Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 112, issue C, 2018

Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets pp. 1-20

Sangram V. Kadam and Maciej Kotowski

Strategy-proof location of public facilities pp. 21-48

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu and Marc Vorsatz

The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners pp. 49-66

Jeannette Brosig-Koch and Timo Heinrich

Revealed time preference pp. 67-77

Pawel Dziewulski

Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination pp. 78-97

David Cooper, Christos Ioannou and Shi Qi

Prospect dynamics and loss dominance pp. 98-124

Ryoji Sawa and Jiabin Wu

King of the Hill: Giving backward induction its best shot pp. 125-138

Martin Dufwenberg and Matthew Van Essen

Communication with evidence in the lab pp. 139-165

Jeanne Hagenbach and Eduardo Perez

Bidding games and efficient allocations pp. 166-193

Reshef Meir, Gil Kalai and Moshe Tennenholtz

Non-linear pricing and optimal shipping policies pp. 194-218

Áron Tóbiás

Financial complexity and trade pp. 219-230

Spyros Galanis

Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis pp. 231-241

Giacomo Bonanno and Elias Tsakas

Volume 111, issue C, 2018

On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition pp. 1-15

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenaël Piaser

The conditions in the existence results for discontinuous games by Reny and by Simon and Zame are incomparable pp. 16-19

Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck

A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions pp. 20-40

Martin Bichler and Per Paulsen

A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data pp. 41-63

Victor Aguiar, Roland Pongou and Jean-Baptiste Tondji

No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems pp. 64-74

Stefano Leucci, Akaki Mamageishvili and Paolo Penna

Free intermediation in resource transmission pp. 75-84

Lining Han and Ruben Juarez

Agreements with reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs pp. 85-99

Dooseok Jang, Amrish Patel and Martin Dufwenberg

Goal bracketing and self-control pp. 100-121

Alice Hsiaw

Confidence in knowledge or confidence in the ability to learn: An experiment on the causal effects of beliefs on motivation pp. 122-142

Mira Fischer and Dirk Sliwka

A window of cognition: Eyetracking the reasoning process in spatial beauty contest games pp. 143-158

Chun-Ting Chen, Chen-Ying Huang and Joseph Wang

(Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem pp. 159-186

Theodoros Diasakos and Kostas Koufopoulos

Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation pp. 187-202

Yuji Fujinaka and Takuma Wakayama

Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals pp. 203-216

Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara

A simple characterization of responsive choice pp. 217-221

Christopher Chambers and M. Bumin Yenmez

Hotelling competition and the gamma distribution pp. 222-240

Bassel Tarbush

On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games pp. 241-249

Andrew Ellis

Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games pp. 250-273

Eray Cumbul and Gábor Virág

Lying opportunities and incentives to lie: Reference dependence versus reputation pp. 274-288

Eberhard Feess and Florian Kerzenmacher

On pure-strategy equilibria in games with correlated information pp. 289-304

M. Khan and Yongchao Zhang

How long is a minute? pp. 305-322

Isabelle Brocas, Juan D. Carrillo and Jorge Tarrasó

Volume 110, issue C, 2018

On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness pp. 1-18

Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt and Markus Brill

An axiomatization of plays in repeated games pp. 19-31

Laurent Mathevet

Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching pp. 32-49

Jose Alcalde

Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information pp. 50-57

Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli

Games for cautious players: The Equilibrium in Secure Strategies pp. 58-70

M. Iskakov, A. Iskakov and Claude d'Aspremont

The object allocation problem with random priorities pp. 71-89

Mustafa Afacan

Preemptive investment under uncertainty pp. 90-119

Jan-Henrik Steg

Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: A new proof for Battigalli's theorem pp. 120-138

Andrés Perea

The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer pp. 139-164

Xi Chen, Ilias Diakonikolas, Dimitris Paparas, Xiaorui Sun and Mihalis Yannakakis

Information acquisition and the value of bad news pp. 165-173

Alessandro Ispano

Setting lower bounds on truthfulness pp. 174-193

Ahuva Mu'alem and Michael Schapira

Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment pp. 194-215

Lukas M. Wenner

Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games pp. 216-225

John Rehbeck

Price competition in product variety networks pp. 226-247

Philip Ushchev and Yves Zenou

Rationalizability and logical inference pp. 248-257

Dieter Balkenborg

Keep on fighting: The dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions pp. 258-272

Derek J. Clark and Tore Nilssen

Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry pp. 273-294

Sung-Ha Hwang, Wooyoung Lim, Philip Neary and Jonathan Newton

Matching in the large: An experimental study pp. 295-317

Yan Chen, Ming Jiang, Onur Kesten, Stéphane Robin and Min Zhu

To reveal or not to reveal: Privacy preferences and economic frictions pp. 318-329

Ned Augenblick and Aaron Bodoh-Creed

Dynamic communication with biased senders pp. 330-339

Chiara Margaria and Alex Smolin