Coalition preferences with individual prospects

Manel Baucells and Dov Samet

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 108, issue C, 585-591

Abstract: We consider a group of individuals, such that each coalition of them is endowed with a preference relation, which may be incomplete, over a given set of prospects, and such that the extended Pareto rule holds. We assume that each singleton coalition has complete vNM preferences. In this setup, Baucells and Shapley (2008) gave a sufficient condition for a coalition to have complete preferences, in terms of the completeness of preferences of certain pairs of individuals. The new property that we introduce of individual prospects requires each individual to have a pair of consequences between which only she is not indifferent. We show that with this property a weaker condition guarantees the completeness of preferences of a coalition: it suffices for a coalition to be a union of a connected family of coalitions with complete preferences.

Keywords: Preference aggregation; Incomplete preferences; Extended Pareto rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D70 D71 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825617301781
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:585-591

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.006

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().