Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Volume 151, issue C, 2025

Optimal tree contest design and winner-take-all pp. 1-23

Qian Jiao, Zhonghong Kuang, Yiran Liu and Yang Yu

The value of and demand for diverse news sources pp. 24-41

Evan Calford and Anujit Chakraborty

The prevalence of take-it-or-leave-it offers pp. 42-58

Shinsuke Kambe

Inefficiency in a frictionless market pp. 59-69

Keith Jin Deng Chan

Obvious manipulations in matching with and without contracts pp. 70-81

R. Pablo Arribillaga and Eliana Pepa Risma

An implementation of the general optimal mechanism in Esö and Szentes (2007) pp. 82-94

Dongri Liu and Jingfeng Lu

Auctions with signaling bidders: Optimal design and information disclosure pp. 95-107

Olivier Bos and Martin Pollrich

Learning in unprofitable games pp. 108-126

Andrea Gaunersdorfer and Josef Hofbauer

Fair division with subjective divisibility pp. 127-147

Xiaohui Bei, Shengxin Liu and Xinhang Lu

Stable mixing in Hawk–Dove Games under best experienced payoff dynamics pp. 148-161

Srinivas Arigapudi and Yuval Heller

Comparative statics of minimum-cost-spanning-tree games pp. 162-182

Zhibin Tan, Cao Zhigang and Zhengxing Zou

Accountability in Markovian elections pp. 183-217

John Duggan and Jean Guillaume Forand

Going through the roof: On prices for drugs sold through insurance pp. 218-242

Jurjen Kamphorst and Vladimir A. Karamychev

Volume 150, issue C, 2025

A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices pp. 1-26

Yuya Wakabayashi, Ryosuke Sakai and Shigehiro Serizawa

Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments pp. 27-33

Homa Hosseinzadeh Ranjbar and Mehdi Feizi

When is trust robust? pp. 34-47

Luca Anderlini, Larry Samuelson and Daniele Terlizzese

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem pp. 48-70

Shurojit Chatterji, Jordi Massó and Shigehiro Serizawa

Taming selten's horse with impulse response pp. 71-92

Tibor Neugebauer, Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Reinhard Selten

Supermodularity and incentive reversal in teams pp. 93-105

Svetlana Boyarchenko, Dominika Machowska and Iryna Topolyan

On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets pp. 106-130

Laura Doval and Balázs Szentes

Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis pp. 131-159

Mikhail Freer and Khushboo Surana

Ideological consistency and valence pp. 160-182

Enriqueta Aragonès and Dimitrios Xefteris

Efficient public good provision between and within groups pp. 183-190

Chowdhury Mohammad S Anwar, Jorge Bruno, Renaud Foucart and Sonali SenGupta

Asymptotic full revelation in cheap talk with many senders pp. 191-196

Oleg Rubanov

Corrigendum to: “Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests” pp. 197-197

Zhonghong Kuang, Hangcheng Zhao and Jie Zheng

Endogenous network formation in local public goods: An experimental analysis pp. 198-214

Ying Chen, Tom Lane and Stuart McDonald

The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation pp. 215-234

Xiaoxiao Hu and Haoran Lei

Homophily and infections: Static and dynamic effects pp. 235-259

Matteo Bizzarri, Fabrizio Panebianco and Paolo Pin

The impact of perceived strength in the war of attrition pp. 260-277

David P. Myatt

Contracting with heterogeneous researchers pp. 278-294

Han Wang

Why do children pass in the centipede game? Cognitive limitations v. risk calculations pp. 295-311

Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo

Computing agents' reputation within a network pp. 312-333

Federico Grigis, Sergio Ortobelli Lozza and Sebastiano Vitali

Foundation and identification of multi-attribute Shannon entropy pp. 334-355

David Walker-Jones

Optimal contracts under interpersonal projection pp. 356-364

Kimiyuki Morita, Akitoshi Muramoto and Takeharu Sogo

Occupational segregation in a Roy model with composition preferences pp. 365-386

Haoning Chen, Miaomiao Dong, Marc Henry and Ivan Sidorov

Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information pp. 387-400

Eric van Damme and Xu Lang

Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab pp. 401-414

Emanuel Kandel, Yevgeny Mugerman and Eyal Winter

Complementarity in matching markets and exchange economies pp. 415-435

Marzena Rostek and Nathan Yoder

Move orders in contests: Equilibria and winning chances pp. 436-468

Lei Gao, Jingfeng Lu and Zhewei Wang

Priority, solidarity, and egalitarianism in the capability approach pp. 469-479

Inkee Jang and Biung-Ghi Ju

Nonparametric identification and estimation of the generalized second-price auction pp. 480-500

Ksenia Shakhgildyan

Deterrence in networks pp. 501-517

Leo Bao, Lata Gangadharan and C. Matthew Leister

On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games pp. 518-536

Rod Falvey, Tom Lane and Shravan Luckraz

The limits of identification in discrete choice pp. 537-551

Christopher Chambers and Christopher Turansick

Volume 148, issue C, 2024

A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games pp. 1-22

Agustín Bonifacio, E. Inarra and P. Neme

Reselling information pp. 23-43

S. Nageeb Ali, Ayal Chen-Zion and Erik Lillethun

The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment pp. 44-67

Daniele Nosenzo, Erte Xiao and Nina Xue

Failing to utilize potentially effective focal points: Prominence can stymie coordination on distinct actions pp. 68-81

Uri Gneezy and Yuval Rottenstreich

Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off? pp. 82-96

Estelle Cantillon, Li Chen and Juan Pereyra

Cheap talk with two-sided private information pp. 97-118

Inés Moreno de Barreda

Can threats improve payoffs from bargaining in markets with retaliations? Evidence from a field experiment pp. 119-137

Haimanti Bhattacharya and Subhasish Dugar

Norms and the evolution of leaders' followership pp. 138-161

Antonio Cabrales and Esther Hauk

Breaking bad: Malfunctioning control institutions erode good behavior in a cheating game pp. 162-178

Rustamdjan Hakimov and Agne Kajackaite

Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games pp. 179-195

Coralio Ballester, Antonio Rodriguez-Moral and Marc Vorsatz

Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents pp. 196-217

Yingjie Niu and Zhentao Zou

Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests pp. 218-243

Zhonghong Kuang, Hangcheng Zhao and Jie Zheng

Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints pp. 244-263

Gregory Z. Gutin, Philip R. Neary and Anders Yeo

Equilibria in matching markets with soft and hard liquidity constraints pp. 264-278

P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Yu Zhou

Commitment to the truth creates trust in market exchange: Experimental evidence pp. 279-295

Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Jason F. Shogren and Adam Zylbersztejn

Time for memorable consumption pp. 296-322

Stefania Minardi and Andrei Savochkin

Towards data auctions with externalities pp. 323-356

Anish Agarwal, Munther Dahleh, Thibaut Horel and Maryann Rui

Stability vs. no justified envy pp. 357-366

Assaf Romm, Alvin Roth and Ran I. Shorrer

Ambiguity and informativeness of (non-)trading pp. 367-384

Yinxiao Chu

Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options pp. 385-397

Camilo J. Sirguiado and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Cooperating with yourself pp. 398-414

Kirill Borissov, Mikhail Pakhnin and Ron Wendner

Risk preferences of learning algorithms pp. 415-426

Andreas Haupt and Aroon Narayanan

Complete conditional type structures pp. 427-448

Nicodemo De Vito

Inference from biased polls pp. 449-486

Andy Brownback, Nathaniel Burke and Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch

Strategic responses to personalized pricing and demand for privacy: An experiment pp. 487-516

Inacio Bo, Li Chen and Rustamdjan Hakimov

Partial credence goods on review platforms pp. 517-534

Ronen Gradwohl and Artyom Jelnov

A recursive measure of voting power that satisfies reasonable postulates pp. 535-565

Arash Abizadeh and Adrian Vetta

Tight incentive analysis of Sybil attacks against the market equilibrium of resource exchange over general networks pp. 566-610

Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li and Xiang Yan