Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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On Market Games When Agents Cannot Be in Two Places at Once pp. 165-173: Rodney Garratt and Cheng-Zhong Qin
Perfect versus Imperfect Observability--An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result pp. 174-190: Steffen Huck and Wieland Müller
Ambiguous Games pp. 191-219: Massimo Marinacci
k-Price Auctions pp. 220-244: Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz
Absorbing Team Games pp. 245-261: Eilon Solan
Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game pp. 262-293: Catherine J. Weinberger
Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems pp. 294-302: Jose Alcalde and Antonio Romero-Medina
Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games pp. 303-310: Levent Kockesen, Efe Ok and Rajiv Sethi
Rationalizable Trade pp. 311-323: Stephen Morris and Costis Skiadas
Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance pp. 324-329: Leslie Marx and Jeroen Swinkels

One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures pp. 1-25: Rabah Amir and John Wooders
Cores of Inventory Centralization Games pp. 26-49: Bruce C. Hartman, Moshe Dror and Moshe Shaked
Adaptive Dynamics in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations pp. 50-96: Yuri (Yuriy) Kaniovski (Kaniovskyi), Arkadii V. Kryazhimskii and H. Young
Maximum Games, Dominance Solvability, and Coordination pp. 97-105: Marco Mariotti
Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms pp. 106-120: David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein
A Shapley Value Representation of Potential Games pp. 121-135: Takashi Ui
Cournot-Nash Equilibria in Limit Exchange Economies with Complete Markets: A Comparison between Two Models pp. 136-146: Giulio Codognato
An Alternative Proof of an Equilibrium Existence Theorem in Exchange Economies with Indivisibilities pp. 147-151: Jinpeng Ma
Fictitious Play in 2 x 3 Games pp. 152-162: Aner Sela

Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game pp. 163-182: Martin Dufwenberg and Uri Gneezy
Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria pp. 183-215: Jürgen Eichberger and David Kelsey
A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures pp. 216-227: Chaim Fershtman
Repeated Games with Bounded Entropy pp. 228-247: Abraham Neyman and Daijiro Okada
Bargaining Through Agents: An Experimental Study of Delegation and Commitment pp. 248-292: Andrew Schotter, Wei Zheng and Blaine Snyder
Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation pp. 293-318: James Schummer
An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Form Evolutionary Games pp. 319-326: Marc Chamberland and Ross Cressman

Stable Coalition Structures with Open Membership and Asymmetric Firms pp. 1-21: Paul Belleflamme
Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions pp. 22-43: Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale
Comparison of Information Structures pp. 44-63: Olivier Gossner
Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda pp. 64-82: Roman Inderst
Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price pp. 83-114: Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico
Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game pp. 115-141: Giovanni Ponti
Extracting Interaction-Created Surplus pp. 142-162: Ran Spiegler

Introduction to the Special Issue pp. 1-6: Rakesh Vohra, David Levine and Dean Foster
Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem pp. 7-35: Dean Foster and Rakesh Vohra
Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play in Perturbed Games pp. 36-72: Michel Benaim and Morris W. Hirsch
A Proof of Calibration via Blackwell's Approachability Theorem pp. 73-78: Dean Foster
Adaptive Game Playing Using Multiplicative Weights pp. 79-103: Yoav Freund and Robert E. Schapire
Conditional Universal Consistency pp. 104-130: Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
An Easier Way to Calibrate pp. 131-137: Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
A Note on Best Response Dynamics pp. 138-150: Ed Hopkins
Calibrated Forecasting and Merging pp. 151-169: Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer and Rann Smorodinsky
The Role of Absolute Continuity in "Merging of Opinions" and "Rational Learning" pp. 170-190: Ronald I. Miller and Chris Sanchirico
Strategic Entropy and Complexity in Repeated Games pp. 191-223: Abraham Neyman and Daijiro Okada
Minimizing Regret: The General Case pp. 224-243: Aldo Rustichini
Optimal Properties of Stimulus--Response Learning Models pp. 244-273: Aldo Rustichini
Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information pp. 274-308: Sylvain Sorin

Anonymous Games with Binary Actions pp. 171-180: Matthias Blonski
On the Least Core and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set pp. 181-188: Ezra Einy, Ron Holzman and Dov Monderer
The Equilibrium Level of Rigidity in a Hierarchy pp. 189-202: Joseph Harrington
Sowing Doubt Optimally in Two-Person Repeated Games pp. 203-216: Eitan Israeli
Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment pp. 217-237: Shinsuke Kambe
An Asymptotic Solution for Sealed Bid Common-Value Auctions with Bidders Having Asymmetric Information pp. 238-255: Michael C. Laskowski and Robert Slonim
Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players pp. 256-270: Kin Chung Lo
Characterizing Natural Implementability: The Fair and Walrasian Correspondences pp. 271-293: Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Yoshikatsu Tatamitani and Takehiko Yamato
Payoff Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice pp. 294-309: Rajiv Sarin and Farshid Vahid
Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors pp. 310-324: Tristan Tomala

Large Cores and Exactness pp. 1-12: A. K. Biswas, T. Parthasarathy, J. A. M. Potters and Mark Voorneveld
The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations pp. 13-24: Steffen Huck and Jörg Oechssler
A Surprise-Quiz View of Learning in Economic Experiments pp. 25-54: Antonio Merlo and Andrew Schotter
Distributed Games pp. 55-72: Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz
Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership pp. 105-129: Eric van Damme and Sjaak Hurkens
An Algorithmic Approach toward the Tracing Procedure for Bi-matrix Games pp. 130-145: Antoon van den Elzen and Adolphus Talman
Axiomatizations of Pareto Equilibria in Multicriteria Games pp. 146-154: Mark Voorneveld, Dries Vermeulen and Peter Borm
Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre- and Postclass Problem Sets as a Didactic Device pp. 155-170: Ariel Rubinstein