Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Volume 23, issue 2, 1998

Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners pp. 119-145

Kalyan Chatterjee and Bhaskar Dutta

Coordination, "Magic," and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Game pp. 146-175

Ido Erev and Amnon Rapoport

Games with Partially Enforceable Agreements pp. 176-200

James Friedman and Claudio Mezzetti

On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-Value Auctions pp. 201-221

Maria-Angeles de Frutos and Robert Rosenthal

Delegation and the Regulation of Risk pp. 222-246

Susanne Lohmann and Hugo Hopenhayn

More Is Better, But Fair Is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games pp. 247-265

Bradley Ruffle

Delegation and Threat in Bargaining pp. 266-283

Bjorn Segendorff

Strategy-Specific Barriers to Learning and Nonmonotonic Selection Dynamics pp. 284-304

Rajiv Sethi

Volume 23, issue 1, 1998

Tight and Effectively Rectangular Game Forms: A Nash Solvable Class pp. 1-11

Joseph Abdou

A Characterization of the Nucleolus for Convex Games pp. 12-24

Javier Arin and Elena Inarra

Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auctions with Variable Awards pp. 25-42

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Charles Kahn

Creative Bargaining pp. 43-53

David Frankel

Imperfectly Observable Commitments inn-Player Games pp. 54-74

Werner Guth, Georg Kirchsteiger and Klaus Ritzberger

The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency pp. 75-96

David G. Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

On the Centipede Game pp. 97-105

Robert Aumann

REVIEWS AND COMMENTS pp. 106-115

James Friedman

Volume 22, issue 2, 1998

Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games pp. 171-202

Andreas Blume

Bargaining and Search with Incomplete Information about Outside Options pp. 203-237

Kalyan Chatterjee and Ching Chyi Lee

On the Rate of Convergence of Continuous-Time Fictitious Play pp. 238-259

Christopher Harris

Knowledge Spaces with Arbitrarily High Rank pp. 260-273

Aviad Heifetz and Dov Samet

Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria pp. 274-298

Philippe Jehiel

The Network of Weighted Majority Rules and Weighted Majority Games pp. 299-315

Drora Karotkin

A Pie Allocation Among Sharing Groups pp. 316-330

Anat Lerner

Perfect and Proper Equilibria of Large Games pp. 331-342

Kali Rath

The Three-Legged Race: Cooperating to Compete pp. 343-363

Roberto Serrano and Inigo Zapater

Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem pp. 364-376

Jorgen Wit

Extending Nash's Axioms to Nonconvex Problems pp. 377-383

Marco Mariotti

Volume 22, issue 1, 1998

Price Formation in Double Auctions pp. 1-29

Steven Gjerstad and John Dickhaut

Bandwagon Effects and Long Run Technology Choice pp. 30-60

Michihiro Kandori and Rafael Rob

Equitable Nonlinear Price Regulation: An Alternative Approach to Serial Cost Sharing pp. 61-83

Van Kolpin

Evolution, Population Growth, and History Dependence pp. 84-120

William Sandholm and Ady Pauzner

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis pp. 121-147

Alvaro Sandroni

Tie-Breaking in Games of Perfect Information pp. 148-161

Torben Tranaes

"Nice" Trivial Equilibria in Strategic Market Games pp. 162-169

Tito Cordella and Jean Gabszewicz

Volume 21, issue 1-2, 1997

EDITOR'S NOTE pp. 1-1

Ehud Kalai

Rationality and Bounded Rationality pp. 2-14

Robert Aumann

Optimal Contracting of Separable Production Technologies pp. 15-39

Peter S. Faynzilberg and Praveen Kumar

Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium pp. 40-55

Dean Foster and Rakesh V. Vohra

Selection in Dynamic Entry Games pp. 62-84

Denis Gromb, Jean-Pierre Ponssard and David Sevy

Strong Equilibrium in Congestion Games pp. 85-101

Ron Holzman and Nissan Law-Yone

Social Learning in Recurring Games pp. 102-134

Matthew Jackson and Ehud Kalai

Extending Invariant Solutions pp. 135-147

Dries Vermeulen and Mathijs Jansen

On the Maximal Number of Nash Equilibria in ann x nBimatrix Game pp. 148-160

Hans Keiding

Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities pp. 161-182

Hideo Konishi, Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber

Dual Reduction and Elementary Games pp. 183-202

Roger Myerson

An Evolutionary Interpretation of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria pp. 203-237

Jörg Oechssler

Characterization of Consistent Assessments in Extensive Form Games pp. 238-252

Andrés Perea, Mathijs Jansen and Hans Peters

Evolutionary Stability of Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Finite Games pp. 253-265

E. Somanathan

On Nash's Hidden Assumption pp. 266-281

Federico Valenciano and José Zarzuelo

Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment pp. 282-308

Eric van Damme and Sjaak Hurkens

Team-Maxmin Equilibria pp. 309-321

Bernhard von Stengel and Daphne Koller

REVIEWS AND COMMENTS pp. 322-324

Robert Wilson