Solidarity and efficiency in preference aggregation: A tale of two rules

Stergios Athanasoglou

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 118, issue C, 126-140

Abstract: This paper is concerned with preference-aggregation rules satisfying desirable efficiency and solidarity requirements. We formulate weaker versions of existing solidarity axioms and show how they imply, in conjunction with strategy-proofness, the existence of reference outcomes holding privileged status. We propose a new class of rules, fixed-order status-quo rules, that can be productively contrasted to their closest counterparts in the literature, status-quo rules based on the least upper bound of a lattice. Fixed-order status-quo rules satisfy stronger efficiency requirements than lattice status-quo rules but have weaker, though still significant, solidarity properties. A subfamily based on lexicographic orders is analyzed further. Fixed-order status-quo rules are characterized by strategy-proofness, strong efficiency, and a third axiom, unanimity-basedness.

Keywords: Social choice; Preference aggregation; Solidarity; Efficiency; Strategy-proofness; Status quo rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:126-140

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.013

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