Cooperation in partly observable networked markets

Itay Fainmesser () and David A. Goldberg

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 107, issue C, 220-237

Abstract: We present a model of repeated games in large two-sided networks between clients and agents in the presence of third-party observability networks via which clients share information about past transactions. The model allows us to characterize cooperation networks—networks in which each agent cooperates with every client that is connected to her. To this end, we show that: [1] an agent a's incentives to cooperate depend only on her beliefs with respect to her local neighborhood—a subnetwork that includes agent a and is of a size that is independent of the size of the entire network; and [2] when an agent a observes the network structure only partially, her incentives to cooperate can be calculated as if the network were a random tree with agent a at its root.

Keywords: Networks; Trust; Graph theory; Repeated games; Community enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D85 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982561730218X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:107:y:2018:i:c:p:220-237

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.008

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().