Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance

Cristina Bicchieri, Eugen Dimant, Simon Gächter and Daniele Nosenzo

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 132, issue C, 59-72

Abstract: We study how compliance with norms of pro-social behavior is influenced by peers' compliance in a dynamic and non-strategic experimental setting. We show that social proximity among peers is a crucial determinant of the effect. Without social proximity, norm compliance erodes swiftly because participants only conform to observed norm violations while ignoring norm compliance. With social proximity, participants conform to both types of observed behaviors, thus halting the erosion of compliance. Our findings stress the importance of the broader social context for norm compliance and show that, even in the absence of social sanctions, norm compliance can be sustained in repeated interactions, provided there is group identification, as is the case in many natural and online environments.

Keywords: Norm compliance; Social norms; Social proximity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D64 D9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (64)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Social Proximity and the Erosion of Norm Compliance (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:59-72

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.012

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