The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

Georg Nöldeke and Jorge Peña

Working papers from Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel

Abstract: We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation NEWLINE game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). Our results confrm their conjecture on the existence, multiplicity, and comparative statics of such equilibria and yield more precise information on how changes in team size affect the location of equilibria.

Keywords: Costly voting; Participation games; Mixed strategy equilibrium; Polynomials in Bernstein form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information (2016)
Working Paper: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information (2016)
Working Paper: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information (2015)
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