraints; Efficient matching; Serial dictatorship; Top trading cycles; Matroid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:145:y:2024:i:c:p:197-207

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.013

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