Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders

Pak Hung Au and Keiichi Kawai

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 119, issue C, 56-78

Abstract: We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders.

Keywords: Information transmission; Bayesian persuasion; Multiple senders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:119:y:2020:i:c:p:56-78

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.002

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