Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments

Kayaba Yutaka, Hitoshi Matsushima and Tomohisa Toyama
Additional contact information
Kayaba Yutaka: Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo
Tomohisa Toyama: College of Liberal Arts, International Christian University

No CIRJE-F-1125, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: We experimentally examine repeated prisoner's dilemma with random termination, in which monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates that a significant proportion of the subjects follow generous tit-for-tat strategies, which are stochastic extensions of tit-for-tat. However, the observed retaliating policies are inconsistent with the generous tit-for-tat equilibrium behavior. Showing inconsistent behavior, subjects with low accuracy do not tend to retaliate more than those with high accuracy. Furthermore, subjects with low accuracy tend to retaliate considerably with lesser strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, while subjects with high accuracy tend to retaliate with more strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, or with strength almost equivalent to it.

Pages: 69 pages
Date: 2019-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments (2020)
Working Paper: Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (2018)
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