Monotone strategyproofness

Guillaume Haeringer and Hanna Halaburda

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 98, issue C, 68-77

Abstract: We propose a way to compare the extent of preference misrepresentation between two strategies. We define a preference revelation mechanism to be monotone strategyproof if declaring a “more truthful” preference ordering dominates (with respect to the true preferences) declaring a “less truthful” preference ordering. Our main result states that a mechanism is strategyproof if, and only if, it is monotone strategyproof. This result holds for any deterministic social choice function on any domain; for probabilistic social choice functions it holds under a mild assumption on the domain.

Keywords: Strategyproofness; Kemeny sets; Misrepresentations; Dominant strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Monotone Strategyproofness (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:98:y:2016:i:c:p:68-77

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.007

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