Propaganda and conflict

Petros Sekeris

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 153, issue C, 569-585

Abstract: In this article we explore how propaganda relates to conflict initiation. In the presence of propaganda, if conflict is highly destructive, parties invest in armaments to improve their share of the pie at the negotiation table. If conflict is lowly destructive, peace is never reached and arming is implemented to boost the troops' morale and fighting efficiency. For intermediate destruction levels, the game only admits mixed strategy equilibria where peace and conflict occur probabilistically. A world without propaganda Pareto-dominates one where information can be manipulated. Although lowly destructive conflicts are conducive to war, arming can pacify the situation by giving rise to mixed strategy equilibria where peace is played with strictly positive probability. Countries are shown to have incentives to invest in propaganda despite the fact that war will then occur with strictly positive probability.

Keywords: Conflict; Peace dividend; Propaganda (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 D84 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:153:y:2025:i:c:p:569-585

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.006

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