Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 130, issue C, 2021

Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives pp. 1-24

Philippe Jehiel and Juni Singh

Designing practical and fair sequential team contests: The case of penalty shootouts pp. 25-43

Nejat Anbarci, Ching-jen Sun and Utku Unver

Noisy persuasion pp. 44-61

Elias Tsakas and Nikolas Tsakas

Nonlinear pricing with finite information pp. 62-84

Dirk Bergemann, Edmund Yeh and Jinkun Zhang

Brexit: A comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options pp. 85-108

Benny Moldovanu and Frank Rosar

Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection pp. 109-130

Aurelie Dariel, Arno Riedl and Simon Siegenthaler

Collective intertemporal decisions and heterogeneity in groups pp. 131-147

Daniela Glätzle-Rützler, Philipp Lergetporer and Matthias Sutter

Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo pp. 148-178

Michelle Garfinkel and Constantinos Syropoulos

Pledge-and-review in the laboratory pp. 179-195

Steffen Lippert and James Tremewan

Division of labor and the organization of knowledge in production: A laboratory experiment pp. 196-210

Victor Klockmann, Alicia von Schenk and Ferdinand von Siemens

Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem pp. 211-223

Keisuke Bando and Ryo Kawasaki

Co-worker altruism and unemployment pp. 224-239

Jorge Vásquez and Marek Weretka

Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams pp. 240-257

Peter Schram

Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism pp. 258-275

Melis Kartal, Wieland Müller and James Tremewan

Observation delays in teams and effort cycles pp. 276-298

Sidartha Gordon, Chantal Marlats and Lucie Ménager

Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions pp. 299-308

Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav and Huaxia Zeng

Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment pp. 309-330

Clemens Puppe and Jana Rollmann

Round-robin political tournaments: Abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power pp. 331-351

Roland Pongou and Bertrand Tchantcho

The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games pp. 352-368

Pedro Dal Bó, Guillaume R. Fréchette and Jeongbin Kim

(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading pp. 369-383

Liad Blumrosen and Shahar Dobzinski

The effects of student composition on teachers' effort and students' performance: Implications for tracking, school choice, and affirmative action pp. 384-399

Behrang Kamali Shahdadi

Experimentation and manipulation with preregistration pp. 400-408

Mike Felgenhauer

Full farsighted rationality pp. 409-424

Dominik Karos and Laura Robles

Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy pp. 425-442

Xiaogang Che, Yangguang Huang and Le Zhang

A new axiomatic approach to the impartial nomination problem pp. 443-451

Paul H. Edelman and Attila Por

De-biasing strategic communication pp. 452-464

Tobias Gesche

Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels pp. 465-473

Ryuji Sano

Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem pp. 474-498

Daisuke Hirata, Yusuke Kasuya and Kentaro Tomoeda

Consumers' privacy choices in the era of big data pp. 499-520

Sebastian Dengler and Jens Prüfer

Monotone persuasion pp. 521-542

Jeffrey Mensch

Value-free reductions pp. 543-568

David Perez-Castrillo and Chaoran Sun

Games with second-order expected utility pp. 569-590

Alan Beggs

Contract design with socially attentive preferences pp. 591-601

Simon Koch and Philipp Weinschenk

Are non-contingent incentives more effective in motivating new behavior? Evidence from the field pp. 602-615

Angélica Córdova, Alex Imas and Daniel Schwartz

Spite vs. risk: Explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction pp. 616-635

Oliver Kirchkamp and Wladislaw Mill

General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis pp. 636-662

Rafael M. Frongillo and Ian A. Kash

Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games pp. 663-683

Francis Bloch and Anne van den Nouweland

Corrigendum to "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness" [Games Econ. Behav. 124 (2020) 219–238] pp. 684-689

Agustín Bonifacio and Jordi Masso

Volume 129, issue C, 2021

Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request pp. 1-14

Jingfeng Lu, Zongwei Lu and Christian Riis

The multiplayer Colonel Blotto game pp. 15-31

Enric Boix-Adserà, Benjamin L. Edelman and Siddhartha Jayanti

Cognitively-constrained learning from neighbors pp. 32-54

Wei Li and Xu Tan

An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches pp. 55-77

Gustavo Saraiva

Early refund bonuses increase successful crowdfunding pp. 78-95

Timothy Cason, Alexander Tabarrok and Robertas Zubrickas

Regime change games with an active defender pp. 96-113

Ole Jann and Christoph Schottmüller

Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions pp. 114-143

Claudia Cerrone, Yoan Hermstrüwer and Pedro Robalo

Persuading a pessimist: Simplicity and robustness pp. 144-157

Afshin Nikzad

Disclosure of information under competition: An experimental study pp. 158-180

Jesal D. Sheth

Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms pp. 181-197

Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun and Siyang Xiong

How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field pp. 198-237

Christian Basteck, Bettina Klaus and Dorothea Kübler

A model of gradual information disclosure pp. 238-269

Haibo Xu

Model-based evaluation of cooling-off policies pp. 270-293

Christian Michel and Andre Stenzel

Preemption with a second-mover advantage pp. 294-309

Vladimir Smirnov and Andrew Wait

Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist pp. 310-328

Joao Correia-da-Silva

Gender stereotypes in deliberation and team decisions pp. 329-349

Katherine Coffman, Clio Bryant Flikkema and Olga Shurchkov

Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information pp. 350-369

Michele Gori

Rollover risk and stress test credibility pp. 370-399

Ana Elisa Pereira

Screening by mode of trade pp. 400-420

Juan Beccuti and Marc Möller

Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes pp. 421-448

Christoph Laica, Arne Lauber and Marco Sahm

Optimal delay in committees pp. 449-475

Ettore Damiano, Hao Li and Wing Suen

Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints pp. 476-491

Eilon Solan and Chang Zhao

Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information pp. 492-502

Fanqi Shi

Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts pp. 503-512

Keisuke Bando, Toshiyuki Hirai and Jun Zhang

Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players pp. 513-535

Qiang Fu, Xiruo Wang and Zenan Wu

Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers pp. 536-548

Michelle Avataneo and Bertan Turhan

Pricing with bargain hunting consumers pp. 549-569

Matthew Gentry and Martin Pesendorfer

A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games pp. 570-589

Ryoji Sawa