Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments

Yutaka Kayaba, Hitoshi Matsushima and Tomohisa Toyama

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 120, issue C, 193-208

Abstract: We experimentally examine repeated prisoner's dilemma with random termination, in which monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates that a significant proportion of the subjects follows generous tit-for-tat strategies, which are stochastic extensions of tit-for-tat. However, the observed retaliating policies are inconsistent with the generous tit-for-tat equilibrium behavior. Showing inconsistent behavior, subjects with low accuracy do not tend to retaliate more than those with high accuracy. Furthermore, subjects with low accuracy tend to retaliate considerably with lesser strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, while subjects with high accuracy tend to retaliate with more strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, or with strength almost equivalent to it.

Keywords: Repeated prisoner's dilemma; Imperfect private monitoring; Experiments; Generous tit-for-tat; Retaliation intensity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C72 C73 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:193-208

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.003

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