Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2026

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 155, issue C, 2026

The topology of poker pp. 1-9

Laurent Bartholdi and Roman Mikhailov

A maximal domain for weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness of the extended probabilistic serial correspondence pp. 10-26

Kiyong Yun and Youngsub Chun

A dynamic optimization approach to delegation with an application to volunteer contracts pp. 27-54

Rene Saran

Information design in the principal-agent problem pp. 55-69

Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu and Konstantin Zabarnyi

Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice pp. 70-88

Gregorio Curello and Ludvig Sinander

The art of concession in General Lotto games pp. 89-106

Rahul Chandan, Keith Paarporn, Dan Kovenock, Mahnoosh Alizadeh and Jason R. Marden

Pricing skewed assets in multi-asset experimental markets pp. 107-148

Shuchen Zhao

Sequential creation of surplus and the Shapley value pp. 149-166

Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, Inés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez-Castrillo

Rankings-dependent preferences: A real goods matching experiment pp. 167-191

Andrew Kloosterman and Peter Troyan

Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence pp. 192-211

Leonie Baumann

Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result pp. 212-227

Pedro Calleja and Francesc Llerena

Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms pp. 228-249

Xueheng Li

Preconvex games pp. 250-266

Eric Bahel, Christian Trudeau and Haoyu Wang

Corrigendum to “Values for environments with externalities – the average approach” [Games Econ. Behav. 108 (2018) 49–64.] pp. 267-269

Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo and David Wettstein

Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices pp. 270-286

Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Tommy Andersson and Lars Ehlers

Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned pp. 287-309

Wataru Ishida and Changwoo Park

Exact Nash-like solutions of blockchain gap games pp. 310-320

Mitsunori Noguchi

Volume 154, issue C, 2025

Strategic mobilization of voters pp. 1-15

Guy Holburn and Davin Raiha

Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences pp. 16-52

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn and Seçkin Özbilen

A direct proof of the short-side advantage in random matching markets pp. 53-61

Simon Mauras, Paweł Prałat and Adrian Vetta

Naive analytics: The strategic advantage of algorithmic heuristics pp. 62-78

Ron Berman and Yuval Heller

Political salience, endogenous bandwagoning, and regime resilience pp. 79-96

Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Steffen Huck and Macartan Humphreys

Rationalizing sharing rules pp. 97-118

Karol Flores-Szwagrzak and Lars Peter Østerdal

Equilibrium and social norms pp. 119-128

Robert M. Anderson and Haosui Duanmu

Interest group information in elections pp. 129-148

Thea How Choon

Ambiguous persuasion: An ex-ante formulation pp. 149-158

Xiaoyu Cheng

Non-isolation, reversals, and social preference pp. 159-174

Paul H.Y. Cheung and Keaton Ellis

Material incentives and effort choice: Evidence from an online experiment across countries pp. 175-199

Elwyn Davies and Marcel Fafchamps

A concavity in the value of information pp. 200-207

Mark Whitmeyer

Approximately fair and population consistent budget division via simple payment schemes pp. 208-225

Haris Aziz, Patrick Lederer, Xinhang Lu, Mashbat Suzuki and Jeremy Vollen

Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness pp. 226-245

Anna Bogomolnaia, Artem Baklanov and Elizaveta Victorova

Who gets the credit? Credit attribution, spillovers, and inefficiency in teams pp. 246-266

Saltuk Ozerturk and Huseyin Yildirim

Information unraveling and limited depth of reasoning pp. 267-284

Volker Benndorf, Dorothea Kübler and Hans-Theo Normann

BAR Nash equilibrium and application to blockchain design pp. 285-301

Olga Gorelkina, Rida Laraki and Maxime Reynouard

Reasoning about your own future mistakes pp. 302-328

Martin Meier and Andrés Perea

Evidence games: Lying aversion and commitment pp. 329-350

Elif B. Osun and Erkut Y. Ozbay

Stochastic adaptive learning with committed players in games with strict Nash equilibria pp. 351-376

