Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 107, issue C, 2018

Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities pp. 1-20

Xiang Han

Reward schemes pp. 21-40

David Lagziel and Ehud Lehrer

Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions pp. 41-59

Tommy Andersson and Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: Theory and experiments pp. 60-92

Luis Miller, Maria Montero and Christoph Vanberg

Collusion through communication in auctions pp. 93-108

Marina Agranov and Leeat Yariv

Stable biased sampling pp. 109-122

Samuel Hafner

Is increasing inequality harmful? Experimental evidence pp. 123-134

Dietmar Fehr

Constitutions and groups pp. 135-152

Ana Mauleon, Nils Roehl and Vincent Vannetelbosch

How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information? pp. 153-181

Tore Ellingsen, Robert Östling and Erik Wengström

Output restriction and the ratchet effect: Evidence from a real-effort work task pp. 182-202

Eric Cardella and Briggs Depew

Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations pp. 203-219

Huanren Zhang

Cooperation in partly observable networked markets pp. 220-237

Itay Fainmesser and David A. Goldberg

Discrimination, social identity, and coordination: An experiment pp. 238-252

Vessela Daskalova

Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust pp. 253-281

Miguel Fonseca and Kim Peters

Do beliefs about peers matter for donation matching? Experiments in the field and laboratory pp. 282-297

Laura Gee and Michael J. Schreck

Buridanic competition pp. 298-315

Benjamin Bachi and Ran Spiegler

Inequality and risk-taking behaviour pp. 316-328

Ed Hopkins

Temptation and commitment in the laboratory pp. 329-344

Daniel Houser, Daniel Schunk, Joachim Winter and Erte Xiao

On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games pp. 345-363

Sourav Bhattacharya, Maria Goltsman and Arijit Mukherjee

Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game pp. 364-379

Jun Xiao

Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning pp. 380-395

Kfir Eliaz and Alexander Frug

Volume 106, issue C, 2017

An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions pp. 1-15

Nozomu Muto and Shin Sato

Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games pp. 16-37

James R. Wright and Kevin Leyton-Brown

Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule pp. 38-50

Mariam Arzumanyan and Mattias K Polborn

Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks pp. 51-74

F. Gauer and Tim Hellmann

Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games pp. 75-88

Christian Seel and Elias Tsakas

Bilateral trading and incomplete information: Price convergence in a small market pp. 89-113

Kalyan Chatterjee and Kaustav Das

Selecting efficient correlated equilibria through distributed learning pp. 114-133

Jason R. Marden

Introspective unawareness and observable choice pp. 134-152

Evan Piermont

Information control in reputational cheap talk pp. 153-160

Nejat Anbarci, Saptarshi P. Ghosh and Jaideep Roy

Promises and expectations pp. 161-178

Florian Ederer and Alexander Stremitzer

The procedural egalitarian solution pp. 179-187

Bas Dietzenbacher, Peter Borm and Ruud Hendrickx

Limited rationality and the strategic environment: Further theory and experimental evidence pp. 188-208

Kristen B. Cooper, Henry S. Schneider and Michael Waldman

Applying “theory of mind”: Theory and experiments pp. 209-226

Erik Kimbrough, Nikolaus Robalino and Arthur Robson

Evaluationwise strategy-proofness pp. 227-238

Bora Erdamar, Remzi Sanver and Shin Sato

Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants pp. 239-259

Alessandra Casella, Jean-François Laslier and Antonin Macé

Political institutions and the evolution of character traits pp. 260-276

Jiabin Wu

Price-setting and attainment of equilibrium: Posted offers versus an administered price pp. 277-293

Sean M. Collins, Duncan James, Maroš Servátka and Daniel Woods

Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey pp. 294-316

Renato Paes Leme

Sequential versus static screening: An equivalence result pp. 317-328

Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz

The cost of segregation in (social) networks pp. 329-342

Nizar Allouch

Volume 105, issue C, 2017

Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem pp. 1-8

Chao Huang and Guoqiang Tian

Balanced ranking mechanisms pp. 9-39

Yan Long, Debasis Mishra and Tridib Sharma

Peer effects and local congestion in networks pp. 40-58

Sergio Currarini, Elena Fumagalli and Fabrizio Panebianco

Modularity and greed in double auctions pp. 59-83

Paul Dütting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Tim Roughgarden

Optimal targeting strategies in a network under complementarities pp. 84-103

Gabrielle Demange

Auctions with selective entry pp. 104-111

Matthew Gentry, Tong Li and Jingfeng Lu

Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates pp. 112-121

Dimitrios Xefteris

The Inverse Shapley value problem pp. 122-147

Anindya De, Ilias Diakonikolas and Rocco A. Servedio

On the externality-free Shapley–Shubik index pp. 148-154

Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, J.M. Alonso-Meijide and M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro

Paternalism, homophily and cultural transmission in random networks pp. 155-176

Fabrizio Panebianco and Thierry Verdier

Social motives vs social influence: An experiment on interdependent time preferences pp. 177-194

Ismael Rodriguez-Lara and Giovanni Ponti

Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction pp. 195-211

Christian Ewerhart

Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence pp. 212-229

Luke Boosey, Philip Brookins and Dmitry Ryvkin

Contagion exposure and protection technology pp. 230-254

Diego Cerdeiro

Privacy-constrained network formation pp. 255-275

Daron Acemoglu, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian and Asuman Ozdaglar

Communication and visibility in public goods provision pp. 276-296

Ernan Haruvy, Sherry Li, Kevin McCabe and Peter Twieg

Sequential commitment games pp. 297-315

Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko and Moshe Tennenholtz

Wary of the worst: Maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive pp. 316-328

Patrick Harless

Cooperating over losses and competing over gains: A social dilemma experiment pp. 329-348

Alessandro Ispano and Peter Schwardmann

Peer effects in endogenous networks pp. 349-367

Timo Hiller