Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching market

Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: For a many-to-many matching market, we study the lattice structure of the set of random stable matchings. We define a partial order on the random stable set and present two intuitive binary operations to compute the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound for each side of the matching market. Then, we prove that with these binary operations the set of random stable matchings forms two dual lattices.

Date: 2020-02, Revised 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Related works:
Journal Article: Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets (2022)
Working Paper: Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets (2020)
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