Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2026

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Volume 158, issue C, 2026

Evaluating non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanisms: Theory and experiment pp. 1-34

Shan Gui and Daniel Houser

Compellingness in Nash implementation pp. 35-62

Shurojit Chatterji, Takashi Kunimoto and Paulo Ramos

Istanbul flower auction: The need for speed pp. 63-79

Isa Hafalir, Onur Kesten, Donglai Luo, Katerina Sherstyuk and Cong Tao

Welfare properties of the Taiwan mechanism pp. 80-113

Ilan Wolff

When is it (im)possible to respect all individuals’ preferences under uncertainty? pp. 114-121

Kensei Nakamura

Failing to correctly aggregate signals pp. 122-131

Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein

Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities: A limit theorem pp. 132-141

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal, Ludovic Julien and Damiano Turchet

Approximating competitive equilibrium by Nash welfare pp. 142-166

Jugal Garg, Yixin Tao and László A. Végh

Neural correlates of interactions between adaptive learning and hierarchical reasoning in repeated strategic games pp. 167-190

Jun Feng, Jia Jin, Sasa Zhao, Edmund Derrington, Xiangdong Qin, Shiguang Fu, Qiang Shen and Jean-Claude Dreher

Guilt and fairness pp. 191-218

Alessandro Stringhi

Morality meets risk: What makes a good excuse for selfishness pp. 219-236

Wanxin Dong and Jiakun Zheng

Representation in collective policymaking pp. 237-259

Daniel Gibbs and Gleason Judd

The quasi-prekernel for cooperative games pp. 260-271

Qianqian Kong, Hans Peters and Hao Sun

The case for lobbying transparency pp. 272-282

Antoine Zerbini

River-sharing problem with floods pp. 283-298

Takayuki Oishi and Tomoya Tajika

The effect of exit rights on cost-based procurement contracts pp. 299-316

Rodrigo Andrade, Henrique Castro-Pires and Humberto Moreira

Reduced strategies and cognitive hierarchies in the extensive and normal form pp. 317-329

Pierpaolo Battigalli

The effects of induced emotions on punishment and reward pp. 330-347

Michalis Drouvelis and Brit Grosskopf

Efficient equilibrium in submodular global games of entry pp. 348-366

Rabah Amir, Rodrigo Harrison and Pedro Jara-Moroni

Competitive limit of competing auctions pp. 367-382

Zizhen Ma and Nicolás Riquelme

A simultaneous analysis of turnout and voting under proportional representation: Theory and experiments pp. 383-401

Aaron Kamm and Arthur Schram

Competing for influence in networks through strategic targeting pp. 402-418

Margherita Comola, Agnieszka Rusinowska and Marie Claire Villeval

Potentials in social environments pp. 419-440

Thomas Demuynck, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Christian Seel

Designing Heaven’s will: The job assignment in the Chinese imperial civil service pp. 441-461

Inácio Bó and Li Chen

Lucky but confident –The effect of confidence on meritocratic beliefs and preferences for redistribution pp. 462-487

Kajsa Hansson and Oda Kristine Storstad Sund

When information and communication are both costly pp. 488-504

Shahir Safi

On the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium under the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism pp. 505-526

Yao Cheng, Dazhong Wang and Jingsheng Yu

Substitutes for nonunitary many-to-many matching with contracts pp. 527-546

Keisuke Bando and Toshiyuki Hirai

Two-player binary global games without dominance solvable states pp. 547-562

In-Uck Park and Efthymios Smyrniotis

Persuasion of interacting receivers pp. 563-583

Yishu Zeng

The evolution of strategies in repeated 2 × 2 anti-coordination games pp. 584-604

Jiabin Wu

Authority measure for opinion dynamics pp. 605-621

Igal Milchtaich, Ron Peretz and Yevgeny Tsodikovich

The effort-maximizing move order in tullock contests pp. 622-629

Lei Gao, Jingfeng Lu and Zhewei Wang

Strategic formation of production networks pp. 630-656

Antoine Mandel, Van-Quy Nguyen and Bach Dong-Xuan

A model of participatory persuasion pp. 657-683

Liuchun Deng and Yufeng Sun

Delay in social learning pp. 684-690

Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn

Caps on bids in all-pay contests with identity-dependent externalities pp. 691-716

Dan Kovenock, Jian Song and Francesco Trevisan

Transparency and information acquisition in college admissions pp. 717-736

Youngwoo Koh and Wooyoung Lim

Eliciting and distinguishing between weak and incomplete preferences: Theory, experiment and computation pp. 737-762