Naoki Funai

Robust price discrimination pp. 377-395

Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon and Moshe Tennenholtz

Unfounded opinion's curse pp. 396-410

King King Li and Toru Suzuki

Markovian persuasion with stochastic revelations pp. 411-439

Ehud Lehrer and Dimitry Shaiderman

Volume 153, issue C, 2025

No trade under verifiable information pp. 1-9

Spyros Galanis

Optimizing successive incentives: Rewarding the past or motivating the future? pp. 10-29

Jens Gudmundsson, Jens Leth Hougaard, Juan Moreno-Ternero and Lars Peter Østerdal

Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers pp. 30-41

Shuhei Morimoto

The matching benefits of market thickness pp. 42-66

Simon Loertscher and Ellen V. Muir

“Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted” - Comment pp. 67-93

Austin Brooksby, Jacob Meyer, Lucas Rentschler, Vernon Smith and Robbie Spofford

Favor exchange with private costs: An experiment pp. 94-112

Arianna Degan, Yushen Li and Huan Xie

Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates pp. 113-130

Felix Brandt, Chris Dong and Dominik Peters

Data provision to an informed seller pp. 131-144

Shota Ichihashi and Alex Smolin

Contract breach with overconfident expectations: Experimental evidence on reference-dependent preferences pp. 145-163

Sabine Fischer and Kerstin Grosch

Gradual matching with affirmative action pp. 164-178

Kriti Manocha and Bertan Turhan

Pricing and information acquisition in networks pp. 179-208

Yifan Xiong, Guopeng Li and Youze Lang

Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance pp. 209-232

Jan Heufer, Jason Shachat and Yan Xu

Watchdog versus yes man: News source and media competition pp. 233-253

Daiki Kishishita and Susumu Sato

Working with AI: An analysis for rational integration pp. 254-267

David Lagziel and Yevgeny Tsodikovich

From monopoly to competition: When do optimal contests prevail? pp. 268-293

Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin and Hongyi Ling

Pay it forward: Theory and experiment pp. 294-314

Amanda Chuan and Hanzhe Zhang

Self-serving biases in beliefs about collective outcomes pp. 315-344

Shimon Kogan, Florian H. Schneider and Roberto A. Weber

Axiomatic analysis of approval-based scoring rules pp. 345-358

Tuva Bardal and Ulle Endriss

Dual communication in a social network: Contributing and dedicating attention pp. 359-385

Gabrielle Demange

A game-theoretic model of misinformation spread on social networks pp. 386-407

Chin-Chia Hsu, Amir Ajorlou and Ali Jadbabaie

Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making pp. 408-429

Alexander Clyde

Corrigendum to “School choice with costly information Acquisition” [Games and Economic Behavior Volume 143 (2024) 248-268] pp. 430-430

Tyler Maxey

Advisors with hidden motives pp. 431-450

Paula Onuchic

Social learning among opinion leaders pp. 451-473

Yangbo Song

Maxmin, coalitions and evolution pp. 474-498

Jonathan Newton and Miharu Naono

Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule pp. 499-522

David Piazolo and Christoph Vanberg

Policy gambles and valence in elections pp. 523-540

Peter Bils and Federica Izzo

Minimal stable voting rules pp. 541-553

Héctor Hermida-Rivera

Robust group manipulation with indifferences pp. 554-568

Steven Kivinen

Propaganda and conflict pp. 569-585

Petros Sekeris

Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers pp. 586-621

Konstantinos Protopappas and David Rietzke

Statistical inference in games: Stability of pure equilibria pp. 622-644

Segismundo S. Izquierdo and Luis R. Izquierdo

Costly waiting in dynamic contests: Theory and experiment pp. 645-678

Jian Song and Daniel Houser

Trial plans as a means of price discrimination pp. 679-701

Ramtin Salamat