Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Volume 97, issue C, 2016

The value of information in risk-sharing environments with unawareness pp. 1-18

Spyros Galanis

Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in 2×2 coordination games pp. 19-31

Boyu Zhang and Josef Hofbauer

Second-order beliefs in reputation systems with endogenous evaluations – an experimental study pp. 32-43

Matthias Greiff and Fabian Paetzel

Sanctions in networks: “The Most Unkindest Cut of All” pp. 44-53

Sumit Joshi and Ahmed Saber Mahmud

Fair implementation of diversity in school choice pp. 54-63

Inacio Bo

Median stable matchings in two-sided markets pp. 64-69

Peter Chen, Michael Egesdal, Marek Pycia and M. Bumin Yenmez

Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract pp. 70-87

Stefan Terstiege

Cooperation and distributive conflict pp. 88-109

Ralph-C Bayer

Testing guilt aversion with an exogenous shift in beliefs pp. 110-119

Kiryl Khalmetski

Peer effects and incentives pp. 120-127

Matthias Kräkel

Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics pp. 128-146

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus

Information revelation in auctions with common and private values pp. 147-165

Xu Tan

Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations pp. 166-173

Wei He and Jiangtao Li

Doing it now, later, or never pp. 174-185

Kutay Cingiz, János Flesch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski

An externality-robust auction: Theory and experimental evidence pp. 186-204

Björn Bartling and Nick Netzer

The curse of uninformed voting: An experimental study pp. 205-226

Jens Großer and Michael Seebauer

Volume 96, issue C, 2016

Formal versus informal legislative bargaining pp. 1-17

Adrian de Groot Ruiz, Roald Ramer and Arthur Schram

Blackwell's informativeness ranking with uncertainty-averse preferences pp. 18-29

Jian Li and Junjie Zhou

Project selection: Commitment and competition pp. 30-48

Vidya Atal, Talia Bar and Sidartha Gordon

Coordination under limited depth of reasoning pp. 49-64

Terri Kneeland

Competitive cheap talk pp. 65-89

Zhuozheng Li, Heikki Rantakari and Huanxing Yang

Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures pp. 90-96

Massimo Morelli and In-Uck Park

Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: A strategic communication experiment pp. 97-114

William Minozzi and Jonathan Woon

The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems pp. 115-131

Alexander Brown and Rodrigo Velez

An experiment on a core controversy pp. 132-144

Huibin Yan, Daniel Friedman and David Munro

Experimentation and project selection: Screening and learning pp. 145-169

Renato Gomes, Daniel Gottlieb and Lucas Maestri

Objective and subjective compliance: A norm-based explanation of ‘moral wiggle room’ pp. 170-183

Kai Spiekermann and Arne Weiss

Volume 95, issue C, 2016

Nash bargaining and risk aversion pp. 1-9

Gordon Rausser and Leo Simon

Participation in moral hazard problems pp. 10-24

Guillaume Roger

Two school systems, one district: What to do when a unified admissions process is impossible pp. 25-40

Vikram Manjunath and Bertan Turhan

Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes pp. 41-46

Shohei Tamura

Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems pp. 47-58

Battal Dogan and Kemal Yildiz

Identifying subjective beliefs in subjective state space models pp. 59-72

Pablo Schenone

Solidarity in preference aggregation: Improving on a status quo pp. 73-87

Patrick Harless

Economics of leadership and hierarchy pp. 88-106

Junjie Zhou

An ordinal minimax theorem pp. 107-112

Felix Brandt, Markus Brill and Warut Suksompong

Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation pp. 113-136

Franz Dietrich

Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability pp. 137-155

Felipe Balmaceda, Santiago R. Balseiro, José R. Correa and Nicolás E. Stier-Moses

Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria pp. 156-167

Stergios Athanasoglou

Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms pp. 168-177

Wonki Cho

Volume 94, issue C, 2015

Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs pp. 1-14

Paulo Barelli and John Duggan

Symmetry and impartial lotteries pp. 15-28

Andrew Mackenzie

Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model pp. 29-38

Tasos Kalandrakis

Strive to be first or avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives pp. 39-56

E. Dutcher, Loukas Balafoutas, Florian Lindner, Dmitry Ryvkin and Matthias Sutter

“Success breeds success” or “Pride goes before a fall”? pp. 57-79

Qiang Fu, Changxia Ke and Fangfang Tan

Strategic sophistication and attention in games: An eye-tracking study pp. 80-96

Luca Polonio, Sibilla Di Guida and Giorgio Coricelli

Extremism in revolutionary movements pp. 97-121

Mehdi Shadmehr

School-track environment or endowment: What determines different other-regarding behavior across peer groups? pp. 122-141

Katrin John and Stephan Thomsen

Invariance to representation of information pp. 142-156

Muhamet Yildiz

How to gamble against all odds pp. 157-168

Gilad Bavly and Ron Peretz

Optimal private good allocation: The case for a balanced budget pp. 169-181

Moritz Drexl and Andreas Kleiner

Monotone equilibria in nonatomic supermodular games. A comment pp. 182-187

Łukasz Balbus, Kevin Reffett and Łukasz Woźny

A global game with strategic substitutes and complements: Comment pp. 188-190

Eric J. Hoffmann and Tarun Sabarwal

Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: Experimental evidence pp. 191-199

Melanie Parravano and Odile Poulsen

Spatial implementation pp. 200-205

Richard L. Brady and Christopher Chambers

On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism pp. 206-213

Kiho Yoon

Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth pp. 214-221

Matthew Gentry, Tong Li and Jingfeng Lu