Georgios Gerasimou

Information manipulation of wishful thinkers pp. 763-786

Emel Filiz-Ozbay and Zhenxun Liu

Cheap talk and lie detection pp. 787-814

Hitoshi Sadakane and Yin Chi Tam

Competition in persuasion in the attention economy pp. 815-826

Federico Innocenti

Volume 157, issue C, 2026

Algorithmic collusion and a folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality pp. 1-21

Álvaro Cartea, Patrick Chang, José Penalva and Harrison Waldon

Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences pp. 22-33

Hande Erkut and Dorothea Kübler

Outcome destabilization pp. 34-49

Francesc Dilmé

Conventions in large games with randomly drawn payoffs pp. 50-70

Jonathan Newton and Ryoji Sawa

Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching pp. 71-87

Hyukjun Kwon and Ran I. Shorrer

Duality in financial networks pp. 88-108

Martijn W. Ketelaars, Peter Borm and P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Timing and skewness of information revelation: Evidence on information structures and compound lotteries pp. 109-124

Enrico Diecidue, Thomas Langer, Sven Nolte, Sebastian Riedmiller and Judith C. Schneider

Strategyproof mechanism for two heterogeneous facilities with constant approximation ratio pp. 125-137

Minming Li, Pinyan Lu, Xingchen Sha, Yuhao Yao and Jialin Zhang

Algorithms and complexity for computing Nash equilibria in adversarial team games pp. 138-152

Ioannis Anagnostides, Fivos Kalogiannis, Ioannis Panageas, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis and Stephen Mcaleer

Strategy vs. direct-response method: evidence from a large online experiment on simple social dilemmas pp. 153-185

Marcus Roel and Zhuoqiong Chen

Present-bias and the value of sophistication: Splurging vs. smoothing pp. 186-225

Subas Acharya, David Jimenez-Gomez, Dmitrii Rachinskii and Alejandro Rivera

A generalization of von Neumann’s reduction from the assignment problem to zero-sum games pp. 226-236

Ilan Adler, Martin Bullinger and Vijay V. Vazirani

Privately designed correlated equilibrium pp. 237-252

Guilherme Carmona and Krittanai Laohakunakorn

Success functions in large contests pp. 253-262

Yaron Azrieli and Christopher P. Chambers

Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice pp. 263-285

Stergios Athanasoglou and Somouaoga Bonkoungou

Equilibrium cycle: A “Dynamic” equilibrium pp. 286-297

Tushar Shankar Walunj, Shiksha Singhal, Veeraruna Kavitha and Jayakrishnan Nair

Auction design with ambiguity: Optimality of the first-price auction pp. 298-321

Sung-Ha Hwang, Youngwoo Koh and Sosung Baik

Adapting stable matchings to evolving preferences pp. 322-350

Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Dušan Knop, Junjie Luo and Rolf Niedermeier

Transaction fee mechanisms robust to welfare-increasing collusion pp. 351-375

Yotam Gafni and Aviv Yaish

Introduction to 25+ years of quantal response equilibrium pp. 376-378

Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey

Rent dissipation and streamlined costs: Laboratory experiments pp. 379-394

Charles Holt and Angela M. Smith

An experimental study of prisoners' dilemma and stag hunt games played by teams of players pp. 395-417

Jeongbin Kim and Thomas R. Palfrey

High-stakes failures of backward induction pp. 418-439

Bouke Klein Teeselink, Dennie van Dolder, Martijn J. van den Assem and Jason D. Dana

Endogenous barriers to learning pp. 440-463

Olivier Compte

Pork barrel politics, voter turnout, and inequality: An experimental study pp. 464-479

Jens Großer and Thorsten Giertz

Electoral accountability in the lab pp. 480-495

Cesar Martinelli and Naila C. Sebastián Esandi

Quantal response equilibrium and rationalizability: Inside the black box pp. 496-515

Shuige Liu and Fabio Maccheroni

The refinement of Nash equilibrium based on equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior pp. 516-534

Rodrigo A. Velez and Alexander L. Brown

On the smooth unfolding of bifurcations in quantal-response equilibria pp. 535-570

Adam Harris, Scott McCallum and Michael S. Harré

Quantal response equilibrium with a continuum of types: Characterization and nonparametric identification pp. 571-591

Evan Friedman and Duarte Gonçalves

Quantal response equilibrium as a structural model for estimation: The missing manual pp. 592-618

James R. Bland and Theodore L. Turocy

Bayesian inference for Quantal Response Equilibrium in normal-form games pp. 619-636

James R. Bland

Non-parametric identification and testing of quantal response equilibrium pp. 637-659

Johannes Hoelzemann, Ryan Webb and Erhao Xie