Wary of the worst: Maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive
Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 105, issue C, 316-328
When rationing a resource or adjudicating conflicting claims, the arrival of new agents necessitates revision. Adopting a worst-case perspective, we introduce guarantee structures to measure the protection a rule provides to either individuals or groups in these circumstances. With the goal of maximizing guarantees for those in the original group, we characterize the constrained equal awards rule. Requiring that a rule provide protection for both the original and arriving agents, so that both gains and losses are shared, we characterize the Talmud rule.
Keywords: Claims problem; Guarantee structures; Worst-case analysis; Talmud rule; Constrained equal awards rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:316-328
Access Statistics for this article
Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai
More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Dana Niculescu ().