Wary of the worst: Maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive

Patrick Harless

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 105, issue C, 316-328

Abstract: When rationing a resource or adjudicating conflicting claims, the arrival of new agents necessitates revision. Adopting a worst-case perspective, we introduce guarantee structures to measure the protection a rule provides to either individuals or groups in these circumstances. With the goal of maximizing guarantees for those in the original group, we characterize the constrained equal awards rule. Requiring that a rule provide protection for both the original and arriving agents, so that both gains and losses are shared, we characterize the Talmud rule.

Keywords: Claims problem; Guarantee structures; Worst-case analysis; Talmud rule; Constrained equal awards rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:316-328

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.011

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