Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 153, issue C, 2025

No trade under verifiable information pp. 1-9

Spyros Galanis

Optimizing successive incentives: Rewarding the past or motivating the future? pp. 10-29

Jens Gudmundsson, Jens Leth Hougaard, Juan Moreno-Ternero and Lars Peter Østerdal

Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers pp. 30-41

Shuhei Morimoto

The matching benefits of market thickness pp. 42-66

Simon Loertscher and Ellen V. Muir

“Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted” - Comment pp. 67-93

Austin Brooksby, Jacob Meyer, Lucas Rentschler, Vernon Smith and Robbie Spofford

Favor exchange with private costs: An experiment pp. 94-112

Arianna Degan, Yushen Li and Huan Xie

Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates pp. 113-130

Felix Brandt, Chris Dong and Dominik Peters

Data provision to an informed seller pp. 131-144

Shota Ichihashi and Alex Smolin

Contract breach with overconfident expectations: Experimental evidence on reference-dependent preferences pp. 145-163

Sabine Fischer and Kerstin Grosch

Gradual matching with affirmative action pp. 164-178

Kriti Manocha and Bertan Turhan

Pricing and information acquisition in networks pp. 179-208

Yifan Xiong, Guopeng Li and Youze Lang

Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance pp. 209-232

Jan Heufer, Jason Shachat and Yan Xu

Watchdog versus yes man: News source and media competition pp. 233-253

Daiki Kishishita and Susumu Sato

Working with AI: An analysis for rational integration pp. 254-267

David Lagziel and Yevgeny Tsodikovich

From monopoly to competition: When do optimal contests prevail? pp. 268-293

Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin and Hongyi Ling

Pay it forward: Theory and experiment pp. 294-314

Amanda Chuan and Hanzhe Zhang

Self-serving biases in beliefs about collective outcomes pp. 315-344

Shimon Kogan, Florian H. Schneider and Roberto A. Weber

Axiomatic analysis of approval-based scoring rules pp. 345-358

Tuva Bardal and Ulle Endriss

Dual communication in a social network: Contributing and dedicating attention pp. 359-385

Gabrielle Demange

A game-theoretic model of misinformation spread on social networks pp. 386-407

Chin-Chia Hsu, Amir Ajorlou and Ali Jadbabaie

Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making pp. 408-429

Alexander Clyde

Corrigendum to “School choice with costly information Acquisition” [Games and Economic Behavior Volume 143 (2024) 248-268] pp. 430-430

Tyler Maxey

Advisors with hidden motives pp. 431-450

Paula Onuchic

Social learning among opinion leaders pp. 451-473

Yangbo Song

Maxmin, coalitions and evolution pp. 474-498

Jonathan Newton and Miharu Naono

Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule pp. 499-522

David Piazolo and Christoph Vanberg

Policy gambles and valence in elections pp. 523-540

Peter Bils and Federica Izzo

Minimal stable voting rules pp. 541-553

Héctor Hermida-Rivera

Robust group manipulation with indifferences pp. 554-568

Steven Kivinen

Propaganda and conflict pp. 569-585

Petros Sekeris

Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers pp. 586-621

Konstantinos Protopappas and David Rietzke

Statistical inference in games: Stability of pure equilibria pp. 622-644

Segismundo S. Izquierdo and Luis R. Izquierdo

Costly waiting in dynamic contests: Theory and experiment pp. 645-678

Jian Song and Daniel Houser

Trial plans as a means of price discrimination pp. 679-701

Ramtin Salamat

Volume 152, issue C, 2025

Stability as right to counsel of choice: A lawyers' matching problem pp. 1-22

Kemal Kıvanç Aköz, Emre Doğan, Onur Kesten and Danisz Okulicz

Rituals of reason: Experimental evidence on the social acceptability of lotteries in allocation problems pp. 23-36

Elias Bouacida and Renaud Foucart

Social image, observer identity, and crowding up pp. 37-54

Yamit Asulin, Yuval Heller, Nira Munichor and Ro'i Zultan

Lone wolves just got lonelier pp. 55-61

Esteban Peralta

Network stability under limited foresight pp. 62-92

P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Abhimanyu Khan

Lying in persuasion pp. 93-112

Zhaotian Luo and Arturas Rozenas

Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace pp. 113-132

Jaideep Roy and Bibhas Saha

Optimal grading contests pp. 133-149

Sumit Goel

Grouping agents with persistent types pp. 150-174

James Malcomson

Borda rule and arrow's independence condition in finite societies pp. 175-180

Guy Barokas and Shmuel Nitzan

Polarizing persuasion pp. 181-198

Axel Anderson and Nikoloz Pkhakadze

Core thresholds of symmetric majority voting games pp. 199-215

Takaaki Abe

Strategy-proof preference aggregation and the anonymity-neutrality tradeoff pp. 216-240

Stergios Athanasoglou, Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Lars Ehlers

Conditional cooperation under uncertainty: The social description-experience gap pp. 241-256

Orestis Kopsacheilis, Dennie van Dolder and Ozan Isler

The motivated memory of noise pp. 257-275

Jeanne Hagenbach, Nicolas Jacquemet and Philipp Sternal

Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods pp. 276-292

Kevin Bauer, Michael Kosfeld and Ferdinand A. von Siemens

Iterated exclusion of implausible types in signaling games pp. 293-312

Francesc Dilmé

Matching with transfers under distributional constraints pp. 313-332

Devansh Jalota, Michael Ostrovsky and Marco Pavone

The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game pp. 333-344

A. Galichon and A. Jacquet

Endogenous limits on veto power in dynamic bargaining pp. 345-370

Ravideep Sethi and Ewout Verriest

Upstream reciprocity in the battle of good vs evil pp. 371-395

Luis Avalos-Trujillo

A taste for variety pp. 396-422

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Dominik Karos and Ehud Lehrer

Bargaining with binary private information pp. 423-442

Francesc Dilmé