Who gets the credit? Credit attribution, spillovers, and inefficiency in teams

Saltuk Ozerturk and Huseyin Yildirim

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 154, issue C, 246-266

Abstract: We examine team incentives in environments with positive spillovers and rewards based on ex-post public credit for collective success. Compared to the ex-ante efficient credit allocation that maximizes the team's overall payoff, ex-post credit distorts individual incentives: higher-ability or lower-cost agents receive excessive credit and overexert effort when spillovers are low, but are under-credited and insufficiently motivated when spillovers are high. To address these inefficiencies, organizations may optimally limit spillovers by restricting peer communication or reducing transparency in teamwork. Moreover, concerns about credit-sharing can deter agents from inviting collaborators or selecting the most capable partners when leading projects.

Keywords: Teamwork; Spillovers; Credit attribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D86 H41 L23 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:154:y:2025:i:c:p:246-266

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.005

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