Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 117, issue C, 2019

Stability and fairness in the job scheduling problem pp. 1-14

Eric Bahel and Christian Trudeau

Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games pp. 15-39

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Martin Dufwenberg and Alec Smith

Stable sharing rules and participation in pools of essential patents pp. 40-58

Antonio Tesoriere

Self-selection in school choice pp. 59-81

Li Chen and Juan Sebastián Pereyra

Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies pp. 82-97

Axel Bernergård and Erik Mohlin

Pre-trade private investments pp. 98-119

Francesc Dilme

Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility pp. 120-143

Onur Kesten and Morimitsu Kurino

The limited value of a second opinion: Competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games pp. 144-162

William Minozzi and Jonathan Woon

Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games pp. 163-194

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan and Ehud Lehrer

Combinatorial clock auctions: Price direction and performance pp. 195-217

David Munro and Stephen Rassenti

Interdependent value auctions with insider information: Theory and experiment pp. 218-237

Syngjoo Choi, Jose-Alberto Guerra and Jinwoo Kim

Zero-sum games with ambiguity pp. 238-249

Dinah Rosenberg and Nicolas Vieille

Motivated memory in dictator games pp. 250-275

Charlotte Saucet and Marie Claire Villeval

Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion pp. 276-288

Shota Ichihashi

An experimental study on sequential auctions with privately known capacities pp. 289-315

Luca Corazzini, Stefano Galavotti and Paola Valbonesi

An axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept pp. 316-321

Mark Voorneveld

Proper scoring rules with general preferences: A dual characterization of optimal reports pp. 322-341

Christopher Chambers, Paul J. Healy and Nicolas Lambert

Understanding outcome bias pp. 342-360

Andy Brownback and Michael Kuhn

Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator pp. 361-379

Shunsuke Hanato

Hedging, ambiguity, and the reversal of order axiom pp. 380-387

Jörg Oechssler, Hannes Rau and Alex Roomets

Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences pp. 388-401

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Johannes Buckenmaier

The dynamics of majoritarian Blotto games pp. 402-419

Tilman Klumpp, Kai Konrad and Adam Solomon

Teams promise but do not deliver pp. 420-432

Kirby Nielsen, Puja Bhattacharya, John Kagel and Arjun Sengupta

Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis pp. 433-450

Nicola Maaser, Fabian Paetzel and Stefan Traub

Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion pp. 451-460

Nicolas Gravel and Michel Poitevin

Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points – an experimental investigation pp. 461-478

Stefania Sitzia and Jiwei Zheng

The truth behind the myth of the Folk theorem pp. 479-498

Joseph Halpern, Rafael Pass and Lior Seeman

Volume 116, issue C, 2019

On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules pp. 1-37

Michael Trost

A strategic product for belief functions pp. 38-64

Ronald Stauber

Bayesian implementation with verifiable information pp. 65-72

Esteban Peralta

Decisions under uncertainty in social contexts pp. 73-95

Stephan Müller and Holger A. Rau

Exploration and correlation pp. 96-104

Evan Piermont and Roee Teper

Claim games for estate division problems pp. 105-115

Hans Peters, Marc Schröder and Dries Vermeulen

Scale effects in multi-unit auctions pp. 116-121

Rebecca Elskamp and Rene Kirkegaard

Strategic voting when participation is costly pp. 122-127

Dimitrios Xefteris

Competition for talent when firms' mission matters pp. 128-151

Francesca Barigozzi and Nadia Burani

An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection pp. 152-157

Eduardo Azevedo and Daniel Gottlieb

Rhetoric matters: A social norms explanation for the anomaly of framing pp. 158-178

Daphne Chang, Roy Chen and Erin Krupka

Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run pp. 179-184

Heinrich H. Nax and Jonathan Newton

Comprehensive rationalizability pp. 185-202

Aviad Heifetz, Martin Meier and Burkhard Schipper

On the identification of changing tastes pp. 203-216

Maximilian Mihm and Kemal Ozbek

The development of consistent decision-making across economic domains pp. 217-240

Isabelle Brocas, Juan D. Carrillo, T. Dalton Combs and Niree Kodaverdian

Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice pp. 241-259

Lydia Mechtenberg and Jean-Robert Tyran

Liability games pp. 260-268

Péter Csóka and P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Majoritarian preference, utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly pp. 269-288

Jaideep Roy, Randy Silvers and Ching-jen Sun

Volume 115, issue C, 2019

Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games pp. 1-29

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Emiliano Catonini, G. Lanzani and Massimo Marinacci

Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents pp. 30-47

Michael Richter

Bayesian versus heuristic-based choice under sleep restriction and suboptimal times of day pp. 48-59

David Dickinson and Todd McElroy

Nonparametric utility theory in strategic settings: Revealing preferences and beliefs from proposal–response games pp. 60-82

Marco E. Castillo, Philip J. Cross and Mikhail Freer

Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study pp. 83-100

Yan Chen and Onur Kesten

Bid caps in large contests pp. 101-112

Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel

In and out of equilibrium II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs pp. 113-130

Matthijs van Veelen and Julián García

Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory pp. 131-145

Gilad Bavly and Ron Peretz

Vanguards in revolution pp. 146-166

Mehdi Shadmehr and Dan Bernhardt

Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules pp. 167-187

Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad and Assaf Romm

Loss aversion and competition in Vickrey auctions: Money ain't no good pp. 188-208

Antonio Rosato and Agnieszka Tymula

Fair share and social efficiency: A mechanism in which peers decide on the payoff division pp. 209-224

Lu Dong, Rodney Falvey and Shravan Luckraz

Dual sourcing with price discovery pp. 225-246

Jose Alcalde and Matthias Dahm

Price dispersion in stationary networked markets pp. 247-264

Eduard Talamàs

On the unprofitability of buyer groups when sellers compete pp. 265-288

Doh-Shin Jeon and Domenico Menicucci

Matching with waiting times: The German entry-level labor market for lawyers pp. 289-313

Philipp D. Dimakopoulos and C.-Philipp Heller

A theory of esteem based peer pressure pp. 314-335

Fabrizio Adriani and Silvia Sonderegger

The duality gap for two-team zero-sum games pp. 336-345

Leonard J. Schulman and Umesh V. Vazirani

Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter? On the demotivational effect of losing in repeated competitions pp. 346-362

Simon Haenni

Playing games with bounded entropy pp. 363-380

Mehrdad Valizadeh and Amin Gohari

Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude pp. 381-395

Siyu Wang and Daniel Houser

Non-cooperative games with prospect theory players and dominated strategies pp. 396-409

Lars Peter Metzger and Marc Oliver Rieger

A belief-based theory of homophily pp. 410-435

Willemien Kets and Alvaro Sandroni

On endogenous formation of price expectations pp. 436-458

Cuong Le Van, Paulina Navrouzoglou and Yiannis Vailakis

Measuring time and risk preferences in an integrated framework pp. 459-469

Mohammed Abdellaoui, Emmanuel Kemel, Amma Panin and Ferdinand Vieider

On Hurwicz–Nash equilibria of non-Bayesian games under incomplete information pp. 470-490

Patrick Beißner and M. Khan