Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 104, issue C, 2017

Confirmation bias with motivated beliefs pp. 1-23

Gary Charness and Chetan Dave

Mixed signals: Charity reporting when donations signal generosity and income pp. 24-42

Anat Bracha and Lise Vesterlund

Consistency and its converse for roommate markets pp. 43-58

Bettina Klaus

Bargaining in dynamic markets pp. 59-77

Mihai Manea

Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux pp. 78-91

Jingfeng Lu and Sérgio O. Parreiras

Continuous-time stochastic games pp. 92-130

Abraham Neyman

Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality pp. 131-145

Daniel Martin

Reasoning about rationality pp. 146-164

A. Bjorndahl, Joseph Halpern and R. Pass

The curse of the first-in–first-out queue discipline pp. 165-176

Trine Platz and Lars Peter Østerdal

Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: The impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction pp. 177-189

Artyom Jelnov, Yair Tauman and Richard Zeckhauser

Common value elections with private information and informative priors: Theory and experiments pp. 190-221

Friederike Mengel and Javier Rivas

Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability pp. 222-229

Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn

Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities pp. 230-240

Taro Kumano

Reaching consensus through approval bargaining pp. 241-251

Jean-François Laslier, Matias Nuñez and Carlos Pimienta

Calendar mechanisms pp. 252-270

Toomas Hinnosaar

Modes of ambiguous communication pp. 271-292

Christian Kellner and Mark T. Le Quement

Perception games and privacy pp. 293-308

Ronen Gradwohl and Rann Smorodinsky

A new epistemic characterization of ε-proper rationalizability pp. 309-328

Andrés Perea and Souvik Roy

Optimal dynamic information provision pp. 329-349

Jérôme Renault, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille

Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: A mechanism design approach pp. 350-371

Semin Kim

A tug-of-war team contest pp. 372-391

Samuel Hafner

Payoff externalities and social learning pp. 392-410

Itai Arieli

Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces pp. 411-429

Matthew Gentzkow and Emir Kamenica

Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A ‘state of the art’ model pp. 430-443

Rune Midjord, Tomás Rodríguez and Justin Valasek

Dynamic behavior and player types in majoritarian multi-battle contests pp. 444-455

Alan Gelder and Dan Kovenock

Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction pp. 456-467

Oren Ben-Zwi

Efficient voting with penalties pp. 468-485

Maksymilian Kwiek

“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests pp. 486-493

Subhasish Chowdhury and Sang-Hyun Kim

Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules pp. 494-506

Peter Buisseret

Shills and snipes pp. 507-516

Subir Bose and Arup Daripa

Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration pp. 517-534

Jonathan Newton

Search with multiple attributes: Theory and empirics pp. 535-562

Adam Sanjurjo

Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable pp. 563-567

Jiangtao Li and Rui Tang

Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks pp. 568-594

Matt V. Leduc, Matthew Jackson and Ramesh Johari

Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values pp. 595-612

Daniel Garrett

Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents pp. 613-631

Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto and Eve Ramaekers

Test design under voluntary participation pp. 632-655

Frank Rosar

Some further properties of the cumulative offer process pp. 656-665

Mustafa Afacan

Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty pp. 666-673

Christoph Kuzmics

The distribution of optimal strategies in symmetric zero-sum games pp. 674-680

Florian Brandl

Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction pp. 681-705

Simon Dato, Andreas Grunewald, Daniel Müller and Philipp Strack

The management of innovation: Experimental evidence pp. 706-725

David Kusterer and Patrick Schmitz

“I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games pp. 726-743

Antonio A. Arechar, Anna Dreber, Drew Fudenberg and David G. Rand

Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness pp. 744-759

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

Dilemmas, coordination and defection: How uncertain tipping points induce common pool resource destruction pp. 760-774

Alexander Maas, Christopher Goemans, Dale Manning, Stephan Kroll and Thomas Brown

Volume 103, issue C, 2017

Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection? pp. 19-29

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger

Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players pp. 30-40

Vincent Anesi and John Duggan

On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations pp. 41-66

Mario Bravo and Panayotis Mertikopoulos

Bidding rings: A bargaining approach pp. 67-82

Kalyan Chatterjee, Manipushpak Mitra and Conan Mukherjee

Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies pp. 83-93

Alan Deckelbaum and Silvio Micali

Matching and chatting: An experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms pp. 94-115

Tingting Ding and Andrew Schotter

Biased contests for symmetric players pp. 116-144

Mikhail Drugov and Dmitry Ryvkin

Flexible contracts pp. 145-167

Piero Gottardi, Jean-Marc Tallon and Paolo Ghirardato

Balance of power and the propensity of conflict pp. 168-184

Luisa Herbst, Kai Konrad and Florian Morath

A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games pp. 185-198

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Andrey Meshalkin and Arkadi Predtetchinski

Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments pp. 199-224

Arnd Heinrich Klein and Armin Schmutzler

Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values pp. 225-253

Yunan Li

Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered pp. 254-261

Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters

Auctions vs. fixed pricing: Competing for budget constrained buyers pp. 262-285

Cemil Selcuk

Social groups and social network formation pp. 286-312

Bassel Tarbush and Alexander Teytelboym