Equilibrium and social norms

Robert M. Anderson and Haosui Duanmu

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 154, issue C, 119-128

Abstract: Richter and Rubinstein (2020) developed a novel model for social norms, which play an essential role in governing individual behavior in many economic situations. We present a generalization of the Richter-Rubinstein model allowing for an infinite agent space, individualized sets of alternatives, externalities, and intransitive preferences. In addition, we study social welfare properties of feasible Pareto efficient profiles and illustrate the applicability of our results in examples including a centrally planned economy, the classical Walrasian exchange economy, and the formation of social norms.

Keywords: Social norms; General equilibrium; Externalities; Intransitive preferences; Infinite set of agents; Envy-freeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:154:y:2025:i:c:p:119-128

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.014

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