Games and Economic Behavior
1989 - 2025
Current editor(s): E. Kalai From Elsevier Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (). Access Statistics for this journal.
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Volume 153, issue C, 2025
- No trade under verifiable information pp. 1-9

- Spyros Galanis
- Optimizing successive incentives: Rewarding the past or motivating the future? pp. 10-29

- Jens Gudmundsson, Jens Leth Hougaard, Juan Moreno-Ternero and Lars Peter Østerdal
- Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers pp. 30-41

- Shuhei Morimoto
- The matching benefits of market thickness pp. 42-66

- Simon Loertscher and Ellen V. Muir
- “Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted” - Comment pp. 67-93

- Austin Brooksby, Jacob Meyer, Lucas Rentschler, Vernon Smith and Robbie Spofford
- Favor exchange with private costs: An experiment pp. 94-112

- Arianna Degan, Yushen Li and Huan Xie
- Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates pp. 113-130

- Felix Brandt, Chris Dong and Dominik Peters
- Data provision to an informed seller pp. 131-144

- Shota Ichihashi and Alex Smolin
- Contract breach with overconfident expectations: Experimental evidence on reference-dependent preferences pp. 145-163

- Sabine Fischer and Kerstin Grosch
- Gradual matching with affirmative action pp. 164-178

- Kriti Manocha and Bertan Turhan
- Pricing and information acquisition in networks pp. 179-208

- Yifan Xiong, Guopeng Li and Youze Lang
- Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance pp. 209-232

- Jan Heufer, Jason Shachat and Yan Xu
- Watchdog versus yes man: News source and media competition pp. 233-253

- Daiki Kishishita and Susumu Sato
- Working with AI: An analysis for rational integration pp. 254-267

- David Lagziel and Yevgeny Tsodikovich
- From monopoly to competition: When do optimal contests prevail? pp. 268-293

- Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin and Hongyi Ling
- Pay it forward: Theory and experiment pp. 294-314

- Amanda Chuan and Hanzhe Zhang
- Self-serving biases in beliefs about collective outcomes pp. 315-344

- Shimon Kogan, Florian H. Schneider and Roberto A. Weber
- Axiomatic analysis of approval-based scoring rules pp. 345-358

- Tuva Bardal and Ulle Endriss
- Dual communication in a social network: Contributing and dedicating attention pp. 359-385

- Gabrielle Demange
- A game-theoretic model of misinformation spread on social networks pp. 386-407

- Chin-Chia Hsu, Amir Ajorlou and Ali Jadbabaie
- Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making pp. 408-429

- Alexander Clyde
- Corrigendum to “School choice with costly information Acquisition” [Games and Economic Behavior Volume 143 (2024) 248-268] pp. 430-430

- Tyler Maxey
- Advisors with hidden motives pp. 431-450

- Paula Onuchic
- Social learning among opinion leaders pp. 451-473

- Yangbo Song
- Maxmin, coalitions and evolution pp. 474-498

- Jonathan Newton and Miharu Naono
- Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule pp. 499-522

- David Piazolo and Christoph Vanberg
- Policy gambles and valence in elections pp. 523-540

- Peter Bils and Federica Izzo
- Minimal stable voting rules pp. 541-553

- Héctor Hermida-Rivera
- Robust group manipulation with indifferences pp. 554-568

- Steven Kivinen
- Propaganda and conflict pp. 569-585

- Petros Sekeris
- Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers pp. 586-621

- Konstantinos Protopappas and David Rietzke
- Statistical inference in games: Stability of pure equilibria pp. 622-644

- Segismundo S. Izquierdo and Luis R. Izquierdo
- Costly waiting in dynamic contests: Theory and experiment pp. 645-678

- Jian Song and Daniel Houser
- Trial plans as a means of price discrimination pp. 679-701

- Ramtin Salamat
Volume 152, issue C, 2025
- Stability as right to counsel of choice: A lawyers' matching problem pp. 1-22

- Kemal Kıvanç Aköz, Emre Doğan, Onur Kesten and Danisz Okulicz
- Rituals of reason: Experimental evidence on the social acceptability of lotteries in allocation problems pp. 23-36

- Elias Bouacida and Renaud Foucart
- Social image, observer identity, and crowding up pp. 37-54

- Yamit Asulin, Yuval Heller, Nira Munichor and Ro'i Zultan
- Lone wolves just got lonelier pp. 55-61

- Esteban Peralta
- Network stability under limited foresight pp. 62-92

- P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Abhimanyu Khan
- Lying in persuasion pp. 93-112

- Zhaotian Luo and Arturas Rozenas
- Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace pp. 113-132

- Jaideep Roy and Bibhas Saha
- Optimal grading contests pp. 133-149

- Sumit Goel
- Grouping agents with persistent types pp. 150-174

- James Malcomson
- Borda rule and arrow's independence condition in finite societies pp. 175-180

- Guy Barokas and Shmuel Nitzan
- Polarizing persuasion pp. 181-198

- Axel Anderson and Nikoloz Pkhakadze
- Core thresholds of symmetric majority voting games pp. 199-215

- Takaaki Abe
- Strategy-proof preference aggregation and the anonymity-neutrality tradeoff pp. 216-240

- Stergios Athanasoglou, Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Lars Ehlers
- Conditional cooperation under uncertainty: The social description-experience gap pp. 241-256

- Orestis Kopsacheilis, Dennie van Dolder and Ozan Isler
- The motivated memory of noise pp. 257-275

- Jeanne Hagenbach, Nicolas Jacquemet and Philipp Sternal
- Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods pp. 276-292

- Kevin Bauer, Michael Kosfeld and Ferdinand A. von Siemens
- Iterated exclusion of implausible types in signaling games pp. 293-312

- Francesc Dilmé
- Matching with transfers under distributional constraints pp. 313-332

- Devansh Jalota, Michael Ostrovsky and Marco Pavone
- The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game pp. 333-344

- A. Galichon and A. Jacquet
- Endogenous limits on veto power in dynamic bargaining pp. 345-370

- Ravideep Sethi and Ewout Verriest
- Upstream reciprocity in the battle of good vs evil pp. 371-395

- Luis Avalos-Trujillo
- A taste for variety pp. 396-422

- Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Dominik Karos and Ehud Lehrer
- Bargaining with binary private information pp. 423-442

- Francesc Dilmé
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