The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

Nöldeke, Georg and Peña, Jorge
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Georg Nöldeke and Jorge Peña

No 10751, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). Our results confirm their conjecture on the existence, multiplicity, and comparative statics of such equilibria and yield more precise information on how changes in team size affect the location of equilibria.

Keywords: Costly voting; Mixed strategy equilibrium; Participation games; Polynomials in bernstein form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information (2016)
Working Paper: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information (2016)
Working Paper: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information (2015)
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