Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets

Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 132, issue C, 255-273

Abstract: We study the lattice structure of the set of random stable matchings for a many-to-many matching market. We define a partial order on the random stable set and present two natural binary operations for computing the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound for each side of the matching market. Then we prove that with these binary operations the set of random stable matchings forms two distributive lattices for the appropriate partial order, one for each side of the market. Moreover, these lattices are dual.

Keywords: Lattice structure; Random stable matching markets; Many-to-many matching markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets (2020)
Working Paper: Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching market (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:255-273

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.005

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