Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule

Mariam Arzumanyan and Mattias K Polborn

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 106, issue C, 38-50

Abstract: We analyze a costly voting model with multiple candidates under plurality rule. In equilibrium, the set of candidates is partitioned into a set of “relevant candidates” (which contains at least two candidates) and the remaining candidates. All relevant candidates receive votes and have an equal chance of winning, independent of their popular support levels. The remaining candidates do not receive any votes. Furthermore, all voters who cast votes do so for their most preferred candidate, i.e., there is no “strategic voting.”

Keywords: Costly voting; Endogenous participation models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:106:y:2017:i:c:p:38-50

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.016

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