Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 128, issue C, 2021

Level-k reasoning in school choice pp. 1-17

Jun Zhang

Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory pp. 18-38

Nikolas Tsakas and Dimitrios Xefteris

Valence, complementarities, and political polarization pp. 39-57

Philipp Denter

Do people intervene to make others behave prosocially? pp. 58-72

Viola Ackfeld and Axel Ockenfels

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models pp. 73-103

Henrique Castro-Pires and Humberto Moreira

Social conformity under evolving private preferences pp. 104-124

John Duffy and Jonathan Lafky

Games in context: Equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions pp. 125-159

Adam Dominiak and Jürgen Eichberger

Bargains, price signaling, and efficiency in markets with asymmetric information pp. 160-181

Mark Schneider and Daniel Stephenson

An experiment on network density and sequential learning pp. 182-192

Krishna Dasaratha and Kevin He

Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium pp. 193-201

Akira Okada

Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures pp. 202-212

Ville Korpela, Michele Lombardi and Hannu Vartiainen

Absorbing games with a clock and two bits of memory pp. 213-230

Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen and Abraham Neyman

Distributional preferences explain individual behavior across games and time pp. 231-255

Morten Hedegaard, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Daniel Müller and Jean-Robert Tyran

Auctions with speculators: An experimental study pp. 256-270

Rodney Garratt and Sotiris Georganas

Volume 127, issue C, 2021

Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee pp. 1-27

Alvaro J. Name Correa and Huseyin Yildirim

Dynamic decision making under ambiguity: An experimental investigation pp. 28-46

Konstantinos Georgalos

Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences pp. 47-66

Ritesh Jain

The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games pp. 67-79

P. Jean-Jacques Herings and László Kóczy

Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading pp. 80-101

Vincent Crawford

Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games pp. 102-112

Péter Vida and Takakazu Honryo

Buying supermajorities in the lab pp. 113-154

Sebastian Fehrler and Maik Schneider

Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers pp. 155-178

Alexei Boulatov and Sergei Severinov

Position auctions with multi-unit demands pp. 179-193

Haomin Yan

Monotonicity and egalitarianism pp. 194-205

Bas Dietzenbacher

Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods pp. 206-226

Guillaume Cheikbossian

On the value of repetition for communication games pp. 227-246

Delong Meng

Volume 126, issue C, 2021

Signaling valence in primary elections pp. 1-32

Giovanni Andreottola

Luce arbitrates: Stochastic resolution of inner conflicts pp. 33-74

Pedram Heydari

Simultaneous auctions with budgets: Equilibrium existence and characterization pp. 75-93

Gagan Ghosh

Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences pp. 94-99

Eric Bahel and Yves Sprumont

Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations pp. 100-135

Xuesong Huang

Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences pp. 136-162

Ghufran Ahmad

Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets pp. 163-185

Dan Alexander

Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: Theory and experiments pp. 186-230

Salvatore Nunnari

Learning from like-minded people pp. 231-250

Delong Meng

The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity pp. 251-277

Alexia Gaudeul, Claudia Keser and Stephan Müller

Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – evidence from a natural field experiment pp. 278-287

Mark Kassis, Sascha L. Schmidt, Dominik Schreyer and Matthias Sutter

Who benefits from corporate social responsibility? Reciprocity in the presence of social incentives and self-selection pp. 288-304

Guglielmo Briscese, Nick Feltovich and Robert L. Slonim

Regularity of dynamic opinion games pp. 305-334

Xavier Venel

Bargaining with a residual claimant: An experimental study pp. 335-354

Matthew Embrey, Kyle Hyndman and Arno Riedl

Positive feedback in coordination games: Stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule pp. 355-373

Sung-Ha Hwang and Luc Rey-Bellet

Moral hazard with limited liability: Random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures pp. 374-386

Wenbin Wang and Shanshan Hu

Economic polarization and antisocial behavior: An experiment pp. 387-401

Maria Bigoni, Stefania Bortolotti and Efşan Nas Özen

Consumer search with blind buying pp. 402-427

Yanbin Chen, Sanxi Li, Kai Lin and Jun Yu

The value of network information: Assortative mixing makes the difference pp. 428-442

Mohamed Belhaj and Frédéric Deroïan

Odds supermodularity and the Luce rule pp. 443-452

Serhat Doğan and Kemal Yildiz

On sequences of iterations of increasing and continuous mappings on complete lattices pp. 453-459

Wojciech Olszewski

Volume 125, issue C, 2021

Trading votes for votes: A laboratory study pp. 1-26

Alessandra Casella and Thomas R. Palfrey

Dynamic expert incentives in teams pp. 27-47

Tsz-Ning Wong and Lily Ling Yang

Young children use commodities as an indirect medium of exchange pp. 48-61

Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo

The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets pp. 62-78

Jacob D. Leshno and Bary S.R. Pradelski

Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples pp. 79-93

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Thomas Mariotti and Gwenaël Piaser

Attainment of equilibrium via Marshallian path adjustment: Queueing and buyer determinism pp. 94-106

Sean M. Collins, Duncan James, Maroš Servátka and Radovan Vadovič

The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an n-player extensive form game pp. 107-140

Kousha Etessami

Elections under biased candidate endorsements — an experimental study pp. 141-158

Junze Sun, Arthur Schram and Randolph Sloof