The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

Georg Nöldeke and Jorge Peña

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 99, issue C, 71-81

Abstract: We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information from Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). To do so, we use methods based on polynomials in Bernstein form to determine how the probability that a voter is pivotal depends on the participation probability and the number of players in the game.

Keywords: Costly voting; Participation games; Mixed strategy equilibrium; Polynomials in Bernstein form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825616300641
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information (2016)
Working Paper: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information (2015)
Working Paper: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:99:y:2016:i:c:p:71-81

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.016

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().