Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 46, issue 2, 2004

Does observation influence learning? pp. 221-239

Olivier Armantier

Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games pp. 240-259

Andreas Blume and Tone Arnold

How to identify trust and reciprocity pp. 260-281

James Cox

Learning to play Bayesian games pp. 282-303

Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Learning with perfect information pp. 304-324

Pradeep Dubey and Ori Haimanko

A characterization of strategic complementarities pp. 325-347

Federico Echenique

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities pp. 348-364

Federico Echenique

A model of noisy introspection pp. 365-382

Jacob Goeree and Charles Holt

Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions pp. 383-397

Jinwoo Kim and Yeon-Koo Che

Learning by matching patterns pp. 398-409

Val Lambson and Daniel A. Probst

The averaging mechanism pp. 410-424

E. Naeve-Steinweg

A note on one-shot public mediated talk pp. 425-433

Alfredo Di Tillio

Volume 46, issue 1, 2004

Word-of-mouth learning pp. 1-22

Abhijit Banerjee and Drew Fudenberg

Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium pp. 23-40

Anthony Burton and Martin Sefton

A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy pp. 41-54

Francesco De Sinopoli

When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable? pp. 55-75

Amrita Dhillon and Ben Lockwood

Ordinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining pp. 76-87

Özgür Kıbrıs

Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods pp. 88-114

Wojciech Olszewski

On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment pp. 115-128

Christopher Phelan

An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players pp. 129-142

Zvi Safra and Dov Samet

Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring pp. 143-173

Amparo Urbano and Jose Vila

The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions pp. 174-188

Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai and Shigeo Matsubara

The possibility of speculative trade between dynamically consistent agents pp. 189-198

Yoram Halevy

Implementation in the many-to-many matching market pp. 199-212

Marilda Sotomayor

Honor, Symbols, and War: By Barry O'Neill, University of Michigan Press, 1999 pp. 213-214

Itzhak Gilboa

Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3: Edited by Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, Elsevier, New York, 2002 pp. 215-218

Barry O'Neill

Erratum to "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly": [Games Econ. Behav. 43 (1) (2003) 57-85] pp. 219-219

Sanjeev Goyal and Sumit Joshi

Volume 45, issue 2, 2003

Introduction to the special issue in memory of Robert W. Rosenthal pp. 271-277

Andrew Postlewaite and Robert Wilson

Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games pp. 278-295

Balazs Szentes and Robert Rosenthal

Equilibrium selection in bargaining models pp. 296-328

Ken Binmore, Larry Samuelson and H. Young

Bayesian learning in social networks pp. 329-346

Douglas Gale and Shachar Kariv

Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game pp. 347-368

Uri Gneezy, Ernan Haruvy and Alvin Roth

A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem pp. 369-374

Srihari Govindan, Philip Reny and Arthur Robson

Regret-based continuous-time dynamics pp. 375-394

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions pp. 395-409

Eric Maskin and John Riley

Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty pp. 410-433

Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite

Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting pp. 434-441

Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein

Monopolists and viscous demand pp. 442-464

Roy Radner and Thomas J. Richardson

Walrasian bargaining pp. 465-487

Muhamet Yildiz

Auction Theory: By Vijay Krishna. Academic Press, 2002 pp. 488-497

Robert Weber

Volume 45, issue 1, 2003

Introduction to the Games 2000 Special Issue pp. 1-1

Ehud Kalai

Presidential address pp. 2-14

Robert Aumann

Introductory remarks on the history of game theory pp. 15-18

Kenneth Arrow

How to play (3 x 3)-games.: A strategy method experiment pp. 19-37

Reinhard Selten, Klaus Abbink, Joachim Buchta and Abdolkarim Sadrieh

Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions pp. 38-72

Pierpaolo Battigalli and Marciano Siniscalchi

Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium pp. 73-96

Dean Foster and H. Young

Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games pp. 97-113

Jacob Goeree, Charles Holt and Thomas Palfrey

A computer scientist looks at game theory pp. 114-131

Joseph Halpern

On authority distributions in organizations: equilibrium pp. 132-152

Xingwei Hu and Lloyd Shapley

On authority distributions in organizations: controls pp. 153-170

Xingwei Hu and Lloyd Shapley

Costly Nash paths pp. 171-180

Yakar Kannai

Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games pp. 181-221

Daphne Koller and Brian Milch

Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information pp. 222-241

Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite

Filling a multicolor urn: an axiomatic analysis pp. 242-269

Herve Moulin and Richard Stong